Models and Modelling between Digital and Humanities: A Multidisciplinary Perspective by Ciula, Arianna et al.
www.ssoar.info
Models and Modelling between Digital and
Humanities: A Multidisciplinary Perspective
Ciula, Arianna (Ed.); Eide, Øyvind (Ed.); Marras, Cristina (Ed.); Sahle, Patrick
(Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Themenheft / topical issue
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ciula, A., Eide, Ø., Marras, C., & Sahle, P. (Eds.). (2018). Models and Modelling between Digital and Humanities: A
Multidisciplinary Perspective. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62883-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Historical Social Research
Historische Sozialforschung
The Official Journal 
of QUANTUM and 
INTERQUANT
Der Schellenmacher
HSR 
Supplement 
31 (2018) 
 
Models and Modelling 
between Digital & Humanities – 
A Multidisciplinary Perspective
H
SR
 S
up
pl
em
en
t 
N
o.
 3
1 
(2
01
8)
   
   
M
od
el
s 
an
d 
M
od
el
lin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Di
gi
ta
l &
 H
um
an
iti
es
Arianna Ciula, Øyvind Eide, Cristina Marras & Patrick Sahle 
(Eds.): Models and Modelling between Digital and Humanities – 
A Multidisciplinary Perspective.
This Supplement of Historical Social Research stems from the 
contributions on the topic of modelling presented at the workshop 
“Thinking in Practice”, held at Wahn Manor House in Cologne on 
January 19-20, 2017. With Digital Humanities as starting point, 
practical examples of model building from different disciplines are 
considered, with the aim of contributing to the dialogue on modelling 
from several perspectives. Combined with theoretical considerations, 
this collection illustrates how the process of modelling is one of 
coming to know, in which the purpose of each modelling activity 
and the form in which models are expressed has to be taken into 
consideration in tandem. 
The modelling processes presented in this volume belong to 
specific traditions of scholarly and practical thinking as well as 
to specific contexts of production and use of models. The claim 
that supported the project workshop was indeed that establishing 
connections between different traditions of and approaches toward 
modelling is vital, whether these connections are complementary or 
intersectional. The workshop proceedings address an underpinning 
goal of the research project itself, namely that of examining the 
nature of the epistemological questions in the different traditions 
and how they relate to the nature of the modelled objects and the 
models being created. This collection is an attempt to move beyond 
simple representational views on modelling in order to understand 
modelling processes as scholarly and cultural phenomena as such.
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Modelling: Thinking in Practice.  
An Introduction 
Arianna Ciula, Øyvind Eide, Cristina Marras & Patrick Sahle ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellieren: Denken in Anwendung. Eine Einführung«. In this intro-
duction of the HSR Supplement “Models and Modelling between Digital and 
Humanities - A Multidisciplinary Perspective” we refrain from providing a nor-
mative definition of ‘model’ and ‘modelling’ and rather attempt at encircling 
the current state of the art. In the first instance this chapter provides a very 
brief overview on modelling as intended as a research strategy applied to scien-
tific fields in the 20th-21st centuries. This overview is followed by a short in-
troduction to modelling in digital humanities, focusing on how modelling has 
developed into a practical strategy and how it has been theorised. The third 
part of the introduction presents the scope of the project ”Modelling between 
digital and humanities: Thinking in practice”. The aim of a project workshop 
held in 2017, of which this volume collects the proceedings, was to present a 
multitude of modelling practices from various disciplines together with differ-
ent theoretical frameworks. The fourth part of this introduction offers an over-
view of each of the papers in this volume. Finally, a fifth section constitutes the 
first item of the proceedings as it reproduces an adaptation of the dialogue 
which was performed to introduce the main topics of the workshop and the 
scope of the project at the event itself. It serves to illustrate the way we organ-
ised the workshop and how the exchanges amongst participants were facilitat-
ed. 
Keywords: Modelling, Digital Humanities, Multidisciplinarity, Visualization. 
                                                             
∗  Arianna Ciula, King’s Digital Lab, King’s College London, Virginia Woolf, 22 Kingsway,  
London WC2B 6LE, United Kingdom; arianna.ciula@kcl.ac.uk. 
Øyvind Eide, Institut für Digital Humanities, Universität zu Köln, Albertus Magnus Platz, 
50923 Köln, Germany; oeide@uni-koeln.de. 
Cristina Marras, Istituto Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee, Consiglio Nazionale 
delle Ricerche, via Carlo Fea 2, 00161 Roma, Italy; cristina.marras@cnr.it. 
  Patrick Sahle, Cologne Center for eHumanities, University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus 
Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany; sahle@uni-koeln.de. 
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1.   Modelling in the Sciences 
Models and modelling as explicit explanatory, exploratory and empirical strat-
egies of inquiry have been increasingly recognised and adopted in science and 
scholarship over the last decades. Popular examples of influential models in the 
natural sciences include the Bohr model of the atom, the double helix model of 
the DNA, and the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey interaction, whereas 
in the social sciences rational actor based models of economic transactions and 
actor-network models have been of key importance. Economic and climate 
models have also gained significant societal relevance and are at the core of 
political discussions. Society macro-planning and policy making are partly 
based on complex economic models, and climate models are increasingly used 
to justify resource planning at all scales, from municipalities to continents. 
Thus, scientific models are not only important in their respective research do-
mains but are also adapted and adopted extensively in public policy planning 
and are prominent elements of the public discourse.  
In contrast to its ubiquity, the concept of model is hard to define. Quite dif-
ferent things are called models: from physical and fictional objects through set-
theoretic structures to mathematical equations, as well as combinations of some 
or all of these. Models are understood to be not just static representations but 
rather tools for interactive inquiry. Models and the process of modelling feature 
a number of often mixed ingredients, including different forms of expressions 
such as mathematical formalism and visual diagrams, as well as a variety of 
conceptual devices such as theoretical ideas, policy views, and metaphors. 
Models as computational construals can also embody quite different forms. To 
complicate matters, processes of translation between multiple expressions and 
conceptual worlds, such as abstraction and idealisation, make modelling a 
slippery practice to pin down conceptually. Typically, modelling is not linear. 
It is rather a complex iterative process of integration and exploration with re-
peated loops of testing, feedback and adjustment. 
The relationship between models and their “targets”, that is the objects or 
systems being modelled, is complex and hard to define, as is the nature of the 
target object or system itself (Gelfert 2016, 93). The scientific understanding of 
this relationship varies across research traditions and has developed significant-
ly over time. In the 20th century, models have been described as as representa-
tions of their targets and the specific nature of the representations did not at-
tract much attention until the latter part of the century. This has changed over 
the last decades, but the categories used to describe models, such as idealised 
models or phenomenological models, are still somewhat vague and the borders 
between them not clear. Furthermore, in philosophy of science, a pragmatic 
view on modelling has emerged over the last decade, in which the relation 
between a model and its target, traditionally expressed as representation in the 
form of formal, structuralist or syntactic morphism (such as isomorphism), is 
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being replaced by emphasizing a pragmatic relationship, often simply described 
as a situation where somebody creates a model of something with some pur-
pose (Gelfert 2016, 113). 
Traditionally, prediction and reproduction of results, as well as explanation 
of observations, have been the main phases of the scientific method in which 
models in the sciences have been created and evaluated. More recently the 
creation and use of models to explore rather than measure, predict, or explain 
have also gained recognition in the philosophy of science.1 All these functions 
are associated with what is considered the purpose of models, which is to sup-
port analysis and discovery as well as to enhance learning and understanding. 
Models are indeed considered to be better suited to learn something new about 
the target systems or objects for several reasons. Their creation and manipula-
tion support surrogative reasoning, where aspects of the system under study are 
sharpened up in the model and hence made more “observable” than by studying 
the target systems or objects directly. The novel concept of model-based rea-
soning captures exactly this.  
Learning from models can take place at two different stages, in the creation 
of the model and in its application and successive manipulation; that is, through 
changing it and observing the effects and reactions. Further, it can take place 
through physical experiments, thought experiments, and simulations. Of key 
importance is the fact that models often serve an exploratory function in re-
search: as a starting point to test an hypothesis, as proof of concept, to generate 
potential explanations to a theory, and to assess what the target system is and 
how its salient features can be observed in separation from background noise 
(in cases where a firm theoretical understanding is not yet established, cf. Gel-
fert (2016, 93). Explanatory, experimental and explorative functions are dis-
tinct and central to model based scientific exploration, but they are neither 
mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. 
The philosophy of science literature has been the venue of extensive debates 
on how models relate to theories.2 This discussion is entangled with the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between model and theory. From the logical positivist 
tradition philosophers of science have inherited the syntactic view, where mod-
els are understood in a mathematical sense as tools with which to perform 
calculus. In this view, where theories are seen as a set of propositions ex-
pressed in first order logic, models are seen as having limited importance for 
science. The semantic view goes in the opposite direction, claiming that theo-
ries should be seen as families of models. Here, formal calculus is removed 
from the core role it plays in the syntactic view. Beyond these views there is 
the position that models are independent both from theories and from the target 
systems or objects, being rather “autonomous agents”. For example, according 
                                                             
1  See e.g. Gelfert (2018, 245). 
2  See e.g. an overview in Frigg and Hartmann (2018). 
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to Morrison and Morgan (1999) models are autonomous in that they are not 
placed between a theory and the physical world but rather outside the theory-
world-axis, enabling models to mediate effectively between the two. 
2. Modelling in the Digital Humanities 
The use of models and modelling also has a long tradition in the humanities. 
Indeed, going back to early modern European research the use of models in 
what could be called, pragmatically, “the humanities” included modelling in 
natural philosophy, which later developed into the natural sciences. The long 
history of modelling is complex due to the only partial overlap between the 
concepts of model and modelling then and what we consider as modelling 
practices today.  
Nevertheless it is fair to say that the explicit use of the word “modelling” in 
humanities research has increased significantly with the introduction of Digital 
Humanities (hereafter DH), where modelling is considered one of the core 
research practices (McCarty 2005, 20-72; Buzzetti 2002; Beynon et al. 2006). 
The high reliance on modelling in this discipline is due to the fact that explicit 
models are extensively required in DH in order to operationalise research ques-
tions. This operationalisation process includes representation of objects of 
study in the form of data to process, in order to make objects and observations 
computable, as well as to analyse, transform and visualise data. The practice of 
modelling in DH is theorised mainly around understandings of modelling in the 
techno-sciences and computer science in particular (Flanders and Jannidis 
2015), although some reference works in the field also take into account other 
research traditions from the humanities, social sciences and informatics 
(McCarty 2005, 2009; Mahr 2009). A key aspect of modelling in DH is the 
focus on interactive use of computers and on studying the modelling process 
with the aim of learning from it. The highly self-reflective arm of DH research, 
that some call a meta discipline to the humanities, engaged in assessing the 
epistemological impact of information technology and software engineering in 
research, calls for a shift from models as static objects (e.g. what functionalities 
they enable) to the dynamic process of modelling (e.g. how were models built 
and used and for what purpose, what constraints they embed, what effect they 
have in refining research questions).  
Models as they are used in science and scholarship are representations – in 
the form of manipulable construals – of something which are created for the 
purpose of studying that something or what is modelled (what above was re-
ferred to as “target” following the tradition in philosophy of science). However, 
the relationship between model and modelled object is more complex than 
static representational understandings have allowed for. Only recently model-
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making has been theorised within a semiotic framework (Knuuttila 2010; 
Kralemann and Lattmann 2013; Marras and Ciula 2014). 
In DH as in other scientific settings, modelling can be considered a creative 
process of reasoning in which meaning is made and negotiated through the 
creation and manipulation of external representations. The specific ambition of 
research in DH, however, is to make scholarly arguments operational via the 
creation and manipulation of digital models. Making external representations to 
reason with has been part of the scholarly Western tradition at least since the 
Enlightenment; DH extends this practice by actively creating and processing 
digital artefacts in different media.  
In the DH context models are always created with the objective of been op-
erationalised. This means that they are created in a way so as to lend them-
selves to be used and manipulated in a computational setting. However, the 
form models take can vary extensively, from a formal schema, to the logics 
informing the running of code (programs or apps) as well as to digital objects 
such as maps or 3D models. Such frameworks can be local to one institution, 
one project, or even to one single researcher, but can also be generalisable and 
scalable, as we see in the development of common formalisms or standards 
such as the recommendations of the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) guidelines 
to encode textual sources. Modelling in DH is also akin to similar processes 
adopted in the area of cultural heritage documentation. The latter has tradition-
ally focused on database development and associated documentation standards; 
dating back to the 1990s there has also been a development of formal ontolo-
gies, exemplified by CIDOC-CRM.3 
What modelling in the (digital) humanities and (digital) cultural heritage 
have in common is partly the source or objects for the models (in general cul-
tural artefacts of some kind) and partly the aim of the whole modelling enter-
prise. While in, e.g., physics the target of modelling activities are aspects of the 
physical world and the goal is the establishment of general laws, in the humani-
ties and cultural heritage modelling targets tend to be human creations and the 
goal of the modelling is often to describe idiosyncratic phenomena or artefacts 
of human creation, acknowledging and valuing subjectivity as part of the mod-
elling process. Often the objective is to express principles grounded to specific 
contexts rather than general laws. 
3. Our Research Project on Modelling 
Scholarly modelling as a formal and informal reasoning strategy across disci-
plinary boundaries was the core of the collaborative Project “Modelling be-
                                                             
3  See Ciula and Eide (2014). 
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tween digital and humanities: Thinking in practice”4, funded by the 
Volkswagen Foundation under the programme “Original, isn’t it? New Options 
for the Humanities and Cultural Studies,” Funding Line 2 “Constellations” 
(2016-2017), from April 2016 to July 2018. The workshop, the proceedings of 
which are collected in this HSR Supplement, was one of the milestones of the 
project. 
This collaborative project connected the research threads of the four Princi-
pal Investigators (PIs) and editors of this volume – Arianna Ciula (Department 
of Humanities, University of Roehampton, UK, until January 2017; King’s 
Digital Lab, King’s College London, UK, from February 2017 onwards), 
Øyvind Eide (University of Passau, DE, until March 2017; University of Co-
logne, DE, from October 2015 onwards), Cristina Marras (CNR-ILIESI, Rome, 
IT), and Patrick Sahle (University of Cologne, DE) – freeing them partially 
from other duties at their own institutions or allowing them to hire research 
assistants and associates5 to take part in the research and to coordinate common 
efforts, including the organisation of the workshop in Wahn.  
Through the lenses of critical humanities traditions and interdisciplinary 
takes on making and using models, the project built on the novelty of DH re-
search in making explicit and integrating existing diverse models of cultural 
phenomena such as texts and events. Its originality laid in using DH research to 
explore possibilities for a new interdisciplinary language of modelling span-
ning the humanities, cultural studies and the sciences; to analyse modelling in 
scholarship as a process of signification; and to develop connections between 
modelling as research and learning strategies. 
The following was used as working definition of modelling within the pro-
ject: modelling is the creative process by which researchers create and manipu-
late external representations (“imaginary concreta”, Godfrey-Smith 2009) to 
make sense of the conceptual objects and phenomena they study. To integrate 
the theories summarised in the section above with a practical dimension, the 
project made use of DH as an interdisciplinary departure to study modelling as 
anchored both to computer science and to the humanities. The project aimed to 
link scholarly modelling as a formal and informal reasoning strategy across 
disciplinary boundaries, spanning also social, life and techno-sciences, and 
bridging across modelling in research and in teaching. 
Building on complementary expertise in DH research, the PIs aimed at re-
flecting on modelling around the central concept of textuality. Textuality stands 
                                                             
4   <http://modellingdh.uni-koeln.de>. 
5  Research associates in the project were: Christopher Pak (King’s Digital Lab, King’s College 
London, UK, October 2017-April 2018), Zoe Schubert (University of Passau and University of 
Cologne, DE, November 2016-December 2017), and Michela Tardella (CNR-ILIESI, IT, July 
2016-July 2017). Research assistants in the project were: Nils Geißler (University of Cologne, 
DE, April 2016-July 2018), Elli Reuhl (University of Cologne, DE, November 2016-July 2018), 
and Julia Sorouri (University of Cologne, DE, January 2017-July 2018). 
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for the complexity of cultural objects studied in the humanities and the theories 
that underpin these studies; it is central to most humanities and cultural studies 
and a perfect example of the variety of subject specific approaches that can 
inform modelling activities. An interesting attempt to integrate models of tex-
tuality from several disciplines into a metamodel to chart and relate single 
models to each other is Sahle (2013). Sahle’s metamodel acts both as a model 
of the phenomenon of textuality and as a model for working with texts in the 
sense of representing, transforming, and analysing them. Therefore, this meta-
model can inform the development of text technologies, digitisation practices, 
and rules for transcription and annotation. 
The hypothesis underpinning the project was that in DH research, implicit 
and explicit models of cultural phenomena are integrated into external meta-
models, e.g. graphical representations, which often embed natural language. 
These metamodels are iteratively translated towards computable implementa-
tions via a variety of more or less formal models. The analysis of modelling 
practices of textuality aim at gaining new insights in the epistemology of mod-
elling in order to address questions such as: How are theory and practice blend-
ed in these modelling efforts? What role do formal and informal metamodels 
play in translating models of cultural phenomena into implementations? What 
shared terminology can help us gain an integrative and non-reductive under-
standing of digital modelling? Can we define the methods of digital modelling 
informed by such an integrative and non-reductive approach? 
The core activities of the project included the organisation of the interna-
tional workshop described below, the publication of its proceedings within the 
present issue, the delivery of a co-authored monograph, and a series of interdis-
ciplinary labs.6 The co-authored monograph, the writing of which is currently 
in progress, aims at integrating the results from these core research activities 
with the outcomes from the workshop to establish a common ground for further 
theoretical and practical research.  
The project aimed at reflecting on two main concepts: textuality and events. 
While textuality mediates the world we live in, events are central to epistemo-
logical perception and description of the processes shaping this world. Under 
this umbrella three interdisciplinary labs were organised in Rome, at the Italian 
National Research Council’s Digital Library, in 2016-2017: “I linguaggi della 
ricerca: parole e immagini” (The languages of research: words and images);7 
                                                             
6  In addition, in 2016-2017, a total of 14 online and face to face project meetings as well as 
mutual research visits brought together the PIs and other team members. These meetings 
were held to reflect on and connect several research strands and to plan the project activi-
ties and its main deliverables. 
7  Lab 1: Riti, Passaggi, Visioni, Linguaggi (Rites, Passages, Visions, Languages), 21 March 2016; 
Lab 2: Navigare la Ricerca (Navigating Research), 26 September 2016; Lab 3: Naufragi e 
Terre Nuove (Shipwrecks and New Lands), 22 May 2017. See <http://modellingdh.eu/ 
index.php/events/> for further details. 
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these events were part of Cristina Marras’ research line and teaching pro-
gramme. The aim of these labs was to investigate the heuristic and cognitive 
role that selected conceptual metaphorical models, belonging to the traditions 
of Western thought, assume in structuring knowledge. Groundwork from phi-
losophy, literary studies, history and linguistics was combined with cultural 
heritage documentation and media studies methodologies. While not directly 
engaged with digital modelling, the Rome labs paved the way for further re-
search for which funding will be sought. 
Figure 1: Snapshot Drawn on Preliminary Network Graph of Terminological 
Connections Developed in D3.js (see Pak 2018), Slightly Reworked by 
Nils Geißler 
 
 
As complementary research strands to the core activities of the project, each PI 
hired postdoctoral researchers and student assistants to conduct some of the 
project research or to support its activities, and to free the PIs’ time from other 
duties. 
In particular, the Italian partner (Marras and Tardella) engaged in termino-
logical and lexicographical research conducting a preliminary analysis of the 
terms “model” and “modelling” from a terminological and etymological per-
spective. The work was based on the assumption that the theoretical issues 
around modelling are deeply connected to the evolution of the relevant termi-
nology, and that by reflecting on the terms and their relations a complex termi-
nological network of underpinning concepts can be built. Based on the map-
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ping of selected dictionaries, encyclopedias and etymological vocabularies to 
support this analysis, preliminary results confirmed that the complexity pertain-
ing to theory and practices in modelling is embedded in the history of the terms 
“model” and “modelling”. This work complemented ongoing research carried 
out in London and Cologne and offered a basis for further analysis and visuali-
sations, undertaken by Pak (see Figure 1) and by Geißler.  
Figure 2 and 3: Preliminary view of interdisciplinary connections developed in 
D3.js (Pak and Ciula 2018) 
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The UK partner (Ciula and Pak) developed a preliminary workflow for corpus 
linguistics research to process and analyse academic articles from five disci-
plines, published from 1900 to 2017. The workflow describes the parameters 
and methods for constructing and analysing a corpus of journal articles ac-
cessed via the JSTOR Data for Research service using corpus linguistics meth-
odologies. Indicative findings show that model/ling is a networked term insofar 
as it co-occurs with semantically related terms defining structural relations 
between entities, such as “pattern” and “hierarchy.” These preliminary findings 
provide the context for more extensive analysis into disciplinary-based dis-
courses on the creation and use of models. Pak also developed visualisations to 
represent the results of this analysis.  
The Cologne partner (Sahle, Geißler and Sorouri) worked at a case study on 
text models and model visualisation, based on a selective interdisciplinary 
literature survey on models for texts which led to a chapter in the project’s 
monograph. Sorouri’s contribution consisted of the translation of abstract or 
verbal models into new forms of visual representations which have been used 
in these proceedings and the forthcoming book.  
The other German partner (Eide and Schubert) focused on the study of the 
connections across modelling, cultural heritage, and intermediality. Partly 
connected to cultural heritage (for instance, archaeological evidence) and partly 
connected to teaching, especially in the area of media modalities and virtual 
reality, Eide’s research informed and has been complemented by Schubert’s 
PhD on theatre in virtual reality.  
In addition to the core activities mentioned above, the PIs and other team 
members gave numerous presentations at relevant conferences and events8 to 
discuss the project premises and disseminate its findings. Either as a result of 
these conference contributions or other research connected to the project, sev-
eral publications have appeared or are forthcoming (Ciula and Marras 2016; 
Ciula and Eide 2017; Ciula 2017a and 2017b; Ciula and Marras 2018 and 
forthcoming). 
4. A Multidisciplinary View on Modelling: The Project 
Workshop 
This Supplement of HSR stems from the contributions on modelling presented 
at the workshop “Thinking in practice”, held at Wahn Manor House in Cologne 
on January 19-20, 2017. Practical examples of model building from different 
disciplines are presented and discussed, with the aim of contributing to the 
discussion of modelling in different disciplines, centered around DH as point of 
                                                             
8  For more details see <http://modellingdh.eu/index.php/events/external-events>. 
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departure. Combined with theoretical considerations, the collection illustrates 
how the process of modelling is one of coming to know, in which the purpose 
of each modelling activity and the form in which models are expressed has to 
be taken into consideration in tandem. The modelling processes presented in 
this volume belong to specific traditions of scholarly and practical thinking as 
well as to certain political contexts. The claim that supported the project work-
shop was indeed that establishing connections between different traditions of 
and approaches towards modelling is vital, being these connections comple-
mentary or intersectional. To underpin the project research aims was indeed 
crucial to examine the nature of epistemological questions addressed in the 
different traditions and how they relate to the nature of the modelled objects 
and the models being created. While this is only touched upon in this volume it 
will be further developed in the forthcoming monograph co-authored by the 
project principal investigators. 
This collection is an attempt to move beyond simple representational views 
on modelling in order to understand modelling processes as scholarly and cul-
tural phenomena in themselves. 
As the objects being modelled take active part in the relational process of 
several modelling efforts, their identities and properties are affected by the 
specificity of each modelling process, modified by the context of production 
and use of modelling processes. The insights that models provide about a spe-
cific phenomena can be of different nature; the goal of this issue is to show in 
practice how different modelling approaches operate in relation both to their 
contexts of production and use and in relation to each other. 
Already at project proposal stage, comparisons and exchange across disci-
plines, within and beyond the humanities and cultural studies, were deemed 
crucial to establish an integrative concept of modelling within the project and 
inform an understanding of what draw us towards (digital) modelling, of how 
and what can we learn by modelling, and of how modelling changes our per-
ceptions and conceptualisations. 
Indeed, while rooted in the disciplinary context of DH, some of the project 
research activities examined the role of modelling and models in designing 
ways of knowing (epistemologies) and being (ontologies) in other selected 
disciplines. In particular, the workshop on which these proceedings are based 
was conceived as a means to reach out and benefit from a wide range of disci-
plines and traditions. Examining the capacity of modelling practices to develop 
“trading zones” that foster interdisciplinary exchange was paramount to the 
project’s original perspective and goal. The international workshop Thinking in 
Practice was proposed as a catalyst to achieve this aim. 
Scholars who are engaged with modelling or are contributing to the scholar-
ly debate on modelling were invited to participate to the workshop at Wahn 
Manor House, so that diverse areas of expertise and disciplines were represent-
ed. Philosophy, Semiotics, Digital Humanities, Computer Science, Archaeolo-
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gy, Geography, Literary and Intermedia Studies, Psychology, Educational 
Studies, Classics, Information Studies and Software Engineering were the 
research areas represented at the workshop. 24 participants attended the two-
day interdisciplinary workshop and 13 speakers presented their perspectives 
and ideas concerning modelling. To facilitate the sharing of ideas in a creative 
and stimulating way, contributions were framed within a dialogic format which 
was complemented by guided practical exercises in which participants were 
asked to reflect upon their own positions in a less conventional yet structured 
way. 
One of the aims of the workshop was to engage in a critical comparison of 
approaches focusing on modelling rather than models. This included presenting 
concrete practical modelling exercises as well as theoretical considerations 
from a number of different disciplines. The comparison had the ultimate objec-
tive of opening up the discussion to identify emerging aspects transferrable 
across disciplines. It was also an aim to challenge our views and modify and 
enrich them based on exchanges with colleagues from other fields and trained 
in different traditions, culturally and linguistically as well as disciplinary. 
Therefore, the concepts of model and modelling that merge from this volume 
presents very different theoretical and methodological perspectives. The result-
ing set of papers offers a view on these concepts that supersedes some of the 
most common assumptions in history and philosophy of science, whereby the 
manipulation of models is given primary focus. Indeed, one of the objectives of 
our project was to investigate the creative process of thinking at play in model-
ling practices, and how the manipulation of models interfaces with other acts of 
signification and reasoning are often highly facilitated by the use of metaphors. 
These proceedings are instrumental in presenting a discussion on the use of 
formal and informal languages in the process of modelling, in particular within 
research contexts in the humanities, engineering, and computer science. 
The organization of this volume reflects the structure and the organization of 
the workshop itself. To facilitate the interdisciplinary dialogue we asked each 
participant to address a series of questions and respond by sharing a written 
“position paper”. In addition, each participant was assigned a respondent so as 
to stimulate further discussion. This format is retained in the papers collected 
here, whereby each paper is followed by a short summary of questions and 
answers. The questions circulated to participants in preparation for the event 
were the following: 
a) “What are the main challenges in the language around modelling?” 
b) “What is the role of analogy, similarity, visuality, and iconicity in model-
ling?” 
c) “Where would you position modelling on the imaginary axis theo-
ry/practice?” 
d) “Do you see modelling as a core method in your discipline?” 
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These questions aimed to integrate theoretical approaches with practical meth-
odologies in the study and application of models and modelling.  
The opening of the workshop also followed interactive format. The presen-
tation of the workshop scope and objectives was performed as a dialogue in 
which themes, aims and participants were narrated and described “as if” from a 
theatrical stage (see Appendix in this introduction). Arianna and Oyvind, re-
spectively a cat and a fox, set up the context of the workshop including the 
agenda for the two days, and introduced each participant as well as the group of 
organisers, explaining the aims and the objectives of the meeting. The dialogue 
was intended as integrated part of the event by setting the context for a com-
mon methodology. It was based on the understanding that in such a multidisci-
plinary context, it was important to de-academicise the communicative struc-
ture and to be open to different languages, modalities and codes of interaction 
and discussion. Furthermore, the lexicon and metaphors adopted in the “dia-
logue” reveal the multidimensionality of the concept of model while also ex-
plicitly referencing the strengths of each invited participant.  
In order to stress the importance of the role of each pair of speaker and re-
spondent, of their exchange and of their cross-disciplinary contributions, each 
participant received as his or her badge a puzzle piece9 matching the one of 
their paired “companion”. The joint between the pieces of the puzzle were 
meant to symbolically represent the articulated composition and complexity 
characterizing the workshop as a meeting of minds. 
To further enhance the exchange and benefit from the encounter amongst 
participants, we decided to combine the discussion with more playful activities 
in the form of interactive exercises. The exercises were intended to develop and 
stabilise each workshop participant’s position with respect to the topic been 
discusses, as well as to grasp the most salient concepts or elements emerging 
during the paper sessions. To guide this part of the work we used two interre-
lated metaphors: the ship and the island. Aquatic or maritime as well as terres-
trial metaphors were adopted. Indeed, these conceptual metaphors are highly 
interrelated, particularly in the discourse around research, research investiga-
tion, and knowledge organisation. They have developed into commonly ac-
cepted models vehiculating, structuring and mapping knowledge in research 
discourses. They are also key metaphors in DH. For example, the use of the 
tree metaphor is adopted extensively in the creation of taxonomies and schemes 
of knowledge and has been taken up as a common way of seeing textual struc-
tures, while the use of maritime metaphors such as “navigation” and “net” is 
central in the discourse around the web more generally. The properties of these 
metaphors adequately captured the nature of the workshop discussion: the fluid 
dynamic exchange facilitated at the event; an investigation around modelling as 
                                                             
9  See the contribution of C. Marras (2018) in the Focus section of this volume. 
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both an analysis of the surface and a plumbing of the ocean depths; the im-
portance of the organization of a ship, where everybody contributes to success-
ful navigation (from the chef to the skipper, from the common sailor to the 
officers or the mechanic); the centrality of the on-board equipment (many 
things are needed: food, scientific instruments, etc.); and the differing expertise 
and roles of the crew. The route of a ship is traced up front, but subsequently 
adjusted during navigation to cope with the many unforeseen events at sea. The 
workshop was structured as an expedition, a navigating out to explore the open 
sea.  
Altogether, the present volume reflects particular research interests in cur-
rent studies of modelling. The contributors have connected their papers to 
dominant scientific debates around modelling concepts, but at the same time 
introduced original perspectives compared to the vast literature on the subject. 
The growth of knowledge, the cross-disciplinarity, the incipient cooperation 
between approaches and expertise on models and practices of modelling is 
therefore what is thematized in this issue.  
This issue is divided in two parts: section 1 includes the 12 paired peer re-
viewed papers presented at the workshop, whereas section 2 is a Focus section 
where specific topics that arose during the workshop are discussed and ana-
lyzed. The Focus section complements the Articles section and it is intended to 
discuss, highlight, and reflect on some of the issues and methodological aspects 
that emerged from the two-day workshop. It focuses on key issues around 
modelling (Patrick Sahle, How to recognize a model when you see one. Or: 
Claudia Schiffer and climate change), methodologies and languages (Cristina 
Marras, A metaphorical language for modelling) as well as organizational and 
logistic aspects (Zoe Schubert and Elli Rehul, Setting the space: Creating Sur-
roundings for an Interdisciplinary Discourse and Sharing of (Implicit) 
Knowledge). Moreover, two contributions are dedicated to the analysis of the 
concepts and definitions emerging from the papers and discussions as they 
were recorded using an observational grid. This grid was designed for the 
workshop and was filled in during the different sessions (Nils Geißler and 
Michela Tardella, Observational drawings. From Words to Diagrams.). An 
“external” view on the meeting from a participant who were neither a speaker 
nor an organizer completes the Focus section (Tessa Gengnagel, The Discourse 
about Modelling: Observation from a participant). 
The 12 papers of Section 1 were written and shared in draft form as part of 
the preparation for the workshop and reviewed for the purpose of this publica-
tion. Each of them also includes responses based on the workshop discussions. 
As outlined above, by inviting experts from a variety of disciplines, the project 
team brought together diverse, complementary and sometimes conflicting 
theoretical views on and practical experiences with modelling. Some very 
crucial questions for scholars working on modelling and on what underpins the 
practice of modelling from an interdisciplinary perspective were asked by 
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Willard McCarty, a key figure in establishing the foundations for the concept 
and practice of modelling in DH. In his Modelling what there is: Ontologising 
in a Multidimensional World, McCarty addresses the question of interdiscipli-
narity in an epistemic and constructive way: “disciplines are not places of arri-
val, clubs to be joined, identities to assume or platforms of visibility, but start-
ing-points”. In Models, modelling, metaphors and metaphorical thinking – 
from an educational philosophical view, his paired speaker, Nina Bonderup 
Dohn, an expert in education studies and processes of design, presents her view 
on models within educational research defining models as “instruments for 
configuration and reconfiguration”. She refers to Paul Ricoeur’s claim that 
metaphors and metaphorical thinking overcome the conventional analysis of 
metaphors inherited from Aristotle, also known as the “substitution model”, 
and see figurative language as the primary vehicle for the disclosure and crea-
tion of new forms of meaning. 
That models are necessary for thinking is the radical position taken by Bar-
bara Tversky, from the perspective of cognitive psychology. In her Multiple 
models. In the Mind and in the World she takes elements and relations among 
models in the represented world and map them onto elements and relations in 
the representing world. Spatial models representing, for instance, gesture rely 
on more direct and accessible mappings to meaning than language, which bears 
only arbitrary relations to meaning. Her paired speaker Christina Ljungberg, on 
the other hand, bringing in her work in the area of iconicity in language and 
literature, discusses the relationship between modelling, reasoning, and creativ-
ity. With examples from picture viewing, map reading, and mental diagrams in 
verbal language, in Iconicity in cognition and communication, she argues that 
iconicity is essential to reasoning, communication and mutual understanding.  
Modelling is ubiquitous in the humanities: the search for patterns and prin-
ciples, and the links between them, is found in all humanistic disciplines and 
periods. The debate around this assumption is represented by two papers: Mod-
elling in the Humanities: Linking patterns to principles by Rens Bod in which 
some commonalities between modelling in the humanities and in the sciences 
are discussed and different modelling strategies and practices explored. In 
Modelling in the Digital Humanities: a Research Program?, Fotis Jannidis 
focuses on the different research fields were the term modelling is used, under 
the assumption that is hard to defend that they are all conceptually connected. 
Jannidis proposes to collect examples of different practices, in order to deter-
mine, which have essential communalities. 
The specificity of modelling practices in archeology is discussed from a the-
oretical perspective by Oliver Nakoinz in his Models and modelling in Archae-
ology, where the author stresses the importance of a “trans-disciplinary model-
ing” framework for archeology, a discipline often challenged by conflicting 
attitudes towards the creation and use of models.  
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From his broad and cross-disciplinary perspective and cartographic practic-
es, Gunnar Olsson provides an eclectic excursus in which the dialectic interplay 
between ethics and aesthetics, two sides of the same coin, guide us throughout 
his EVERYTHING IS TRANSLATION (including the art of making new boots 
out of the old ones). A semiotic perspective in the framework of Charles S. 
Peirce’s theory of signs is introduced by his paired speaker Claas Lattmann in 
Iconizing the Digital Humanities. Models and modelling from a semiotic per-
spective. In this contribution models are considered as icons; the fact that mod-
els are not identical to the things they represent (and that they represent only 
partially) are the true basis for genuine creativity and progress in research. 
From the field of engineering and computer science, Giorgio Fotia and Paul 
Fishwick discuss how modelling represents a core method of investigation in 
the sciences. Fotia, with his paper Modelling practices and practices of model-
ling, proposes the concept of computing as an instrument for discovery in the 
sciences and as a useful metaphor to reflect upon when trying to unify the 
description of the practices of modeling across many different domains. Fish-
wick, in his original perspective on Information modelling of the Humanities, 
claims that the idea of information and information processing is part and par-
cel with the humanistic tradition and that written and pictorial languages can be 
used as basis for formalizing information and models. 
Models in computer science and in digital humanities were the focus of 
Günther Görz, Some remarks on modelling from a Computer Science perspec-
tive and Francesca Tomasi, Modelling in the Digital Humanities: Conceptual 
data models and knowledge organization in the cultural heritage domain. Görz 
addresses a key point in his reflection on models and modelling: the distinction 
between models of and models for: “One of the basic tasks of computer science 
is to rewrite models derived from other scientific disciplines so that they can be 
represented and processed on computers.” This makes the practice of model-
ling in a research software engineering context an inherently interdisciplinary 
undertaking. Francesca Tomasi sees data models as knowledge organization 
systems which are at the core of the Digital Humanities domain. In her paper 
she adopts a multi-dimensional vision: models are seen as processes of abstrac-
tion, as interpretations, and as formal languages to implement such abstractions 
in order to create something processable by a machine.  
When taken together, the 12 papers provide an interdisciplinary insight into 
the relationship between model and modelling. A dense intertextual structure 
pervades this volume. The reader is invited to follow the threads through the 
different contextualisations and analyses of models by linking the papers with a 
broader theoretical approach to modelling with the ones which are case-studies 
oriented.  
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Appendix:  The Dialogue 
Photo 1 and 2: The Fox and the Cat 
 
The stage is set. A castle, it is called; in reality more of a mansion. A place of 
illusions, of double addressing and complex references. The site of a theatre 
museum. A castle in which pizza is served from cardboard boxes. Illusions and 
fictions. Something pretending to be what it is not, something standing for 
something else. Models and stories, multiple levels of signs. 
Two persons pretending to be what they are not. Gesturing to their demon-
strable incapability to be actors, they stand there as objects for the gaze of an 
audience not yet aware of its composition nor of the rules of the game. Objects 
trying to take the lead as subjects, trying to mark the setting, using masks and 
pretence. 
They try to de-academize an academic setting, using the memory of the 
place to bring back what could have been different. Their play was easily seen 
through. In self defence they made themselves openly vulnerable. A fox. A cat. 
And what is an actor if not a model representing the world view of the au-
thor and the stage director? All models, models eve-
rywhere; not only the workshop but the whole project 
is already threatened with a total breakdown into a 
meaningless all-encompassing concept of models. 
Even a cave painting is a model. What about the cave 
itself? Where to start? How to sort out this mess? 
 
Have mercy on them. Give them a voice, let them try to explain.  
- Why are we here? What do we expect from you? We will not spend 
much time on this introduction, but still: where can we start? 
- From the beginning perhaps? From where the project came to be? 
- Yes. We kept talking about modelling, we talked a lot, both of us, but al-
ways came back to modelling, like the centre of a rosetta. We did not just 
talk, we were also inspired by reading works of wise people in Digital 
Humanities. 
- Like Willard, your PhD supervisor and my missed teacher. 
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- Yes, him of course. The word was polysemous but we were not scared. 
Maybe a bit too cocky sometimes. And with fixations, like jotting things 
down, creating short texts describing all sorts of weird things. You know. 
- We had some ideas about how to juggle slippery concepts like modelling. 
We had some disagreements too. We saw the Volkswagen Foundation 
call, the deadline closed in on us and instead of it wooshing by we jotted 
down something and drew together our dream team. Remember? 
- How old do you think I am? Of course I remember. Cristina and Patrick. 
- And they said yes! We knew already then that they would go for the best 
research assistants, hiring Michela, Nils, and Julia. 
- Well, how could they say no to you? We also got a 
lot of support from my colleagues in Passau and 
Jonas came here to take part in the fun. What we 
did not know then was that Zoe and Elli would 
make it all even better. Thinking with more eyes 
was what we needed in order to expand our hori-
zons and see in multiple dimensions.  
- What we did not yet know was that the Volkswagen Foundation would 
decide to fund our project! Thanks Vera! 
- We were ambitious and uncertain; we still are, I guess we will always be, 
but we also knew it was worth the challenge. Digging into what people 
mean and meant by modelling and how they use it, both the words and 
the activity. Draw some lines to follow, finding a way. Our way. 
- Yes and going beyond Digital Humanities, peeping out at the vastness of 
the open sea. Where to start? 
- We knew we could stay in the mare nostrum more 
or less comfortably and that’s why the project has 
case studies on modelling texts and modelling 
events – the case studies will be challenging but we 
wanted to make sure we could draw from others 
beyond the team and beyond Digital Humanities.  
- To be frank the interdisciplinary workshop idea 
was to seek inspiration but also to make sure we had stars to orient by 
when we sail out to see coastlines we did not yet know. So much new. So 
much happening. So much to understand. It takes a village to bring up a 
researcher. 
- We tried to be brave. We wanted to catch a glimpse of the same feeling 
we had when reading Gunnar’s book Abysmal. 
- Yes, grounded but ready to fly. You can’t be grounded without refer-
ences and you can’t fly or navigate without pointing ahead. 
- Thanks to an important team effort we managed to get people here that 
could ground us in different ways; whether in an archaeological pit hold-
ing Oliver’s hand or in a gesture following Barbara’s route descriptions – 
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which in many ways stand between texts and maps, as manuscripts in 
general stand between the spatial and the textual. 
- Indeed, and like Anton Ego in Ratatouille, all we want is some perspec-
tive. Rens can give us some looking back, forward and sideways at the 
history of the Humanities. Fotis will unflatten texts, building a statistics 
of wonders.  
- Günther by taking us down and up in the laby-
rinths where artificial intelligence meets com-
puter sciences through the practice of museum 
curators using WissKI. 
- Giorgio would weave the threads where soft 
and hard sciences are made of the same wool. 
- I don’t like hard and soft but wool is cool. Paul knows 
how to make modelling of artworks talk with compu-
ting. Francesca spins the wheel of knowledge represen-
tation.  
- And Nina talks to and with people, young people, those 
who will come after us and for whom modelling and de-
sign could make a difference in life. A difference for life 
to come. A part of their cultural capital if we take our 
responsibilities seriously. 
- Yes, because ultimately modelling for us is a way or many ways of mak-
ing sense. Understanding modelling is part of a diverse cultural literacy 
one should master, as citizen in a democracy. Show the kids they can 
model – and then we can learn from playing with models together. 
- Claas and Christina will dare to hold some icons, a special type of icon 
via which we make sense of the world. 
- (If I understand what an icon is tomorrow night I will be happy – and 
probably a bit sad too. If not, it is not their fault). Make sense of the 
world? Or the many worlds? 
- Whatever helps us reason, playing with the blocks, building new things, 
making sense of the old ones. 
- I don’t remember where it came from exactly but in 
Krakow we realized the modelling qualities of the 
Danish wonder tool for thinking with your hands, 
playing with brick models. [pause] We finally got to 
our Lego then!  
- Well, Lego is not to be talked about, and workshops 
are not about introductions. It is about time. 
 
Turning to the audience the fox expresses the hope that they have given at least 
a vague idea why each and every one in the room are invited. 
The false modesty of the false animals stays until the end.  
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Leaving the pseudo-fiction they move over to their appointed roles in life 
and break the spell through a final short academic presentation of the project 
“Modelling between digital and humanities: Thinking in practice,” its aims, 
participants, and methodology. 
Through an intense two-day agenda with 
formal and informal talks, with exercises 
and shared meals, the specific setting of this 
event will release a shared potential among 
and between the participants. This, at least, 
is the hope of the organizers. The dream of 
the organizers. What the organizers need in 
order to find a way in the chaos of concept 
explosions. 
Look at them, a last glimpse, up there with the silly masks in their hands and 
their futile hopes for clarity. Have mercy on them. Try to help them. Give them 
your best and maybe they will be able to walk around and across the abysses 
towards the unknown land of their dreams. 
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Abstract: »Modellieren was ist: Ontologisierung in einer multidimensionalen 
Welt«. The incursion of digital computing machinery into the public sphere and 
the return of “ontology” from philosophical exile occurred almost simultane-
ously, circa 1948. In this essay I ask, what do the modelling machine and phi-
losophers’ irreconcilable accounts of “what there is” have to do with each oth-
er? Are the ontological pluralism of the former and the multi-centric multi-
naturalism of the latter kin? If so, then recent anthropology has much to say to 
digital humanities. 
Keywords: Modelling, ontology, anthropology, multidimensionality, semantic 
stretch. 
[T]he universe has always appeared to the natural mind as a kind of enigma of which 
the key must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing word or 
name. That word names the universe’s principle, and to possess it is after a fashion 
to possess the universe itself. “God”, “Matter”, “Reason”, “the Absolute”, “Energy”, 
are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them…. But if you follow 
the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word as closing your quest…. 
[Each word] appears less as a solution… than as a program for more work …. (Wil-
liam James, Pragmatism 1907) 
The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same 
world with different labels attached. (Edward Sapir, The status of linguistics as a 
science 1929)  
The only way you can catch yourself in the act of reflecting on yourself is by becom-
ing another self – a self which, when it looks down on your reflecting self, will not 
be included in the reflection. If you want to understand yourself better, you always 
have to keep on the move. (Jonathan Rée, I See a Voice 1999) 
1.  A Mid Twentieth Century Co-Occurence 
These days, for perfectly obvious reasons, some of us find ourselves telling a 
Spenglerian Untergang des Abendlandes. The evening news confirms that we 
are all going to hell in a handbasket. But when I look around what I see is an 
abundance of compelling scholarship in many disciplines, scholarship that 
                                                             
∗  Williard McCarty, Department of Digital Humanities, King’s College London, Strand, London 
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beckons us to interconnect our own work with it and to connect both to the 
world we live in. The connections to be made are reciprocal and recursive: we 
give that others may give back, do ut des, again and again in a cycle that 
changes both. 
Here my aim is more modest than such a large project would suggest but 
still indicative of the benefits. My aim is to suggest – I can do no more than 
that – some of what might result from growing connections with anthropology 
and related disciplines. Anthropologists, you may know, have been interested 
in doing the reverse since at least 1962 (Hymes 1965) and were thinking along 
similar lines from the early 1940s (Heims 1991, chap. 2). Today both sides 
have much more to offer each other than was the case then. 
My story begins with a curious mid-twentieth century co-occurrence in the 
Anglo-American world: of the digital computer (which must be told what there 
is) and of the return from philosophical exile of ontology (the study of what 
there is – or, as Ian Hacking says (2002, 2), of “whatever we individuate and 
allow ourselves to talk about”).1 Stumbling on this co-occurrence led me to 
wonder how the two co-occurrents might be connected beyond computer scien-
tists’ adoption of the term in the late 1970s.2 You may know that thirty years 
earlier, just as the public was becoming aware of computers, philosopher 
Willard Van Orman Quine began giving serious attention not just to ontology 
but to ontologies in the plural.3 (In Germany the co-occurrence happened earli-
er, with Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in 1927 and Konrad Zuse’s Z-series 
machines from ca. 1935, a year before Turing’s foundational paper.4) I asked 
myself, what might there be in these co-occurrences to help us explain them? 
But then I noticed something else: the rather dramatic and fruitful career, seed-
ed by Quine, that ontology has taken in theoretical anthropology and related 
disciplines for the last few decades. So my question became also this: what 
                                                             
1  A convenient date for the first public exhibition of a large-scale digital computer is the 
launch of the Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator (SSEC) at IBM World Headquarters 
(New York) in 1948, visible from street-level until 1952 (McCarty 2011, viii). For ontology 
see note 3. 
2  For early examples see Kosslyn 1978 (drawing inter alia on Goodman 1968) and McCarthy 
1980, Alexander et al 1986. Formal definition came with Gruber 1995. See also Gruber 
2009, Sowa 2000 (51-131) and Zúñiga 2001. For related activities in Natural Language Pro-
cessing see e.g. Margaret Masterman’s work in the 1950s and 1960s (Priss and Old 2009; 
Sowa 2010 [245-50]); for database design see Sølvberg 1979; Ramsay 2004 (195). 
3  See Quine 1948, (1953) 1961 (his note on “Identity, ostension, and hypothesis”, p. 169, in 
particular), (1960) 2013 and 1969. For the status of ontology at the time see Feibleman 
1949. 
4  At the very beginning of Sein und Zeit ([1927] 2001, §3) Heidegger makes a distinction 
between ontological (Being as such) and ontic (regional or specific Being, i.e. delimited and 
implicitly temporal, as studied in the sciences); see Steiner 1978 (79-80). For Zuse’s devel-
opment of his stored-program computer see Zuse (1993) 2007 (chap. 3). Heidegger’s work 
became known in Anglophone computer science with Dreyfus 1972 and important in that 
discipline thanks to Winograd and Flores 1987. 
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might we learn about the creative potential of digital machines from the schol-
ars of human historical and contemporary alterity? 
Nothing in the literature suggests that computer scientists took much notice 
of philosophy when they started talking about ontology. Perhaps they thought 
they didn’t need to, since ontology is obviously fundamental to computing 
machinery: after all, to do any useful work the machine must be given a model 
of what there is (Smith 1985). But the complexity of the world and limitations 
of time constrain any implementable ontology to be a version of the domain to 
which it applies, that is, to be an ontology, one of many. Hence the implicit, 
more specific and possibly important connection between the digital machine 
and both Quine’s and Heidegger’s pluralisation. 
2. The Popularity of “Model”, Many Ontologies and 
Cosmological Change 
To get further with this, let me take a different tack. When we think about 
models carefully, as Nelson Goodman did in Languages of Art (1968), we can 
become quite annoyed, as he did, at the ungovernable, viral appeal of the word 
“model”. For us its sloppy use makes its specifically computational sense diffi-
cult to pick out; in consequence, we are apt to miss what is genuinely new and 
so have no convincing answer other than “more, faster” to rightfully skeptical 
colleagues. But its popularity is an inescapable fact, I realised. So I started to 
ask, why is it so popular? Was the invention of the digital machine a like re-
sponse, as the coordinated surge of word and thing would suggest? [Figure 1]. 
Might the same be true for “ontology”? What can we learn from that? What are 
they responses to? Answers aren’t as obvious as may seem: Plato’s Symposium 
teaches that we tend to go for what is achingly present in its absence, and so 
want, and thus desire. Rather than go for a quick dismissal by reference to 
technological determinism, pure coincidence or the fog of a Zeitgeist, I won-
dered if we might be able to identify a Foucauldian “historical a priori”5 – or, 
to paraphrase Jonathan Rée, that metaphysical notion which, in the middle of 
the last century, infiltrated ordinary common sense and became a real force in 
the world (1999, 382). 
Consider, for example, Quine’s argument that translation is inevitably inde-
terminate 2013 [1960] chap. 2), from which he concludes that we can do no 
better than many incompatible stock-takings of the world’s goods. Put that next 
to Quine’s friend and reader Thomas Kuhn’s argument two years later in The 
                                                             
5  The phrase is from Georges Canguilhem’s review of his former student Michel Foucault’s Les 
mots et le choses (1966) in Canguilhem 2005/1967, 90; quoted and discussed in Hacking 
2002, 5. 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  36 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012 [1962]) for the inevitability of succes-
sive, incompatible, indeed incommensurable paradigms. Consider also my 
favourite example of a clarion-call within digital humanities: the American 
literary critic Louis Milic’s short article, published four years after Structure, in 
which he wrote that, “We are still not thinking of the computer as anything but 
a myriad of clerks or assistants in one convenient console” (and I would go so 
far as to say “a myriad of servants”, since for us their far quicker, less intrusive 
and better service is so discrete as to be all but invisible). “The true nature of 
the machine is unknown to us…”, he went on to say (and I would add, un-
known because this “nature” is not natural, not a given, but an emergent recur-
sive co-creation of human and machine). Milic saw, as he said, that “Its intelli-
gence and ours must be made complementary….”, and so implied the crucial 
beyond-the-Turing-Test question of what we take intelligence to be. He went 
on: “Thinking in a new way is not an easy accomplishment. It means”, he said, 
“reorientation of all the coordinates of our existence” (1966, 4-5, my empha-
sis). It means, in other words, a cosmological reconfiguration. He called his 
brief article, “The next step”. It was, I like to point out, the first article in the 
first issue of the first journal in digital humanities. I don’t think we’ve taken 
that step yet. 
3. The “Ontological Turn” in Anthropology 
I intended no causal implications when I said that Quine seeded later develop-
ments in anthropology, though his thought-seed did germinate there. What he 
actually did, on record, was to draw an analogy between the ontologising phi-
losopher and a fictional anthropological linguist attempting to translate an 
imagined native’s exclamation at the sight of a rabbit (2013 [1960], 25ff.). 
Such was and is the field anthropologist’s dilemma, the core scenario to which 
some anthropologists have responded by making what has been called “the 
ontological turn”, away from the epistemological angst Quine depicted to 
something rather new.6 Commenting on Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: 
Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human (2013), for example, Philippe 
Descola refers to 
[the] general predicament that some of us… find ourselves enmeshed in. To 
put it simply, the project of repopulating the social sciences with nonhuman 
beings, and thus of shifting the focus… toward the interactions of humans 
with (and between) animals, plants, physical processes, artifacts, images, and 
other forms of beings… (2014) 
                                                             
6  Increasingly noisy since Henare, Holbraad and Wastell identified “a quiet revolution” and 
applied the term “ontological turn” to it (2007, 1, 7). 
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Modelling (we might say) everywhere, of everything, by every being with 
agency.  
The arguments quickly become complex, intricate, difficult. I can only pre-
sent a sliver. Almira Salmond’s helpful overview in the journal Hau sorts the 
enthusiastic confusion this turn has become into “three ethnographic strategies 
for addressing ontological alterity” (2014): Tim Ingold’s, Descola’s and the 
one she favours, which for want of space is my sole focus here. She calls it 
“recursive” because it draws recursively, transformatively on “the imaginative 
powers of the… peoples and collectives” whom anthropology proposes to 
explain.7 Its leading proponent, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, defines it in stark 
contrast to what he calls “our modern cosmological vulgate”: the multicultural-
ist supposition of “a single world or nature… around which different partial 
cultural views orbit” (2010, 329). This vulgate sounds pleasingly liberal and 
democratic. Look closely, he argues, and the single world it supposes turns out 
to be our world universalised. In other words, take a step back and this world 
begins to look very much like Michel Foucault’s invocation of Jeremy Ben-
tham’s panopticon.8 In the late eighteenth century Bentham designed a cylin-
drical prison with a central watch-tower from which all inmates could be se-
cretly observed. Because no inmate could know when he was being watched, 
the panopticon induced “the sentiment of an invisible omniscience”9 – a crip-
pling, economical god’s-eye view. Hence the predicament of those entrapped 
by their very visibility, as Foucault has said, and thus Viveiros de Castro’s 
metaphor for the colonising grip of that panoptic cosmological vulgate.  
4. The Multidimensionality of the Real and Our “Next 
Step” 
Ontology had to change before the turn in anthropology could be made, from 
elaboration of a “great chain of being” to a probing which reveals multiple 
ontologies.10 The modelling machine, working through many disciplines, has 
undoubtedly been an influential part of this change, so also the viral spread of 
the term “model”. Remarkably, throughout the panic of relativism in the “sci-
ence wars”,11 modelling and the many ontologies it makes operational have 
diversified not destroyed the idea of the real. The anthropologists I have quoted 
                                                             
7  Viveiros de Castro 2014 [2009], 40. 
8  Foucault, “Panopticism”, in Foucault 1995 [1975], 195-228; plate 3 shows Bentham’s de-
sign). See Bentham1995. 
9  A widely quoted phrase, not in Bentham’s works, often attributed to an anonymous archi-
tect. See Nugent 2011; Lyon 2006. 
10  Lovejoy 2001 [1936]; see also Lovejoy 1909. 
11  Hacking 1999; Geertz 1984. 
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have responded by taking “the enemy’s point of view” seriously – Viveiros de 
Castro’s phrase 1992 [1986] – as a recursive instrument of disciplinary self-
redefinition. Such recursion is no stranger to modelling. Ancient historian and 
anthropological fellow-traveller G. E. R. Lloyd has used his half-century of 
meticulous comparative analyses of ancient Greek and Chinese thought to draw 
out the “multidimensionality” of the real and to show the “semantic stretch” it 
requires of us.12 We might call this the agile modelling of an endlessly faceted 
world. Thirty-five years ago Ian Hacking, in Representing and Intervening 
(1983), argued cogently that new things become real by means of manipulatory 
experimental modelling. In his essay “Historical Ontology”, he has asked, 
echoing Foucault: “if we are concerned with the coming into being of the very 
possibility of some objects, what is that if not historical?” What does such 
reasoning lead to if not specific, local ontologies, “molded in time”?13 
What is to be done with these anthropological, historical and philosophical 
inflections of modelling gone viral – with the possibilities they suggest and the 
demanding help they offer for growing nascent digital humanities into one of 
the literae humaniores? That’s the question I struggle with. Half a century on 
from Louis Milic’s “The Next Step” I wonder what we can say his cosmologi-
cal reconfiguration would entail if we took it seriously by taking on the anthro-
pologists’ challenge. To use Clifford Geertz’s terms, it would mean something 
far beyond the mimetic “modelling of” real-world data, beyond also “modelling 
for” objects that begin as more or less definite ideas and aim at concrete reali-
sation.14 Both of these will, of course, remain valuable things to do. But they 
are hardly sufficient for a computing of as well as in the interpretative disci-
plines. (Let us be done with the crippling fright of the technoscience which 
makes our beloved machine possible and with the equally damaging ignorance 
of social thought, and so call these disciplines the human sciences.) 
What I think taking Milic’s next step might lead to most immediately is a 
concerted, experimental, hardware-actualised enquiry into what we mean by 
“intelligence”, by “reason”, by “cognition” – recursively involving the ma-
chine’s point of view with our own as both develop in interaction with each 
other. This is not the already well developed programme to demonstrate that 
cognition is computational, rather to find out through a back-and-forth conver-
sation what it is.15 It would mean enquiring into the machine’s cosmology, as it 
is now, as it could become. This enquiry would mean, to paraphrase Viveiros 
                                                             
12  Lloyd 2015, 5. See Inwood and McCarty 2010, contributions to which embrace all three of 
Salmond’s ethnographic approaches to ontology. For a summary of Lloyd’s work, <https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloyd> (Accessed December 19, 2016). 
13  Hacking 2002, 2, 4; Foucault 1984. See also Lovejoy 1909. 
14  For a discussion see McCarty 2013 [2005], 24; referring to Geertz 1993 [1973], 93. 
15  Yes, some of this goes on in the cognitive sciences, but we in the humanities have not 
included ourselves, nor have these sciences looked often to the humanities for more than 
window-dressing. 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  39 
de Castro, treating ideas indigenous to digital hardware as concepts to think 
with, then following the consequences, defining the range of possibilities these 
concepts presuppose, the conceptual persona they make possible, the reality 
they delimit (2014, 187). This is in no way to disrespect the Amazonians and 
the others from whom Viveiros de Castro and colleagues have learned so 
much. It is, rather, to ask if we can learn from these anthropologists in turn 
what it means to pull oneself away from the narcissistic self-entrapment that 
Joseph Weizenbaum discovered in the mid-1960s when users of his conversa-
tional program Eliza mistook it for their confessor.16 It is to ask whether the 
ontological turn in the anthropological sense has taken hold in digital humani-
ties. 
Is it not nascent in what the scholar-programmer already does, most when 
designing, building and refining simulations? Elsewhere I have argued that the 
great lesson to be learned from simulation – which is modelling turned loose to 
go where it can – is that it shows computing to be just such a producer of fic-
tion: an instrument not so much for nailing down facts (although it can do that) 
but for imagining them, acting them out, solidifying them, in some cases giving 
us a new (tentative) reality to probe (McCarty 2018). I know of no better ex-
ample of this than John Wall’s simulation of John Donne’s Gunpowder Day 
sermon in 1622 as it might have been delivered from the long-vanished Paul’s 
Cross preaching station adjacent to the medieval St Paul’s, which the Great 
Fire of London destroyed in 1666. With his Virtual Paul’s Cross Wall explores 
“what we are doing when we believe we have discovered, from our experience 
with a digital environment, things about past events that are not documented by 
traditional sources” (2016,283). That’s a cliff-edge, inviting flight, a fiction (to 
paraphrase Viveiros de Castro) that is historiographical, but historiography that 
is not fictional: a digital machine’s perspective on the sermon preached on a 
semi-fictional occasion by a semi-fictional John Donne from a semi-fictional 
Paul’s Cross in a semi-fictional space to a semi-fictional crowd. Ironically we 
have very good reason to think that it is a better, more truthful fiction than we 
get by pretending that Donne’s published words, which he wrote down some-
time later from the notes he used while preaching, are the real sermon. 
In 1962 Cambridge linguist Margaret Masterman proposed that the comput-
er could become a “telescope of the mind”, changing, as the early telescope 
did, our whole conception of the world (1962, 38-9). Some toss this off. But is 
the instrument as unproblematic as her metaphor seems to imply? To echo 
Hacking (1983, 186-209), do we see through, or see through, a telescope? 
Today (just as in microscopy) optoelectronics interpose a hermeneutic black-
box between the eye and its object, complicating – but not essentially altering – 
                                                             
16  See esp. the introduction to Weizenbaum 1976. Note that according to its author, Cannibal 
Metaphysics is a commentary on an unwritten, fictional book entitled Anti-Narcissus: An-
thropology as a Minor Science (Viveiros de Castro 2014 [2009], 39). 
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the philosopher’s question. For when Galileo looked through his occhialino 
much of what he saw had been seen before, but the differences were enough to 
make “what was” “momentarily mutable”, stuff of the eye reshaped by his 
mind into “a compelling argument for Copernicanism”.17 
Disciplines, I like to say, are not places of arrival, clubs to be joined, identi-
ties to assume or platforms of visibility, but starting-points. So the question is: 
where from here? There are many maps. 
5.  Figure 
Figure 1 
 
  
                                                             
17  Thanks to Crystal Hall (Bowdoin) for the commentary on Galileo, in private e-mail, 6/1/17. 
The literature is extensive; see esp. Lipking 2014; Biagioli 2006, chap. 2. 
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6.  Discussion 
NBD: Nina Bonderup Dorn 
RB: Rens Bod 
GO: Gunnar Olsson 
FJ: Fotis Jannidis 
WM: Willard McCarty 
 
In her dedicated response NBD singled out the alterity of worlds, especially its 
connection with the concept of situated knowledge in her own paper. She ques-
tioned the implications of “ontological turn”, asking whether the change is not 
so much a rejection of epistemological concerns but a product of them and a 
shift of emphasis. WM agreed, noting the meandering of “turns”, now this way, 
now that, common in academic disciplines, each turn attempting to correct for 
prior deficiencies. NBD wanted to know what is “the machine’s point of 
view”? WM responded by referring to the mediation enforced by the absolute 
consistency and complete explicitness of the digital medium and to the combi-
natorial negotiation implicit in modelling. He argued again for the crucial im-
portance of binary logic on the one hand and imaginative play against that foil 
on the other. 
RB noted that the fictionalizing trajectory of computational simulation, as in 
the example of the Virtual Paul’s Cross, is not yet accepted in the humanities. 
WM pointed to the mistaken belief that the computer is a fact-and-proof ma-
chine, a “knowledge-jukebox”, and advocated strong emphasis on the machine 
as an instrument of the imagination. RB mentioned the corrosive effects of 
simulation on mind/body dualism. 
GO, following up on NBD’s point about the “ontological turn”, offered the 
arresting counter-metaphor of epistemological and ontological concerns as 
diachronic intertwined strands, each dependent on the other. 
FJ, finally, asked what possibly we can mean by using such words as “intel-
ligence” and “perspective” when talking about machines. He asked if such talk 
is guilty of a category error. WM thought that the development and adoption of 
digital machinery was eroding such categorical distinctions, that drawing such 
lines has a long history of being redrawn to save outmoded ideas of the human. 
He may have quoted Evelyn Fox Keller, to the effect that asking if a product of 
computational biology is alive is beginning to look like an historical rather than 
a philosophical question. And he may have added that “intelligence” no longer 
looks like a single benchmark. 
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Models, Modelling, Metaphors and Metaphorical 
Thinking – From an Educational  
Philosophical View 
Nina Bonderup Dohn ∗ 
Abstract: »Modelle, Modellierung, Metaphern und metaphorisches Denken - 
Aus einer pädagogisch-philosophischen Sicht«. In this contribution, I present 
my view of models and metaphors within educational research, very broadly 
speaking. I start out by articulating my educational philosophical perspective as 
a form of applied philosophy. Inspired by Ricœur, I then define models as “in-
struments for configuration and reconfiguration”. I argue that metaphors and 
metaphorical thinking are more basic than models and modelling. The former 
can guide reasoning in a holistic, heuristic manner. The latter can be used ana-
lytically to develop the initial metaphorical similarity into articulated analogies. 
Models and metaphors may be deployed explicitly and consciously but may also 
(mis)lead cognition through implicit structuring of thinking. I proceed to give 
examples of the roles which models and metaphors have within different areas 
of (research in) education, teaching, and learning. One example is the explicit 
development of design patterns; another is implicit adherence to either an ac-
quisition metaphor or a participation metaphor of learning. Towards the end, I 
provide tentative answers to three questions posed by my discussion pair, 
Willard McCarty, concerning 1) computer modelling, 2) open-endedness of 
models and metaphors, and 3) situated knowledge and relativism. 
Keywords: Models, metaphors, epistemology, learning, educational research, 
design patterns. 
1.   Introduction 
In this article, I shall present my view of models and metaphors within educa-
tional research, very broadly speaking. I shall start out by articulating the per-
spective and background from which I come and the type of questions I focus 
on. I explicate my understanding of “model” and “metaphor” – and their rela-
tionship – and proceed to give examples of the roles which models and meta-
phors have within different areas of (research in) education, teaching, and 
learning. I thus take on the following questions: 
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Denmark, Universitetsparken 1, 6000 Kolding, Denmark; nina@sdu.dk. 
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- Do you have a preferred definition of models and/or modelling? 
- What is the relation between modelling and reasoning? 
- What is the role of analogy and similarity in modelling? 
- Do you see modelling as a core method in your discipline? 
The perspective and background from which I approach models and metaphors 
is that of educational philosophy, with a particular focus on epistemological 
questions concerning knowledge and learning. I practice educational philoso-
phy as a form of “applied philosophy”, i.e. a discipline, where philosophy is 
put to use within other areas of education research1. I bridge epistemology and 
learning theory, and do so both theoretically and in terms of practical peda-
gogy. It is thus a defining characteristic of my research that I combine philo-
sophical inquiry into the nature and requirements of knowledge and education 
with the conduct and analysis of empirical investigations of learning practices 
inside and outside of schools. On this background, querying the significance of 
models and metaphors as formal and informal reasoning strategies for me con-
cretizes to questions like the following: What role do models, modelling, meta-
phors and metaphorical thinking play in (research on) educational design? 
What role do I as an educational philosopher see them as playing in teaching 
and learning, and in the conceptualization of teaching and learning – in re-
search and practice? What role do I as an epistemologist understand them as 
having in reasoning and cognition in general? 
2. Basic Definition of Models – Preferred Definition 
Ricœur, following Hesse, defines a model as “an instrument of redescription”, 
explaining that “the model is essentially a heuristic instrument that seeks, by 
means of fiction, to break down an inadequate interpretation and to lay the way 
for a new, more adequate interpretation” (Ricœur 2003 [1975], 283). He further 
claims that models have metaphoric reference, in that, by use of the model 
“Things themselves are ‘seen as’; they are identified… with the descriptive 
character of the model.” (Ricœur 2003 [1975], 287). This fundamental relation-
ship between models and metaphors, that models draw on a metaphorical “see-
ing as”, is central to my approach to models. However, I follow Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999, 1980; Johnson 1987) in viewing metaphorical understanding, 
not the linguistic expression of it, as primary. Furthermore, I take models to be 
grounded in metaphorical “seeing as”, rather than the other way around, and in 
contrast to the position – suggested by Ricœur with Black (Ricœur 2003 
                                                             
1  I have explicated my view of ‘applied philosophy’ as a ‘philosophizing with’ in Dohn (2011b). 
A collection of articles articulating and engaging in this type of applied philosophy is found 
in my Professorial Thesis (Habilitation in German) (Dohn 2017). 
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[1975], 283) – that metaphors and models play analogous roles, each within its 
own field (poetics versus science): On my view, metaphorical “seeing as” is a 
holistic coupling of fields where the one is understood “in the light of” the 
other and where the implicitly postulated resemblance between the fields is as 
much a result of the “seeing as” as it is a prerequisite to it. Models expand and 
articulate this holistic coupling into more concrete form, clarifying the resem-
blance, at once aligning and restricting it. This is done by explicating the re-
semblance as an analogy between the fields where traits from the one corre-
spond (most often one-to-one) to traits within the other. Models thus – for good 
and bad – lead thinking along a much more clearly demarcated route than the 
holistic imaginative metaphorical coupling itself. “Modelling” refers to the 
process of explicating the holistic coupling as analogy. Paradigmatic examples 
of models are material or digital configurations/visualizations, mental schema-
tizations, scripts, and theoretical representations. As they are grounded in met-
aphorical “seeing as” understood not as (first and foremost) linguistic expres-
sion, but as understanding of the one field “in the light” or “through the lens” 
of the other, the basis of at least the former three are not necessarily linguisti-
cally articulated. Their explication into analogy will obviously involve linguis-
tic representation and further conceptualization, though. Nonetheless, Ricœur’s 
characterization of models as “redescription” accords too much significance to 
this linguistic articulation process. Likewise, material and digital models typi-
cally provide epistemic affordances through the visualization of relationships 
between aspects, but Ricœur’s terminology easily misleads one to neglect 
visualization and its potentials. Defining models as “instruments for configura-
tion and reconfiguration” appears more appropriate.  
This constitutes my answer to the first question above, i.e. of a preferred 
definition of models and/or modelling. It also indicates my overall take on the 
second and third questions, i.e. which role I as an epistemologist understand 
models, modelling, metaphors and metaphorical thinking to have in reasoning 
and cognition, and what role analogy and similarity play in modelling: Meta-
phors and metaphorical thinking are more basic than models and modelling. 
They can guide reasoning in a holistic, heuristic manner, where the similarity 
postulated by the metaphor is to some extent configured by the metaphor itself. 
Models can be used analytically to gain insights based on developing the initial 
metaphorical similarity into articulated analogies. To this I should add that 
models and metaphors may be deployed explicitly and consciously but may 
also (mis)lead cognition through implicit structuring of thinking.  
In the following, I turn to the more specific questions of the role of models 
and metaphors within education and educational research, including education-
al design. Space limitations bar an exhaustive overview, but I shall provide 
some indicative examples, which between them illustrate both explicit and 
implicit uses. 
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3. Role of Models and Metaphors in (Research on) 
Educational Design 
Educational design may be defined as the organization of learning resources 
and activities to support learners in attaining learning objectives (implicitly or 
explicitly defined). Educational design is carried out by teachers, course plan-
ners, educational developers etc. That is, educational design is not itself re-
search. However, research is undertaken with, for, and on educational design, 
e.g. to develop and test design principles, investigate learning theoretical ques-
tions, or test hypotheses on knowing, motivation, collaborative learning etc. 
Models and metaphors – and modelling and metaphorical thinking – are de-
ployed consciously in educational design, but also play significant roles at a 
more implicit, unreflected and unacknowledged level, as structuring resources 
of thinking. 
One form of explicit, conscious deployment is constituted by the develop-
ment, investigation and subsequent utilization of design patterns to organize 
teaching and learning activities in a structured way (Carvalho and Goodyear 
2014; Goodyear 2005; Mor et al. 2014). The concept of design patterns was 
originally developed by Alexander in the context of architecture to deal with 
recurring problems in a uniform, yet flexible way (Alexander et al. 1977). 
Design patterns provide a core solution (the pattern) which can be used flexibly 
in the diverging multitude of situations where the problem is experienced. 
Within educational design, design patterns constitute models of students’ and 
teachers’ activities (design elements), aimed at a particular goal (e.g. facilita-
tion of reflection or development of problem solving skills), following learn-
ing-theoretically informed principles (design principles) within an overall 
frame such as a lesson, a test, a lab experiment or study time between lessons. 
Examples of design patterns are “the interactive lecture” for learner-centered 
learning (Mor et al. 2014, chap. 1.2.2) and “try once, refine once” for learning 
through assessment (Mor et al. 2014, chap. 4.2.7). Related to this approach, 
again involving explicit, conscious use of models, is the development and 
application of personas in the design of courses or educational programmes: A 
persona is a fictional but realistic character, representative of a group of those 
users one is designing for, in this case potential participants in the course or 
programme. Typically, several personas will be developed based on user stud-
ies. Between them, the personas should cover the range of different user 
groups. The advantage of this use of models is that it is much easier for course 
or programme developers to imagine and take into account learners’ (diverg-
ing) goals, priorities, attitudes and behavior when they have realistic personal-
ized characters to think from. Potential conflicts between learners may also be 
foreseen and counteracted in the design. 
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The development of design patterns and personas is becoming widespread 
within educational design. In this sense, this type of modelling is increasingly 
viewed as a core method within this field (last question above). The scientific 
adequacy of the method is documented, but is still being researched. 
An example of a more implicit use of a model is the understanding – dis-
cernable from educationalists’ practice – of the implementation process in-
volved in realizing design patterns or “best practice” examples in concrete 
educational settings. This implicit model is shown in Figure 1. The gist of it is 
that implementation is a “plug-and-play” process, i.e. that there are no essential 
changes taking place between initial idea, design pattern and actual practice. 
The initial idea is articulated (becoming clearer but “essentially” staying the 
same) and then put to use (presupposing predictability of practice “on all essen-
tial counts”) (Dohn and Hansen 2016).  
Figure 1: Implicit Understanding of Design Pattern Implementation Process 
 
However, this is a very simplistic understanding that is not representative of 
actual implementation processes. There are significant transformational pro-
cesses involved in articulating an idea and convincing others of its viability 
(idea ĺ pattern) and likewise in the actual enactment of the pattern in practice 
(pattern ĺ practice). As argued by Wenger, a design comes into emergent 
being in the concrete realization which people give it within their specific 
communities of practices in attunement to and adaptation of already existing 
routines and participation patterns: “[P]ractice cannot be the result of design, 
but instead constitutes a response to design” (Wenger 1998, 233). The imple-
mentation process is thus more adequately depicted as a “messy”, iterative 
realization process, subject to influence by unforeseen aspects, and therefore 
not strictly predictable and certainly not linear (Figure 2). 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  51 
Figure 2: Actual Design Pattern Implementation Process 
 
Neglecting the complexities of the implementation process, i.e. implicit adher-
ence to the model in Figure 1, is highly problematic, on the verge of being 
detrimental to learners’ learning: It amounts to ignoring the learners’ differing 
uptakes of and approaches to the design pattern as well as the variance in social 
relationships and interaction patterns across classes/groups of learners. Put 
bluntly, activities which have been successful in one class may fail totally in 
other classes. 
4. Role of Models and Metaphors in (Conceptualizations) 
of Teaching and Learning – In Research and Practice 
Following design patterns or best practice scripts is one way in which models 
are put to use within teaching and learning. Conceptualizations of learning and 
the deployment of these conceptualizations in teaching and learning activities is 
another. One such example is Kolb’s model (Figure 3) of the learning process 
as a cycle where the learner cognitively moves through processes of concrete 
experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active exper-
imentation – leading again to concrete experience and another spin through the 
cycle (Kolb 1984). 
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Figure 3: Kolb's Model of the Learning Process as a Cycle of Cognitive Processes 
 
This model is widely used to argue for the need to engage learners in practical 
activities beyond reading and writing to allow the experiential and experi-
mental processes to take place. It is also used to structure teaching and learning 
activities to ensure that learners move through the circle rather than being stuck 
in one process. A further development of the model is Kolb’s claim that learn-
ers will have a preference for one (or two) of these learning processes. This 
leads to a second model with a set of different learning styles consisting of 
specific combinations of these preferences. Gardner’s model of intelligence as 
comprised of seven different types of intelligence is another example (Gardner 
2006), as is the version of learning styles advocated by Dunn and Dunn (1993, 
1992). All of these models are put to use within educational practice in the 
development of teaching and learning activities corresponding to learners’ 
different styles or intelligences–or alternatively, in activities designed to chal-
lenge them beyond their preferred style or intelligence. Ideally, this approach 
has the advantage of customizing learning to each learner, which presumably 
will heighten their learning outcome. However, there is a clear risk of stigma-
tizing learners. Likewise, not all disciplines may be learnable through all learn-
ing styles/intelligences, just as the competencies required in future jobs may 
not necessarily match all learning styles or intelligences equally well.  
Another example of a model developed in educational research and put to 
use in educational practice is Hiim and Hippe’s relational model intended for 
pedagogical analysis of learning situations (1993). The model stresses the 
interrelationship between six elements: student learning outset, framing factors, 
learning objectives, curricular content, learning process, and evaluation. This 
model is widely used, at least in the Scandinavian countries, both for analysis 
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of learning situations and for planning them (though the latter is explicitly 
advised against by Hiim and Hippe). 
At a more implicit level, Sfard has shown that two metaphors of learning 
guide research on learning, namely the metaphor of acquisition and that of 
participation (Sfard 1998). I have argued that the same metaphors are also 
embodied in educational and Web 2.0 practices, respectively, and that prob-
lems arise when the latter are introduced as learning activities within the former 
(Dohn 2009b, 2009a). 
As a last example I wish to point to an ongoing research project that I am 
leading, which is sponsored by the Danish Council for Independent Research, 
Humanities, Grant No. DFF-4180-00062. The title of the project is Designing 
for situated knowledge in a world of change. The overall project aim is to ad-
dress the challenge posed by two seemingly opposed factors: On the one hand, 
the need in today’s society for people to move frequently between settings and 
to put their knowledge learnt in one context to use in others. On the other hand, 
research findings which show knowledge to be situated, i.e. as acquiring form 
and content from the context in which it is learnt (Schön 1983; Lave 1988; 
Lave and Wenger 1991; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Dohn 2011a). These re-
search findings imply that knowledge is not easily transferred from one context 
to another, but needs transformation and resituation. The project has both a 
philosophical side, aimed at investigating what is involved in the transfor-
mation and resituation of knowledge, and a pedagogical side, aimed at develop-
ing concrete designs for learning which facilitate learners in learning to trans-
form and resituate knowledge. Our preliminary findings indicate that it is 
precisely through metaphorical thinking – and to some extent modelling – that 
learners succeed in putting knowledge to use in new contexts. Metaphorical 
thinking is involved in the holistic seeing of new situations “as” known ones 
whilst flexibly attuning to differences between them. Modelling takes place in 
the form of structure mapping of traits based on the basic metaphorical postula-
tion of resemblance between the situations. 
5.  Discussion 
Articulating a view such as mine within the context of this HSR Supplement’s 
focus on the role of models and modelling in the Digital Humanities of course 
raises a number of questions. Willard McCarty has posed particularly succinct 
ones to me. The questions are not easy and I fear that I shall not be able to 
provide satisfactory answers to them – certainly not within the space allotted to 
me; perhaps not at all. A few considerations will have to suffice:  
Firstly, given the context of Digital Humanities, Willard McCarty very rea-
sonably asks what is special about computer modelling (as opposed to any 
other kind). Now, posing the question in this way of course presupposes that 
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something is special about computer modelling – a presupposition which might 
well be challenged. I certainly acknowledge – indeed I would advocate – that 
computer modelling (simulations, visualizations, 3D worlds etc.) permits us to 
have experiences which would be hard or impossible to come by in the physi-
cal world alone, for a number of reasons, including historical, geographical, 
economical, organizational, physical, and skills-related ones. One example is 
provided by McCarty in his contribution to this volume where he references 
John Wall’s Virtual Paul’s Cross (Wall 2016), a computer simulation, made by 
the Virtual St. Paul’s Cathedral Project, which allows one to witness John 
Donne’s sermon for Gunpowder Day, Nov. 5th 1622. Another example is ava-
tar embodiment, which allows one physically impossible bodily experiences 
such as flying or morphing into animal shapes, potentially stimulating reflec-
tions on embodiment itself and its role in cognition and learning (Riis 2016). 
Yet a third is students’ use of simulation programs as part of their academic or 
professional training, e.g. programs emulating chemical reactions or organiza-
tional developments. Computers may thus stimulate imagination, facilitate 
reasoning, and provide us with learning situations in novel ways, potentially 
leading us to insights which we would otherwise be barred from. Nonetheless, I 
am not convinced that computer modelling is special in principle, neither epis-
temologically nor ontologically speaking. Like all other models, computer 
models require a modeler. This modeler may in some instances be a step re-
moved compared to modelers of physical models, in the sense that s/he works 
to provide a model which may itself develop over time. Still, computer models 
depend fundamentally on the imagining of the modeler and on his/her under-
standing of the domain to be modeled – exactly as do physical models. The 
basic ontological status of the computer model is thus no different from that of 
the physical model. Neither is its basic epistemological status: Though it may 
be harder to foresee the specific epistemic affordances for people engaging 
with the computer model than for physical models, the dependency of their 
insights on the scope and direction of the modeler’s understanding is funda-
mentally the same as for physical models. 
A second question McCarty raised concerns the degree to which reasoning 
with metaphors and models can be open-ended. Models, he claims, have an 
analytical focus, are directed to some end, articulated, and spelled out. Fur-
thermore, he claims, both models and metaphors are analogical, and reasoning 
by way of metaphors and models thus is reasoning analogically, from a relation 
between two things we know to a presumed relation between corresponding 
things (A is to B as C is to D). Therefore, it seems, reasoning by way of models 
and metaphors cannot really be open-ended.  
My answer to this question centers on my disagreement with McCarty about 
the claim that metaphorical thinking is analogical. I follow Lakoff and Johnson 
in seeing the dependency between analogy and metaphor as going the other 
way: Metaphorical thinking is primary: it is a holistic seeing-a-whole-field-as-
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  55 
another-field through the metaphor as “focal point”. In this way, metaphorical 
thinking is in fact open-ended, in that the focal point does not determine the 
insights to be gleaned by the holistic seeing-as, but sets the outset and domain 
for them. Analogy builds on the metaphorical, holistic seeing-as, but hones in 
on certain aspects of the seeing-the-field-as - explicating that “A is to B as C is 
to D”. Thereby it transforms the initial “seeing as” into something more specif-
ic, at once enabling and restricting cognition. I agree that modelling is analogi-
cal, making it less open-ended than metaphorical reasoning. However, as indi-
cated in my answer to the first question, I do believe that some computer 
modelling, e.g. in the form of 3D simulations, may set the environment for 
experiences which were not to be foreseen. In this way imagination and in-
sights to be inspired from computer modelling may well be quite open-ended. 
A final set of questions from McCarty concerns the ontological implications 
of my situated view of knowledge. He refers to Donna Haraway (1988), who 
has argued interestingly about the nature of knowledge as situated, calling at 
once for a localized embodied epistemology and rejecting both objectivism and 
relativism. In her words, the essential problem for epistemology and for science  
is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for 
all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing 
our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a no-nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world (579, italics in original).  
McCarty points out that the revolutionary force of the said “radical historical 
contingency” have led theorists such as Ingold to shift from “knowledge that” 
to “knowledge how” and to reconceive the world in terms of skills. But this 
raises the ontological problem of how to come up with Haraway’s “faithful 
accounts of a ‘real’ world”. 
In answering these questions, I should first say that I am sympathetic to 
Donna Haraway’s general epistemological points regarding situated 
knowledge, which is perhaps not surprising, given that we share inspirational 
sources in phenomenological philosophy. I definitely agree, on the one hand, 
that we have to accept the historical contingency of our beliefs, dependent as 
they are on the way we engage with the world to form them. And on the other 
hand, this should not lead us into relativism. I consider myself a pragmatist 
realist, not in the Peircean sense where reality is that on which science con-
verges in claiming the existence of2, but in a phenomenological sense: With 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty I would say that we are always already in the 
world which is as it is on the background of our agency in it. The split between 
subject and object, between cognition and world, is a secondary one, building 
fundamentally on “taking a step back” from the world we are always already 
engaged in and interacting with. Speaking ontologically—and with the under-
                                                             
2  Peirce (1958). 
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standing I get from the anthropologist literature that McCarty refers to in his 
contribution to this volume – it doesn’t make sense (as Popper did and others 
have done after him)3 to talk of a first world of nature and a second world of 
culture. The natural world we live in is a cultural one, formed by our cultural 
interactions with it, and vice versa. Therefore, I find it problematic to speak (as 
objectivist realists would) of the ontological existence of one world that we 
epistemologically speaking have different views upon: Our “views” of the 
world are not static observational views, but are interactional views; i.e. we 
form and are formed by the world in dynamic interaction and our “views” are 
part of this forming and being formed.  
Potentially, we can say, as McCarty does, and as I think Haraway would, 
too, that different cultures have different “realities”, because different cultures 
engage in (and in reaction, correspondingly are formed by) different interac-
tions. They do so, however, around what Charles Taylor called “human con-
stants” (Taylor 1985) as well as in interaction with natural laws etc. Hence it is 
not the case that “anything goes”, and, though there may be more equally good 
answers to what the world is like, not any and every answer is equally good 
(i.e. no relativism on my part). For each culture, there are facts of the matter 
regarding the way the world is structured – and structurable – for them. Provid-
ing an explication of these facts of the matter is, I think, providing the “faithful 
accounts of a ‘real’ world”, based on a world reconceived in terms of skills, 
which McCarty calls for with Haraway and Ingold.  
As a final comment (also upon prompting from McCarty), let me revert 
again to the overall question of this special issue concerning the role of models 
in the Digital Humanities by explicating how computer models figure in my 
pragmatist realism and my understanding of knowledge as situated: As indicat-
ed above, on my view computer models may provide ways to simulate new 
interactions with the world. In this sense, they may indeed provide us with 
“new worlds” – or at least altered ones. Nonetheless, the novelty and strange-
ness of these altered worlds will be delimited in their outset by the framing of 
the modeler’s imaginings. The possibility of computer modelling thus does not 
fundamentally change our ontological and epistemological situation, but it does 
hold the potential for a number of new specific experiences. Hence, it also 
holds the potential for us to develop specific forms of situated knowledge not 
possible in the physical world alone. This situated knowledge will, however, 
still be the knowledge of embodied beings living in a physical world. No matter 
how immersed we are in a digital “virtual world”, we will still be immersed as 
physical beings, who e.g. sit on chairs, interact with keyboard and mouse, get 
sore shoulders from cramping up behind the screen, etc. Our apparent “virtual 
experiences” and “virtual situatedness” will therefore always be those of a real, 
                                                             
3  E.g. Bereiter (Bereiter 1995). Popper argues for his position in (among others) Popper (1972). 
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embodied person. That is, they will in point of fact be real, embodied experi-
ences, not of virtuality per se, but of interacting in hybrid physical-virtual con-
texts. And the situated knowledge developed through this interaction will re-
flect this. 
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Multiple Models.  
In the Mind and in the World 
Barbara Tversky ∗ 
Abstract: »Multiple Modelle. Im Geist und in der Welt.«. Models, in whatever 
sense, have a dual status: they are what they are and they represent something 
else, even Borges’ (1999) legendary point-to-point map. Representations select, 
add, and distort the information they represent. Models are meant for more 
than representation; they are meant as thinking tools, to promote inference, 
discovery, and creative thought. Research has shown that representations cre-
ated on the page or in the air (gesture) have an accessible semantics and syntax 
and that such representations promote thought through a wordless conversa-
tion between the eye and the hand and the (sometimes virtual) page. 
Keywords: Model, representation, inference, diagram, sketch, gesture. 
1.   Introduction 
Model is one of those abundantly useful words that gets used abundantly by 
many communities in varying senses. Whether a model airplane or a model of 
good behavior or a business model or fashion model or a mathematical model 
or a mental model – what these seemingly disparate examples have in common 
is that they represent something else. Now, representation is one of those 
abundantly useful words that gets used abundantly in varying senses, so it’s not 
clear we’ve made progress. But let’s dig a little deeper, starting with the con-
cept of representation. A common view of representation is that it extracts 
certain features and relations from whatever it’s representing, but not all. It 
maps elements and relations in the represented world to elements and relations 
in the representing world. Whoever or whatever created the representation 
presumably selected those features and relations for a reason. A paradigmatic 
example of a representation is a map; it takes places and relations among them 
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in the real world to places and relations in the representing world, the map. 
Someone designing a map for cyclists would select different features and rela-
tions than someone designing a map for drivers. Representations do more than 
select. They can also add information, say names of towns and streets, geo-
graphical borders, icons for restaurants and hotels, bands of color for depths of 
oceans or altitudes of mountains, and they can distort information, say straight-
ening roads and enlarging them. Weather maps add notations for weather pat-
terns that are invisible.  
A model generally does more than represent. It is meant to go further, to en-
courage thought, to allow inferences, discovery and creative leaps. It’s a think-
ing tool.  
Models need not be tangible. Models can be mental, a set of beliefs of how 
something, a machine or a government or a person, operates. Of course physi-
cal phenomena, the firings of neurons, underlie mental models but mental 
models are not equivalent to the firings of neurons or even the specific firings 
of specific neurons. Models can be created by words, which have physicality in 
the form of sound waves or marks on a page, but again they are not equivalent 
to their physical instantiation. I can use words instead of a map or a diagram to 
tell you how to get from the train station to the hotel or how to operate the 
ticket machine for the train and you can use those words to create a mental 
model. If my words created from my mental model and your mental-modelling 
are precise enough you should be able to buy a ticket and arrive at the hotel. 
Even if, as is typical, much information is left out; representations and models 
are always used in a context of shared understanding. 
Even if the words are carefully crafted, turning a mental representation in 
one mind into the right set of words and translating the words into a mental 
model in another mind can be effortful and error-prone, especially when the 
spatial array or the set of actions are complicated. Words are wonderful, I use 
them frequently and rather like them, but they bear arbitrary relations to mean-
ing.  
There are other forms of communication, both for self and for other, that 
have more direct correspondences to meaning. I’m thinking, of course, of ges-
ture and graphics. By gesture I mean poses or actions of the body, especially of 
the hands and head, that act on thought rather than on the world. By graphics I 
refer to marks on a virtual page, with a broad scope for both. Marks could be 
the parts of a model of a building or a molecule and a page could be a screen or 
the face of a rock or a virtual 3-D space that stands for a building or a mole-
cule. Graphics also include sketches, photos, maps, charts, diagrams, and such. 
There are two important points here. The ways that information is represented 
in gesture and graphics is more natural, immediate and direct than the ways 
information is represented in words. Next, both gesture and graphics are in the 
world, not in the mind. They are outside the mind and not only can be sensed 
but must be sensed by the body. Of course we can imagine gesturing and imag-
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ine seeing or creating graphics but imagination is between the ears, and the 
stuff that’s beyond the ears and can be sensed has a different status and differ-
ent effects. And of course words can be outside the mind and sensed by the 
body but they fail the tests of naturalness and directness of representation.  
So far, a lot of words. Now for some action. Or truthfully, words that de-
scribe research activities that give backing to and expand the claims. Because 
we thought that representing and thinking with words is far from sufficient to 
understand how people represent and think about many of the important things 
in their lives, faces, bodies, objects, spaces, and events in time, we studied 
those one by one to uncover how they are represented and thought about 
(Tversky 2005a, 2005b; Tversky 2009; Tversky, Zacks and Hard 2008). The 
upshot: mostly not in words; each followed its own logic though descriptions of 
each in words turns out to be fascinating in and of itself. Then we turned to the 
spaces people create to expand their own thought. These have a long, long 
history. Cave paintings date back at least 35,000 years. Images of maps, ani-
mals, people, and mysterious symbols incised in stone are ancient and scattered 
across remote parts of the world. What roles these served for the people who 
made them or viewed them can only be a matter of speculation but the difficul-
ty of making them and their ubiquity attest to strong human–and only human–
desires to create and contemplate them. 
2. Graphics 
One line of research has been showing how graphics communicate (Tversky 
2009): what are the semantics and pragmatics of graphic displays and how do 
people use them for comprehension, inference, discovery and creativity? 
Graphics make use of marks on a page and place on a page to convey a range 
of meanings quite directly. Gesture turn out to be similar, but of course also 
different. Let’s start with graphics even though gesture comes first, phylogenet-
ically and ontogentically. Again maps serve as a paradigmatic example: maps 
map; they use elements and spatial relations on a page to represent elements 
and spatial relations in the world. Visual-spatial representations of people, 
animals, objects, and mechanical systems do the same. Many other sets of 
concepts that are not inherently spatial can be spatialized: mandalas, the Peri-
odic Table, organization charts, and graphs among them.  
2.1  Place on a Page 
Even preschool preliterate children can use place on page meaningfully. They 
can put stickers along a line on a page to represent the temporal relations of 
breakfast, lunch and dinner or the quantitative relations of handfuls, bag-fulls, 
and shelf-fulls of candy or their preferences for foods. They are inclined to put 
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greater quantities and values up rather than down. Older children readily use 
proximity on the page to represent proximity on an abstract dimension, time, 
quantity, preference. Why up? Most likely because going up means countering 
gravity, so going up takes strength and health, because people grow taller as 
they grow older, that taller people and buildings and trees are stronger, that 
more money makes a taller pile, that healthy energetic people stand tall and 
weak depressed ones are stooped – the vertical dimension is loaded. All (or 
almost all) good thing go up; it’s overdetermined. The horizontal dimension is 
more neutral though reading order confers substantial directional preferences 
and handedness confers value preferences.  
2.2  Marks on a Page 
There are several kinds. First there are words and word-like symbols and ab-
breviations. Next there are depictive elements, presumably the original founda-
tions of ideographic languages, depictions that resemble what they represent 
like a depiction of the sun or a crescent moon as well as depictions or icons that 
represent figuratively, like the scales of justice or a trash can for deleting files 
or a file folder for creating them. The elements we have been most interested in 
are a third kind, meaningful abstract forms: dots, lines, arrows, circles, boxes, 
and blobs. It’s a long story, so just a few examples here. In a series of experi-
ments in which people interpreted and created graphics, we found that these 
forms have context-sensitive meanings that have shared readily grasped mean-
ings. Dots can represent intersections in maps, people in social networks, ideas 
in knowledge networks. Lines connect dots. They serve as paths in maps and 
relationships in social networks and connections in knowledge networks. Boxes 
contain one set of things and separate those things from things in other sets. 
The Periodic Table elegantly puts each separate element in a box and arranges 
them in rows and columns that represent their molecular properties. 
2.3  Using Graphics 
We’ve not only looked at how graphics are designed to represent a range of 
information, we’ve also looked at the ways different forms of graphics serve 
learning, comprehension, inference, discovery and creativity. These interact 
interestingly with expertise, ability and task. Maps allow a plentitude of infer-
ences based on proximity and direction as well as terrain. So does the Periodic 
Table. The same information presented in different ways encourages different 
inferences, for example people interpret bar graphs as discrete comparisons and 
lines as trends. For learning and comprehension, clarity is critical. Creating 
either a visual or verbal explanation of STEM phenomena increases learning 
but creating a visual explanation is far more powerful (Bobek and Tversky 
2016). For design, art and data discovery, ambiguity is productive because it 
allows for reconfiguration and reinterpretation. Architects and artists say they 
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have conversations with their sketches, they draw for one reason but when they 
examine what they’ve drawn, they make unintended discoveries. From those 
they get new ideas (Tversky and Suwa 2009). The same processes of discovery 
hold for scientists trying to understand a large and complex data set.  
3. Gesture 
Like graphics, gestures also map and spatialize. They use actions in space and 
place in space to map meanings directly. Gesture has some advantages over 
graphics, and some disadvantages as well. Gesture needs nothing more than the 
body we were born with, no pencil, no paper. Gestures are dynamic, so perhaps 
better suited to represent dynamic information, change over time. But gestures 
are fleeting while graphics on a page stay still in front of the eyes to be con-
templated and revised. We have been studying the roles of gesturing and dif-
ferent kinds of gestures for both those who view gestures and those who per-
form them. Gestures commonly accompany speech and often add important 
information not conveyed by the words. The same explanation in words, say of 
arrangements of events in time or explanations of the workings of an engine, 
are understood differently depending on the gestures that accompany the 
speech. More surprising is the finding that the gestures people make alone in a 
room without speaking influence their own understanding and memory. In one 
study, students alone in a room studied descriptions of environments such as a 
small town or a large gym with four or eight landmarks and paths among them 
(Jamalian, Giardino and Tversky 2012). They knew they would be tested and 
that the tests would require inferences, such as spatial relations from perspec-
tives different from those in the descriptions. A majority of participants ges-
tured while reading at least one of the four descriptions. They produced line-
like gestures for paths and point-like gestures for landmarks. That is, as a set, 
their gestures formed models of the environments. Those who gestured per-
formed better on the tests than those who didn’t and those who gestured for 
some descriptions but not all performed better on the descriptions for which 
they gestured. Another group was required to sit on their hands; they performed 
worse. They rarely looked at their hands so the facilitation seems to be spatial-
motor. Gesturing clearly helped them think. We think the spatial-motor repre-
sentations created by the gestures translated the words into thought. 
4. In Sum 
Models are necessary for thinking; by omitting, adding, and distorting the 
information they represent they can recraft the information into a multitude of 
forms that the mind can work with to understand extant ideas and create new 
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ones. Models take elements and relations among them in the represented world 
and map them onto elements and relations in the representing world. In the 
cases of tangible, diagrammatic, and gestural models, the elements and rela-
tions are spatial. The fundamental elements are dots and lines, nodes and links. 
A dot can represent any concept from a place in a route to an idea in a web of 
concepts. Lines represent relations, any relation, between dots. As such, spatial 
models rely on more direct and accessible mappings than language, which 
bears only arbitrary relations to meaning. These mappings can be put into the 
world and made visible or visceral in graphics and gesture. Putting thought into 
the world promotes thought in self and other.  
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Iconicity in Cognition  
and Communication 
Christina Ljungberg ∗ 
Abstract: »Ikonizität in Kognition und Kommunikation«. Iconicity is fundamen-
tal to creative processes of reasoning such as modelling. We use models not on-
ly to orient ourselves in the physical world surrounding us but also as ways to 
sketch out problems by “mapping them,” describe processes, or make decisions 
by using models such as diagrams, maps, or schemata. Mental images are icons, 
and icons can lead to new and rare insights and to the discovery of relations 
that would not be recognized without their iconic representation. Discussing 
the relationship between modelling, reasoning, and creativity, this contribution 
argues that iconicity is essential to reasoning, communication and mutual un-
derstanding, besides being inherently performative. The paper demonstrates its 
argument with examples from picture viewing, map reading, and mental dia-
grams in verbal language. 
Keywords: Iconicity, diagrammatic reasoning, modelling, analogy, similarity, 
visuality, performativity. 
1.   Introduction 
Thinking involves experimentation, trying out various possibilities. Besides 
other cognitive instruments such as words, images and other signs, a model is 
one of the heuristic devices that we deploy in such experimental contexts in 
order to probe and explore new fields of thoughts and ideas. Models are inter-
nal (mental) or external diagrammatic representations. This is why iconicity – 
the general characteristic of mental images – is essential to cognitive pro-
cessing; it builds on perceptual similarities and contrasts. We depend on mod-
els, not only for orienting ourselves in our physical environment but also for 
the ways in which we sketch out problems by “mapping them,” describe our 
experiences or make decisions by means of diagrams, maps, and schemata. 
Iconicity is fundamental to constructing models because mental images are 
icons, and interpreting icons can lead to the discovery of relations not other-
wise recognized so that new and even surprising insights may be obtained. 
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2. Iconicity 
Iconicity is a semiotic concept introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce, the 
founder of modern semiotics. Peirce divides signs into three classes, iconic, 
indexical and symbolic, with respect to the way each sign relates to its (dynam-
ic) object. Indices stand in a real or causal relation to the object they indicate; 
symbols are related to their object by habits or conventions, while icons are, 
roughly, associated with their objects by being, in some way or other, similar to 
them. This similarity can be a visual likeness in the sense that the sign resem-
bles the form or colour of its object, but it may also be of an abstract kind, in 
the sense that it merely represents its structure, in which case the icon is a dia-
gram. A diagram may have the form of external representation, on paper or as a 
three-dimensional model, or it may be a mental image of the object it repre-
sents. In the sense that interpreting and understanding a sentence, for example, 
or any other kind of information, means understanding how its constituent parts 
are related, understanding means creating a mental diagram (see Nöth 2015). 
2.1  Iconicity and Analogy 
Analogy, as Aristotle defines it, “is when the second term is to the first as the 
fourth to the third [and] we may then use the fourth for the second, or the sec-
ond for the fourth” (Poetics 21). In the study of iconicity, analogy comes into 
play when we go one step further and subdivide the icon into its three Peircean 
subclasses of images, diagrams and metaphors. Whereas icons of the image 
type resemble their objects by some distinguishing features, and diagrams 
represent the mere structure of their object, a metaphorical icon is a sign that 
evinces a relation of similarity to some other sign, which is mediated by a third 
(the classical tertium comparationis). Metaphors are thus iconic mediators 
between ideas. As Mark Johnson (1981, 42) points out, “all theories are elabo-
rations of basic metaphors or systems of metaphors”. As far as metaphorical 
models are concerned, the focus is on diagrammatic iconicity. Both scientific 
and technological models as well as creative thought processes are essentially 
diagrams. Any analogy is a diagrammatic icon since it represents a parallelism 
between the structures of two conceptual domains – forming a structure that 
makes the relations between diverse objects, external or internal, more intelli-
gible. 
Take, for instance, a map. For a geographical map to fulfil its function, there 
must exist a “structural analogical relationship of the scaled topographic map to 
reality” (Woodward 2001, 56). A map represents points in space that are dia-
grammatically arranged by means of map signs. Even though map signs are 
culturally constructed, the structural similarity of a map to its territory is a 
concept that, as Woodward argues, is “fairly readily understood” (2001, 56). 
This is what enables the map maker as well as the map reader to visualize a 
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region or a route, project its development or implementation, or to make 
thought experiments by modelling a plan of action. It is this diagrammatic 
modelling that links cartography so closely to the nature of human cognition 
and to our orientation in real space. Models such as maps are ideal instruments 
for orientation, since they possess the unique facility to permit us both to “en-
ter” the map, position ourselves on it and within it as well as above it, allowing 
us to visualize our position inside it as well as the “full picture” from above. 
This is why the diagrammatic icon is our main interest in this paper. Diagram-
matic iconicity is the prototypical characteristic of reasoning since reasoning is 
to arrange ideas diagrammatically. 
3. The Relation between Modelling and Reasoning 
“Diagrammatic reasoning”, as Peirce (CP 2.272) calls it, is the only cognitive 
procedure by which we can obtain new knowledge. A diagram only shows the 
relations existing between its constituents; it does not interpret them. Interpret-
ing is reasoning, and in the process of interpreting the relations presented by a 
diagram, its interpreters can make diverse inferences by which they may obtain 
insights that the diagram itself does not convey. This is why observing a dia-
gram can create new knowledge. 
3.1  The Creative Process of Picture Viewing 
To illustrate this I would like to have a look at a picture such as Pietro Perugi-
no’s Christ Delivering the Keys of the Kingdom to St. Peter (ca. 1481-2, Figure 
1), which is, strictly speaking, a diagram employing the main elements of the 
central perspective – horizon line, vanishing point and orthogonal lines. Since 
the actors in the foreground, being centrally and symmetrically placed, attract 
our immediate attention, this is where we start. What we see up front is an 
event, carried out by the two actors in the center, one standing and one kneel-
ing, with a large key in profile connected to a second key held by the figure to 
the left, who is in the process of handing it over to the kneeling figure on the 
right. We can tell that these two actors are the most important ones because of 
their position in the painting and that the significance of the gesture of rever-
ence is shown by the surrounding group of people. Because the audience are all 
so closely observing what is going on, this effectively draws our attention to 
the center, too. Further back, behind the front actors, we discern some smaller 
characters, who look as if they were standing on top of the front actors’ heads. 
We also see an open square with lines that converge on the doorway of the 
temple in the background, making clear that this is the door for which the keys 
they carry will fit. 
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How do we process this picture? By using “diagrammatic reasoning”, we 
employ the picture as a diagram of perspective and mentally calculate the dis-
tances between the various objects that it represents, and thus we draw our 
conclusion on how the objects are related in their topographic and social space. 
First focusing on the two figures up front, the bright open space between them 
has us move our gaze towards the horizon line guided by the diagonal line 
behind the head of Christ, then connecting them with the temple door, which is 
diagrammatically positioned where the projections intersect at the picture’s 
vanishing point. Viewing the picture thus means that we, in a process of exper-
iment and discovery, can gain new information from the picture sign by ma-
nipulating its parts according to certain rules – and in so doing, acquire infor-
mation about how the objects making up the diagram are interrelated. From 
there, we infer what the scenario means. 
Figure 1: Pietro Perugino, Christ Delivering the Keys of the Kingdom to Saint 
Peter (ca. 1481-82). Fresco. Rome (Vatican), Sistine Chapel 
Public Domain: Wikimedia commons. 
One could well object that the event the painting represents is a well-known 
Biblical narrative that legitimates the Christian Church and that diagrammatic 
reasoning is therefore unnecessary. Does the image not simply depict what the 
title states? It is true that the title is necessary to indicate the names of the two 
protagonists in the center, but otherwise a viewer familiar with the cultural 
background in general can come to an understanding of the painting’s meaning 
by using diagrammatic reasoning alone. Even ignoring the main event por-
trayed in the painting, the diagram it forms make viewers understand that the 
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act depicted is of major importance. While keeping in mind that Perugino’s use 
of the then newly invented Renaissance convention of perspective is unique to 
Western art and may therefore not have the same impact on a non-Western 
viewer, the suggested relationship between the gesture, the key and the temple 
door would incite as well as aid most viewers to solve the riddle of its meaning. 
3.2  The Performativity of Diagrams 
This example shows why the convention of the central perspective has been 
enormously successful in the history of painting. Centering everything on the 
eye of the beholder, it functions, in the words of John Berger, “like a beam 
from a lighthouse” since “[p]erspective makes the single eye the center of the 
visual world” (Berger 1968, 16). By this device, the painting becomes a dia-
gram, instigating diagrammatic thinking, and since this process is less about the 
concrete shapes and forms of the figuration represented than about the dynam-
ics, it opens up the potential relationships it depicts. This points to the per-
formativity of diagrams: by inciting diagrammatic reasoning, which is less 
about structure than about manipulation and experimentation, thus trying out 
prospective alternatives, it produces new information and insight and, in so 
doing, creates new knowledge.1 
Diagrammatic reasoning also functions when we try to understand paintings 
with less explicit diagrammatic structure and symbolic content than in Perugi-
no’s painting. Even contemplating a picture such as Malevich’s Suprematist 
Composition: White on White (1918, Figure 2), one of the best-known exam-
ples of twentieth century avant-garde Russian art, helps us consider various 
alternatives and come to an interpretation. Malevich’s picture has often been 
given a mythologizing reading involving a quasi-mystical experience (Faerna 
1996). While its negation of figuration and pictorial composition has been 
interpreted as a “leap into a mystical beyond, inner as well as outer” (West 
2017, 92), which enables the viewer “to penetrate the universe through our 
imagination” (Hultén 1965), diagrammatic reasoning reveals intriguing materi-
al and phenomenological conditions seldom taken into account. 
                                                             
1  For an interesting analysis of Perugino’s painting from a different perspective, see Michael 
Marrinan’s essay ‘On the Thing-ness of Diagrams’ (2016, 28-9). 
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Figure 2: Suprematist Composition: White on White. Kasimir Malevich (1918). 
Public Domain: Wikimedia commons. 
Despite its title, the painting is not monochromatic, especially if we compare it 
to Yves Klein’s IKB 79 (1959).2 In contrast to Klein’s blue, one of nearly two 
hundred monochromatic blues, in Malevich’s painting white is not just white 
but a bluish square with imprecise outlines placed asymmetrically on a beige 
background. This does not only put colour designation into question but since 
figure and background are only distinguished by a minimal difference, the 
viewer gets the impression of seeing the figure placed on top of the back-
ground. However, as Frederik Stjernfelt (2007, 288) has pointed out, the square 
could even function as an ambiguous pattern, a Kippfigur shifting between 
object and background so that the object changes from being an object in the 
foreground and instead becomes a hole in the background, opening towards 
something else – or a void? Even though the difference between the two sur-
faces is minimal, one could also imagine that the square could refer to a zone of 
gravitation, which makes the square’s oblique position one of instability, 
threatening to disappear into the background. It is precisely this diagrammatic 
relationship between figure and ground that gives the painting its compositional 
2  The comparison between Malevich’s White on White (1918) and Klein’s monochromatic blue 
IKB 79 (1959) also clearly demonstrates the difference between a diagram and an icon of 
the image type. Whereas Malevich wanted his art to express “the supremacy of pure feeling 
or perception” (MOMA 1999, 85), which would seem to correspond to an image icon, it is 
Klein’s holistic aesthetic which actually achieves this. As Klein writes, “Art does not depend 
on vision but on the sensibility that affects us, on affectivity therefore, and on that much 
more than all that touches our five senses” (Klein 1958, quoted in Stich 1994, 85). 
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tension and invites experimenting and acquiring or drawing further conclusions 
through diagrammatic reasoning.  
4. Modelling and Creativity
Material models are mental diagrams before they become external signs. They 
also live on as mental diagrams in the minds of those who interpret them. Ma-
terial models such as maps are telling instances of how we operate on models 
to try out various possibilities, make decisions and, in so doing, find new solu-
tions and create new knowledge. 
4.1  Creative Solutions 
Figuring out one’s travel route on the London Underground Tube map (Figure 
3) is an instructive example of how we operate creatively on a diagram. The
map only shows the relationships between the various stations, without specify-
ing the best connections between the point of departure A and a goal B. By
experimenting on the various possibilities of finding the most advantageous
route from A to B, including line changes, we are capable of modelling an
itinerary that suits our purpose. The map per se does not mark the specific
route we are taking. It is only by mentally manipulating the alternative routes
offered by the map that we can obtain this information, that is, that we as users
are able to trace new alternatives of new routes from the map. We may choose
to change at different stations, or use a different combination of lines to avoid
changing more than once – although the diagram does not directly indicate how
to find the quickest and most efficient route.
A comparison between Harry Beck’s famous map of 1933 and the first Lon-
don Underground map of 1908 (Figure 4) shows how innovative Beck’s map 
was. The London Metropolitan Railway – which was the world’s first under-
ground train line – had opened in January 1863 but, operated by several railway 
companies, developed so rapidly that it left passengers completely confused 
about how to find the easiest way to go from A to B. In 1908, finally, railway 
company operators united and pooled their resources to create a joint adver-
tisement in the form of a free publicity map (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3:  Harry Beck’s original London Underground Map (1933), Transport for 
London 
Source: <https://tfl.gov.uk/maps/>. 
Figure 4: The First London Underground Map (1908) 
Source: By Unknown, <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/clive.billson/tubemaps/1908.html>,  
Public Domain, <https://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
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However, the amount of information collected on the 1908 map proved too 
complex for many travelers. Displaying the lines of the eight various railway 
companies, labeled and colour-coded, the relative positions of their stations 
along the lines, the station’s connective relations with each other and the vari-
ous fare zones, the map of the sprawling Tube network was quite a challenge 
for Londoners and even more so for visitors unfamiliar with both the locations 
and the system. In addition, the additional information of important destina-
tions such as hospitals, main theatres, hotels and cemeteries included on the 
map cluttered it and made it difficult for its users to read and orient themselves 
efficiently. 
What makes Beck’s map so revolutionary is thus the diagrammatic reduc-
tion of a complex set of information into an operational network.3 By abandon-
ing geographical detail entirely and simplifying the complex structure by geo-
metrically straightening the lines to have the stations appear vertically, 
horizontally, or at 45 degree diagonals, Beck managed to represent the London 
Underground as a circuit diagram. First rejected by the publicity department on 
grounds that his design was too radical, the map was however granted a trial 
print run, which met with overwhelming success – this was exactly what the 
public wanted. That it became a template for transport systems worldwide and 
still is in operation after almost 85 years testifies to its merit. 
4.2  Architectural Models 
Similarly, in architecture, the strength of an architectural model or blueprint of 
a building is that while it represents the overall framework of a construction, its 
various interrelated parts can be changed, moved or discarded, allowing for an 
entirely new structure to be created that may not have been intended from the 
start. It abstracts from the concrete kinds of material in which it will be con-
structed, which is one of the key features of diagrams since this allows “the 
mind more easily to think of the important features” (Peirce 1998, 13). Never-
theless, as useful and productive as this kind of modelling are to those who are 
used to thinking visually, architectural drawings, like maps, need some practice 
to be mentally visualized and to convert the orthogonal plan into a mental 
diagram of a finished building. That is why architectural renderings, virtual 
two-dimensional images or animations showing the attributes of a proposed 
project, have become an indispensable tool for explaining to customers and 
politicians what the finished construction will look like. 
3  As Kenneth Fields and William Cartwright (2014, 349) point out, Beck was most likely influ-
enced by many maps, but he “pushed the boundaries and created something different, in-
novative and experimental”, which, I would argue, proves the strength of Beck’s diagram-
matic reasoning and subsequent reduction. 
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4.3  Mental Diagrams and Verbal Language 
Mental diagrams are also at work in verbal language. We think in words, imag-
es and other signs arranged in mental diagrams – mental models – so that our 
thoughts can arrange and rearrange the diagram in mental experiments while 
probing and exploring new possibilities. Although words are symbols, they also 
evince iconic and indexical properties – otherwise they would be too abstract to 
represent anything. Iconicity, especially diagrammatic iconicity, plays a crucial 
part here. Syntactic deep structures are diagrams of what the sentences mean, 
and there is also iconicity in the sequential order of the words of our utterances. 
In the classical example, Caesar’s veni, vidi, vici, the shortness of the words is 
an icon of the short time in which Caesar conquered his opponents. Further-
more, as Winfried Nöth (2015, 23) points out, the order of the words is a dia-
gram of the order of the events during that battle. Diagrammatic iconicity can 
be found at all levels of language use: at the level of sentences, phrases and 
words. Verbs, for example, involve mental diagrams of the agents involved in 
the action they represent. 
Mental diagrams are systems and structures, and to the degree that language 
is a system that imposes structures on utterances and texts, verbal thought thus 
has diagrammatic form. Furthermore, a word is also a mental diagram of its 
phonological form, a mental schema of the order, the articulation and the stress 
pattern of how its vowels and consonants are to be uttered or written. That is 
why analogies are important to linguistic theorizing and modelling. Diagrams 
are important factors of language change, language evolution, and language 
acquisition, as the studies by Douglas Hofstadter (1995), Terrence Deacon 
(1997), Esa Itkonen (2005), Dieter Wanner (2006), Olga Fischer (2007), Win-
fried Nöth (2008) and others have shown, all of whom have given evidence that 
the basic mechanism of learning is analogy. 
5. Conclusion: Iconicity as a Precondition for 
Communication and Understanding 
Iconicity is then fundamental to communication and mutual understanding, in 
oral conversation as well as in writing and reading. It also plays an essential 
role in creative thought. It is the mental images, diagrams and metaphors trig-
gered by icons that enable us to understand an utterance or create textual 
worlds from the little black marks on the page. While texts consist of symbols, 
that is, letters and words, these symbols create mental images of relations, 
fictional worlds in which we can move and which we can see in our mind, by 
applying our own experiences and cognitive makeup to the text. This, in turn, 
shapes our individual fictional architecture, its furniture and its cartographic 
imagination in the reading process – and accounts for the creativity it involves. 
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Iconicity thus plays a paramount part in cognition and communication. Ob-
serving a picture, orienting oneself in a text or finding one’s way on a map are 
all complex creative cognitive activities involving modelling through dia-
grammatic reasoning, making use of analogy, similarity, and visuality in this 
process. 
6.  Discussion
Barbara Tversky had two questions to my position statement: 
1) Peirce’s diagrammatic reasoning – is all reasoning actually diagrammatic
and the only way in which we can get new insights? Does diagrammatic
reasoning really apply to Perugino’s painting, which is so heavily loaded
with religious symbols?
2) David Woodward quote: Barbara did not agree with Woodward’s state-
ment that there must exist a “structural analogical relationship of a map
to reality” – as an example, she suggested a cognitive map, which does
not need this “structural analogical relationship”.
To which I answered 
1) Diagrammatic reasoning, in the sense of C.S. Peirce (CP 2.272), is the
only cognitive procedure that provides us with new knowledge. This is
because a diagram only shows the relations existing between its constitu-
ents but it does not interpret them. Interpreting is reasoning. In the pro-
cess of interpreting the relations presented by a diagram, the interpreter
can make diverse inferences by which the interpreter obtains insights that
are not conveyed by the diagram itself. That is why reading a diagram
can result in new insights that the diagram itself does not formulate. As I
argued, even though the title of Perugino’s work clearly states the name
of the two protagonists, a viewer unfamiliar with the cultural background
could arrive at an understanding of the painting’s meaning by diagram-
matic reasoning only, without knowing the Bible narrative. The relation-
ship proposed between the gesture, the key and the temple door provides
clues for solving the meaning of the picture.
2) My point does not concern “cognitive maps” in the usual sense but geo-
graphical maps – a geographical map does not fulfill its function if it
does not have a “structural analogical relationship” to reality, which is
what it is made for, otherwise people could not use it for orientation. At
the same time, all maps could be said to be cognitive as well as being
“protocols of cognition” – they inform us about their own processes of
creating meaning by their selection of and the relation in which they rep-
resent the objects in question.
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Modelling in the Humanities:  
Linking Patterns to Principles 
Rens Bod ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellieren in den Geisteswissenschaften: Verbindung von Prinzi-
pien und Mustern«. Modelling is ubiquitous in the humanities: while scholars 
do many things, the search for patterns and principles, and the links between 
them, is found in all humanistic disciplines and periods. Modelling in antiquity 
consisted mainly of explaining and constraining patterns by means of princi-
ples. In the early modern period, modelling also included the prediction and 
refutation of patterns by means of these principles. Since the late nineteenth 
century, the focus shifted to interpreting and criticizing patterns by means of 
principles. I will discuss some commonalities between modelling in the humani-
ties and in the sciences. The exploration of different modelling strategies and 
practices in the (history of the) humanities has just begun and may lead to a 
new field coined History and Philosophy of the Humanities (HPH), analogous to 
History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). 
Keywords: Patterns, principles, modelling, exceptions, explaining, understand-
ing, interpretation. 
1. Understanding the World by Means of Patterns and
Principles
The idea that the world can be understood in terms of empirical patterns and 
underlying principles is arguably one of humankind’s most important insights. 
A pattern is a regularity observed across events or artefacts, with or without 
exceptions.1 A principle is a generalization that brings together different pat-
terns under a single denominator and which is usually said to explain the regu-
larities. While patterns are empirical, principles are theoretical. Although pat-
terns and principles had different meanings in different periods, the concepts 
seem to be universal. From China to Europe and from Africa to the Americas, 
∗ Rens Bod, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Vossius Center for the History of
Humanities and Sciences, University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 94242, 1090 GE Amsterdam,
The Netherlands; rens.bod@uva.nl.
1 On the concept of pattern, see McAllister 2011.
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people have searched for regularities and underlying principles in both the 
natural and cultural world.2 
The quest for patterns and principles is not limited to the (natural) sciences, 
but is found in all knowledge-making disciplines, including the humanities.3 
Besides discovering patterns and underlying principles in planetary move-
ments, diseases and in the evolution of species, scholars have also found pat-
terns and principles in the transmission of texts, the evolution of languages and 
the development of artistic, musical and literary styles – to name a few. Com-
ing up with theoretical principles that generalize and explain empirical patterns 
is one thing, but showing that there is indeed an explicit relation between the 
patterns found and the principles proposed is quite another. In fact, the problem 
of understanding the relation between patterns and principles has hardly been 
touched upon in the philosophy of the humanities while it has received consid-
erable attention in the philosophy of science. 
I shall argue that the humanistic practice of connecting patterns to principles 
can best be understood as a form of “modelling”. However, the terms “model“ 
and “modelling” are highly ambiguous in the literature. There appears to be no 
common terminology used by either scientists or philosophers.4 This is not in 
itself problematic as it gives us some freedom to redefine “modelling” in a 
humanistic context. We will see that our notion of modelling has some com-
monalities with notions of modelling used in the natural and social sciences.  
To explore what may be needed for an understanding of modelling in the 
humanities, I shall start with a bird’s eye overview of this modelling practice in 
the history of the humanities. My overview, which focuses on the European 
tradition, suggests that questions such as “How does a philologist reconstruct a 
text from extant copies?”, “How does an historian interpret an historical event 
or process?”, “How does a musicologist analyze a piece of music?” and “How 
does an art historian interpret a painting?” are prime examples of modelling in 
the humanities. Yet they have rarely been analyzed from an epistemological 
perspective. This is partly due to the fact that humanities scholars tend to leave 
their modelling decisions implicit – and sometimes even deny that they are 
“modelling”. One of my long-term goals is to make the implicit decisions in 
humanistic practice explicit. I thus take from the field of historical epistemolo-
gy the notion that knowledge can only be adequately understood if studied in 
its historical development.5 I maintain that modelling is not limited to the digi-
tal humanities, let alone to the sciences, but that concepts from the digital hu-
                                                             
2  See Bod 2013a. 
3  I will not go into the question of how the humanities could best be defined. For this, see: 
Bod et al. 2016; Bod and Kursell 2015. For the scope of the current paper, it suffices to refer 
to Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of the humanities (“Geisteswissenschaften“) as the disciplines 
that study the expressions of the human mind – see Dilthey 1883: 29-30. 
4  For an overview, see Koperski n.d. 25 September 2017, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/models/>. 
5  For an introduction to Historical Epistemology, see Nasim 2013. 
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manities – where the notion of pattern has been used from its inception6 – may 
help us in studying other humanities disciplines. In doing so, I will paraphrase 
questions like those given above in terms of patterns and principles. Thus the 
question “How does a philologist reconstruct a text from extant copies?” may 
be rephrased as: “What kind(s) of patterns does a philologist extract from ex-
tant copies and on the basis of what principle(s) does s/he use these patterns to 
reconstruct the original text?”. 
We must keep in mind that humanistic practice is not limited to modelling. 
Humanities scholars do many things: they keep alive the works from the past 
through teaching and writing, they build and maintain archives, they aim at 
developing critical consciousness and historical responsibility, and they also 
pose research questions regarding humanistic artefacts. It is in these research 
questions that the notions of patterns and principles, and the relation between 
these two, are fully fleshed out. 
2. Modelling in the Ancient Humanities: Explaining  
and Constraining 
One of the oldest modelling practices in the humanities is found in philology. 
With the establishment of the Library of Alexandria hundreds of thousands of 
manuscripts – and remnants thereof – were brought together. Among the many 
copies of the same text, no two were alike. In some cases the differences were 
modest and had come about because of copying errors, but the discrepancies 
could also be substantial, consisting of whole sentences that appeared to be 
deliberate changes, additions or omissions. There were also texts that had only 
survived in the form of incomplete fragments. How could the original text – the 
archetype – be deduced from all this material? This was the guiding question 
for a long succession of librarians at the Library of Alexandria. Aristophanes of 
Byzantium (c.257-180 BCE) opted for an explicit philological method to figure 
out how an unknown word form in a manuscript can be identified as either an 
archaic word or as an error. He approached this problem on the basis of a con-
cept of analogy (Callanan 1987). If one could establish that an unknown word 
was conjugated or declined following the same pattern as a known word, it 
could be taken as an archaic word; otherwise it was a corrupted word. Aris-
tophanes defined five such patterns or rules that word forms had to comply 
with in order to be described as “analogous” (analogía). The word forms had to 
correspond in regard to gender, case, ending, number of syllables and stress (or 
sound). Aristophanes’s successor, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c.216-c.144 
BCE), added a sixth rule: when comparing two word forms, both had to be 
                                                             
6  See e.g. Ramsay 2005; Bod 2013b. 
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compound (complex) or non-compound (simplex) (Schironi 2004). The Alex-
andrian philologists thus used the designation of analogía as the underlying 
principle that generalized over the various rules of comparison. New rules for 
reconstructing manuscripts could be (and in fact were) introduced, but they had 
to follow the principle of analogy. This principle served not only as a generali-
zation of existing patterns and rules but also as a constraint for new rules. 
While there were competing schools as well, in particular the school of Per-
gamon that focused on exceptions (anomalía) rather than rules, the Alexandri-
an method has withstood the test of time as a critical approach to text recon-
struction. We owe a debt of gratitude to the insights of the Alexandrians, as 
well as to succeeding generations of tragedians and historians who employed 
their method, for the editions of Homer, Hesiod, Pindarus, Archilochus and 
Anacreon which have been handed down to us. 
Modelling practices are also found in other ancient humanistic disciplines. 
In their descriptions of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, the historians 
Herodotus (c.484-425 BCE) and Thucydides (c.460-c.395 BCE) believed they 
could recognize a pattern in past events, namely that of rise, peak and decline. 
Herodotus found this pattern in both people and states, such as the tyrant Pisis-
tratus and Athens, King Croesus and Lydia, and Darius and Persia: their for-
tunes rose and fell. Herodotus considered the pattern to be the basic structure of 
history: “For many states that were once great have now become small, and in 
my lifetime those that are great used to be small.” (Herodotus, Histories, 1.5.) 
Thucydides also contended that the rise and fall of Athens and its disintegration 
during the Peloponnesian Wars had parallels with other historical periods. He 
believed that this pattern was analogous to human nature and could therefore 
serve as an “aid for interpreting the future” (Thucydides, History of the Pelo-
ponnesian War, 1.22.). 
The Greek historian Polybius (c.200-c.118 BCE) found a different historical 
pattern, namely in the history of Rome. Polybius expressed great admiration for 
the way Rome succeeded where the Greeks had failed. Rome, he argued, refut-
ed the pattern that had occurred in the history of Athens, i.e. a cycle of monar-
chy, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy and, via tyranny, back to monarchy 
again (Polybius, Histories, 1.1-2.). Unlike Athens and other cities, Rome was 
immune to this cycle – and therefore to decline – because of its mixed constitu-
tion. Rome’s governmental structure at the time of Polybius included a monar-
chy (the consuls), an aristocracy (the senate) and a democracy (the people’s 
assemblies). According to Polybius this simultaneity broke the cyclical pattern, 
which turned the history of Rome into a non-cyclical history, or so he believed 
(ibid., 1.4.).  
Although we know nowadays that Rome was also subject to decline, Polyb-
ius did try to find an explanatory principle for the two patterns he observed: the 
rise, peak and decline of the Greek city states, and Rome’s continuous flourish-
ing without decline. His principle of mixed vs non-mixed constitutions leads in 
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the first case to prosperity and in the second to decline. Of course, Polybius’ 
principle could only generalize over two patterns (one of which turned out to 
be incorrect), but he did search for a principle which explained the patterns he 
found. This principle could even make predictions for other city states, alt-
hough Polybius never applied his principle to other situations.  
The search for theoretical principles underlying observed patterns is also 
found in the study of literature, art and music. For example, Aristotle found 
regularities in classical tragedies that he explained by a set of poetical princi-
ples for “good” narratives (Aristotle, Poetica, XXIV, 60a16). These general 
principles were meant as descriptive generalizations underlying the patterns 
found in plays, poems and stories, but Aristotle’s principles were soon used 
prescriptively by Horace and others as a normative guideline for constructing 
new poems. In the field of art history, Pliny found a pattern in Greek and Ro-
man art, which could be defined by mathematical proportions known as the 
canon (Pliny, Naturalis historia, 34. 55.) Although Pliny did not find principles 
for what he called “beautiful” art, he did find mathematical principles for 
“good” art. In musicology, Aristoxenus found melodic regularities in Greek 
musical pieces, which he tried to explain by a few underlying principles that 
constrained the space of possible melodies without explicitly producing melo-
dies (Gibson 2005, 169). These poetic, artistic and musical principles con-
strained the set of possible patterns without producing new pieces of theatre, art 
or music. 
The relation between patterns and principles in Antiquity can thus best be 
described in terms of constraints. Patterns in the humanities cannot be formally 
reduced to principles, like in Euclidian mathematics. Instead, principles in the 
ancient humanities define the conditions or constraints within which these 
patterns and rules can play out. These principles are mainly used to explain 
patterns, and sometimes to predict and interpret patterns. This gives us a first 
clue as to the relation between principles and patterns. 
3. From the Medieval to the Early Modern Era: Predicting
and Refuting
After the fall of the West-Roman empire, European learning was concentrated 
in monasteries, cathedral schools and (later) universities. The basic university 
curriculum was formed by the artes liberales, which were subdivided into the 
so-called trivium, consisting of grammar, logic and rhetoric, and the quadrivi-
um, which consisted of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music. While the 
practice of modelling continued, it was made subservient to biblical-theological 
authority. History writing in the West was dominated by Universal Histories 
that consisted of a narrative pattern that divided the time between the Creation 
and the Last Judgment into different periods (Mortley 1996). The underlying 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  83 
principle was the notion of biblical coherence: all narrative patterns had to be 
in accordance with biblical narrative. In poetics the main goal was to bring 
textual interpretation in accordance with Biblical interpretation (Preminger, 
Hardison, and Kerrane 1974). In philology, the Alexandrian method was brief-
ly revived by Lupus de Ferrière (c.805-62), but philological practice in the 
West remained subservient to ecclesiastical authority (Gariepy 1967). Roger 
Bacon maintained that the old Latin manuscripts of the church fathers were the 
first authority in any attempted reconstruction of biblical texts (Roger Bacon, 
Opus maius, part III.). 
With the advent of humanism, we see a renewed interest in empirical pattern 
searching and modelling. In philology, Angelo Poliziano (1454-1494) goes 
beyond the Alexandrian philological approach when he takes into account the 
genealogical relationship between extant copies (Poliziano 1970-1971). 
Poliziano realized that a group of completely consistent sources could still pose 
a problem. Assume that a number of sources – A, B, C and D – all agree on one 
point, and that B, C and D are entirely dependent on A for their information.7 
Should B, C and D nevertheless be included as extra evidence of the authentici-
ty of A? According to Poliziano they should not: if derived sources were mutu-
ally consistent, they should be identified and eliminated (Poliziano 1970-1971, 
I.39.). Sources should be ranked genealogically so that their dependence in
regard to an older source becomes clear. One anomalous manuscript can refute
dozens of consistent manuscripts purely on the basis of its position in the gene-
alogical ranking. This underlying principle is known as the eliminatio-principle
(from eliminatio codicum descriptorum) or the “oldest source principle” (Maas
1960, 2).
Poliziano used his method with exemplary precision. His quest for genealo-
gies of manuscripts resulted in highly accurate reconstructions of Terence, 
Virgil, Seneca, Propertius and Flaccus. But it is mainly after Poliziano that his 
philological principle revealed some of the most surprising patterns found in 
the early modern period, especially in the work of the philologist and historian 
Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609). Scaliger aimed at unifying all ancient 
histories (Graeco-Roman, Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian and Jewish) so as to 
create the definitive historical chronology (Grafton 1983-1993). Scaliger there-
fore reconstructed various historical texts, among them Manetho’s list of Egyp-
tian dynasties. Using the information from these sources, particularly about the 
duration of the different dynasties, Scaliger was able to date the beginning of 
the first Egyptian dynasty to 5285 BCE. To his dismay this date was nearly 
1300 years before the generally accepted day of Creation, which according to 
biblical chronology had to be around 4000 BCE. In order to “save the phenom-
ena”, Scaliger introduced a new time pattern – the tempus prolepticon – a time 
7  This example comes (with slight modification) from Grafton 1991, 56. 
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before time (Scaliger 1658 [1606]). He placed every event that occurred before 
the Creation, such as the early Egyptian kings, in this proleptic time. Scaliger’s 
solution may come across as artificial, but for a Protestant in around 1600 it 
was inconceivable to cast doubt on the Bible. Yet at the same time Scaliger was 
too consistent to give up on his philological method. It was only a couple of 
generations later when scholars and philosophers like Isaac Vossius and Spino-
za realized that the only possible interpretation of Scaliger’s result was that the 
earliest Egyptian kings had actually lived before the biblical date of the Crea-
tion. This meant that the Bible could not be taken seriously as a historical 
source. Scaliger’s pattern of world history conflicted with biblical chronology, 
and this triggered a chain of biblical criticism that finally resulted in the En-
lightenment.8 
Thus, in the early modern era, a temporal pattern was no longer neutral but 
could be used to refute a formerly well-established world view. This is not to 
say that patterns were neutral in Antiquity – Herodotus and Thucydides also 
interpreted their findings, but their pattern (of rise, peak and fall) corroborated 
their world view rather than challenged it. In the early modern period, however, 
the discovery of certain patterns became critical as they were in opposition to 
the then accepted world view which they effectively refuted. This was not only 
the case for Scaliger’s discovery, but also for discoveries in other humanities 
disciplines. In linguistics, Johannes de Laet designed a number of principles for 
comparing words in different languages, showing that there could be no rela-
tionship whatsoever between American-Indian languages and Hebrew. This 
effectively refuted the idea that Hebrew was the cradle of all languages (de 
Laet 1643). In music theory no hard distinction – with whatever underlying 
harmonic principles – could be found to distinguish consonant from dissonant 
intervals. This rebutted the centuries-old Pythagorean cosmic harmony.9  
4. The Modern Period: Interpretation and Criticism
The first conceptual distinction between the notions of “humanities” and “sci-
ence” was put forward in Giambattista Vico’s Scienza Nuova (1725), but his 
work was ignored for almost a hundred years. It was in the nineteenth century 
when Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) gave a foundation for the disciplines that 
we nowadays call humanities. According to Dilthey the humanities 
(Geisteswissenschaften) are concerned primarily with verstehen (understand-
ing), whereas science (Naturwissenschaften) is about erklären (explaining) 
(Dilthey 1883, 29-30). Humanities scholars would be failing if they observed, 
8  At various places it has been argued that there is a direct line running from Scaliger via 
Saumaise and Isaac Vossius to Spinoza. See e.g. Israel 2002; Jorink 2010. 
9  See Cohen 2010. 
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counted, measured or hunted for apparent regularities. What they should be 
doing is searching for the motives and intentions of historical figures. Laying 
bare these inner mainsprings is more important than studying the external man-
ifestations of the human mind. In this context one also uses the distinction 
introduced by Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) between an “idiographic” 
approach to knowledge (which is the study of the unique and the special) and a 
“nomothetic” way of studying (which seeks to generalize) (Windelband 1904). 
While the humanities were supposed to search for the unique, the sciences 
would deal with the general. This vision turned out to be extremely influential 
as it gave the humanities a powerful identity enabling them to differentiate and 
emancipate themselves from the other disciplines.  
This constitutive separation between the humanities and sciences, however, 
did not correspond to actual practice in the humanities before the nineteenth 
century, as we have already seen. The search for patterns and principles and the 
search for a connection between them (modelling), both before and after the 
nineteenth century, simply continued in all humanities disciplines. When 
Dilthey’s and Windelband’s visions were gaining ground – from the early 
twentieth century onwards – modelling practices in the humanities continued. 
Such practices are found not only in linguistics (e.g. De Saussure, Jakobson) 
but also in philology (Lachmann, Greg), musicology (Schenker, Lerdahl), 
literary theory (Propp, Todorov), art history (Wölfflin, Panofsky) and historiog-
raphy (the Annales school), just to name a few. 
For example, in philology Karl Lachmann (1793-1851) created a principle-
based method of text reconstruction that is known as stemmatology.10 In this 
method, an external representation (“model”) of surviving texts is built – a 
history tree or stemma – that can be used to reconstruct the original text from 
the patterns found in surviving texts. Many elements of stemmatology had 
already been in use for centuries, such as the concept of an archetype (the Al-
exandrians), the genealogical method (Poliziano), as well as the notion of a 
history tree which was used by Carl Johan Schlyter in 1827 (see Figure 1). 
However, Lachmann unified these separate elements into a systematic whole.11 
He believed that a history tree or stemma could be constructed on the basis of 
one underlying philological principle: if an error is created in a version of a 
text then all descendants of that text contain the same common error. On the 
basis of differences between extant texts, a stemma could be constructed. 
Lachmann distinguished three phases: Recensio (determining the genealogical 
relationship between the surviving texts in the form of a history tree), Examina-
tio (deciding on the primitive text) and Emendatio (emending so as to recon-
struct the archetype). Thus modelling in stemmatology was not just a matter of 
                                                             
10  For the fundamentals of Lachmann’s theory, see Lachmann (1876) 2007. See also Ziegler 
2000. 
11  Timpanaro 1963, 5-13. For an English translation, see Timpanaro 2005. 
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linking patterns in manuscripts to the underlying philological principle, but also 
of creating an intermediary representation, a stemma, which facilitated the 
modelling process. 
Figure 1: The Earliest Known Representation of a Stemma by Carl Johan 
Schlyter (1827) 
In art history, the analysis of stylistic patterns was initiated by Giovanni Morel-
li (1816-1891), who created detailed taxonomies of pictorial representations of 
ears, noses, hands and other parts of the body, as well as clouds, leaves, folds 
and individual brushstrokes in Italian art (Morelli 1890-1893). His underlying 
principle was that an artist’s personal style is found in the details of a painting 
over which the artist has no control. Connoisseurs and art historians were 
trained in the Morellian method and learned how to compare stylistic patterns 
across a wide corpus of paintings (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Giovanni Morelli’s Study of the Depiction of Ears by Eight Different 
Renaissance Artists (Morelli 1980-1993) 
Morelli’s method was also used in archaeology to classify Greek vases and 
reliefs. But his stylistic analysis was entirely based on details. It is thanks to the 
work of Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945) that we have stylistic principles with 
which not only all the separate parts of a work of art can be examined, but also 
their relationship to the whole. In his Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
(1915), Wölfflin introduced a gamut of new stylistic concepts that he grouped 
in five pairs of opposites in order to characterize style transitions (in particular 
from Renaissance to baroque). He defined notions like linear versus painterly 
representations, flat versus deep composition, closed versus open forms and 
clear versus diffuse representations, among others. His notions still form the 
basis of historical art analysis today. Yet Wölfflin’s principles were also criti-
cized by people like Walter Benjamin who in his essay Strenge Kunstwissen-
schaft (1933), who argued that Wölfflin neglected the social and cultural inter-
pretations of paintings. Later work by Aby Warburg and Erwin Panofsky did 
take such interpretations into account. 
The quest for relating patterns to principles is also found in literary studies. 
While it may not be surprising to find pattern and principle-seeking practices in 
the work of early formalist and structuralist literary scholars like Propp, Jakob-
son and Todorov, it is less well-known that those who reacted to and criticized 
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structuralism – the post-structuralists – were also relying on patterns (as well as 
principles). This becomes particularly clear if we look at the work of Roland 
Barthes (1915-1980), who built on but also went beyond the long tradition set 
out by the formalists and structuralists. In his book S/Z (1970), Barthes started 
his famous analysis of Balzac’s story Sarrasine by organizing the novella into a 
complex pattern consisting of 561 reading units (“lexies”). He then analyzed 
these units in terms of different meaning attributions, showing that Balzac’s 
realistic text is full of symbolic and other connotations which can be interpreted 
in various different ways by the reader. 
With these examples I do not want to say that modelling was uncontrover-
sial in twentieth-century humanities. In historiography, for example, the oppo-
sition was strongly felt. While social-economic historians and (pre-war) cultur-
al historians like Spengler and Toynbee searched for general patterns and 
underlying principles in history, their results were criticized by narratologists 
(who argued that only the “narrative” could give an account of an absent past), 
the critical school (which claimed that only general criticism could demytholo-
gize the past) and by postmodernists (who went farthest by arguing that any 
claim to historical truth is subject to deconstruction). Yet a closer look reveals 
that the pattern-rejecting historians criticized not so much patterns per se but 
“universal” patterns that were claimed to be culture independent. Their criti-
cism made way for a quest for different patterns that were culture specific or 
ideological. In fact, some historians have found patterns in a historical epoch 
by employing categories and principles from that period. If a historian knows 
the rules of fifteenth-century art theory or rhetoric, for example, they can use 
them to analyze and interpret works of art, texts and other, even less obvious 
objects, dating from that time (Baxandall 1971). 
In musicology and linguistics, as well as in the more recent disciplines of 
theatre studies, film studies, television studies and media studies, we find prac-
tices of pattern searching and the interpretation of these patterns by means of 
deeper principles. In film studies, for example, scholars have developed precise 
methods for analyzing a film by integrating insights from semiology, literary 
studies and linguistics. We see this perhaps most clearly in the work of Chris-
tian Metz (1931-1993), who developed his “Grande Syntagmatique,” in which 
he called the building blocks of film syntagmas. In the spirit of Noam Chom-
sky’s generative syntax (Chomsky 1957), Metz designed a number of theoreti-
cal principles to create a hierarchical organization for these syntagmas so that 
the cinematic structure of the film as a whole could be visualized and interpret-
ed. Such a cinematic narrative structure is represented by a tree diagram where 
the leaves of the tree represent film scenes and the branched structure reflects 
the relationships between the scenes (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Christian Metz’s “Grande Syntagmatique” 
 
From: Buckland 2000, 115. 
 
This formal, principle-based analysis into building blocks has led to some 
surprising results. For example, the narrative structure of the popular series 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, which has dragged on for years, has been 
found to consist of only eight narrative building blocks that are endlessly re-
shuffled (Löwe, Pacuit, and Saraf 2009). This kind of narrative modelling thus 
uses an intermediate representation: the tree diagram. 
It often occurs, however, that films, as well as novels and other narratives, 
cannot be represented by a tree diagram. This happens when narratives are 
neither linear nor tree-branching, but form a network that fans out and consists 
of a multiplicity of junctions without a clear beginning or end. Such a concept 
of an interwoven structure was articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guat-
tari, who introduced the term “rhizome” to this end in Mille plateaux (1980).12 
The term rhizome is taken from botany, where it refers to an underground, 
usually horizontal, stem that often bends upwards again and thus creates a new 
                                                             
12  For an English translation, see Deleuze and Guattari 2004. 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  90 
plant. A rhizome is more complex than a hierarchical tree structure used in, for 
example, stemmatic philology. In a rhizome the different parts that are split up 
hierarchically in a tree structure can also be directly connected to one another. 
In mathematics and information technology, a rhizomatic structure is covered 
by the concept of graph.13 Thus the structure of a website or a video game 
cannot normally be represented as a linear or hierarchical structure but as a 
rhizomatic one. Both tree-diagrams and rhizomes are models in the humanities 
that mediate between patterns and their underlying principles. 
5. Humanistic versus Scientific Modelling 
While modelling in the long-term history of the humanities may seem quite 
different from modelling in the sciences, we find some commonalities as well. 
Our notion of modelling in the humanities is in fact analogous to the notion of 
modelling in Mary Morgan’s and Margaret Morrison’s influential work Models 
as Mediators (1999). According to Morgan and Morrison, phenomena in phys-
ics and economics can usually not straightforwardly be derived from underly-
ing theories, but need to be connected by external models that serve as a kind 
of mediators. Their notion of linking between phenomena and theory in the 
sciences by means of models makes a strong analogy with our notion of linking 
between patterns and principles. 
There is an important difference as well. Morgan and Morrison exclusively 
focus on models as external representations of the objects or phenomena under 
study. We have seen that such a notion of model is not valid for all humanities 
disciplines. In many of these disciplines, modelling consists of describing the 
steps needed to link patterns to principles. While some humanities disciplines 
do indeed use external representations such as trees, graphs or rhizomes to link 
patterns to principles (see above), other disciplines use procedures, rules or 
constraints to do this job. Thus models in the humanities can consist of either 
internal representations (like a set of rules for deriving the archetype of extant 
texts) or external representations (like a tree diagram for analyzing a film). But 
regardless of whether humanistic modelling makes use of internal or external 
representations, the main goal of linking patterns to principles is to explain, 
understand and interpret the expressions of the human mind. 
My quick overview of modelling in the humanities has of course only 
scratched the surface. The exploration of different methodologies, strategies 
and practices in the humanities has just begun. But it has led to new questions, 
such as: what is the epistemological place of the notion of pattern or regularity 
in the humanities and how does it differ from the sciences? How can we under-
                                                             
13  See Chartrand 1985. See also Moretti 2005. 
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stand the relation between the unique and the general? And how can singular 
events that are not part of a pattern be modelled in the humanities (see also the 
discussion below)? What we need to properly deal with these questions is a 
new discipline that we would call History and Philosophy of the Humanities 
(HPH), which should operate on par – and possibly in close alliance with – the 
already existing History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). 
6.  Discussion
Question (Fotis Jannidis): How do we reconcile patterns and the unique in 
the humanities? What about practices that are not defined by an interest in 
looking for patterns? 
Answer: Indeed, as I have stated in the introduction, not all practices in the 
humanities are defined in terms of patterns and principles. But it should be kept 
in mind that patterns are not in opposition to unique events. Patterns actually 
consist of unique events or artefacts, and a unique artefact can often (but not 
always, as we will discuss below) be connected to underlying principles as 
well, so as to explain, understand, interpret or criticize that artefact. Take as an 
example the field of art history (but any other field would do): according to 
Wölfflin (see above), Baroque paintings share a certain common pattern, that 
is, they can be understood in terms of a number of stylistic principles typical 
for that style. But this also means that a single, unique Baroque painting can 
just as well be described by these principles: as a singular Baroque painting it 
shares common features with other Baroque paintings. At the same time, the art 
historian may be interested in the differences between the singular painting and 
other Baroque paintings (e.g. by highlighting the uniqueness of Caravaggio’s 
style), but in all cases the art historian will have to refer to the particular Ba-
roque pattern (and possibly the underlying principles). Thus even if one is 
interested in studying a single painting or literary work or musical piece, one 
may still use patterns and generalized principles in order to interpret a single 
artwork. And this is what I have called modelling.  
Question (Fotis Jannidis): But how do we deal, then, with exceptions that do 
not fit patterns? 
Answer: This is an interesting issue, especially if we consider exceptions 
that neither fit a pattern nor connect to underlying principles. As I said above: 
while modelling is found in all humanities disciplines, it is not the only practice 
in the humanities. Nevertheless, the problem of dealing with exceptions is 
found in almost all knowledge-making disciplines. And yet, common wisdom 
has it that the essential difference between the humanities and the natural sci-
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ences lies in the notion and treatment of exceptions.14 The statement that “the 
exception proves the rule” seems unthinkable in natural science – although we 
should stress here that in the humanities this pronouncement is mainly used in 
the prescriptive tradition of secondary school grammars. All the same, there are 
most certainly exceptions in the humanities. However they are not solely to be 
found in the humanities, but in the natural and social sciences too. Theoretical 
physics, with its universal laws, is sometimes referred to as the only exception-
less discipline. This may represent a possible demarcation. Yet this demarca-
tion characterizes not so much the difference between science and the humani-
ties, as between theoretical physics and other fields. While theoretical physics 
permits no scope for exceptions, applied physics is full of ad hoc corrections, 
phenomenological constants, normalizations and so-called provisos. Although 
the universal laws of nature are considered to be exception-free, in mathemati-
cal derivations and explanations of specific phenomena ad hoc approximations 
and corrections are used more than once.15 We cannot assert anything other 
than that there is a gradual scale from disciplines with the least exceptions to 
those with the most. While theoretical physics reflects an ideal picture, it is not 
feasible for most natural sciences, such as biology, geology, forensic science 
and even chemistry, let alone for other academic areas. 
In the humanities there is such a gradual shift from almost absolute sound 
shift laws in linguistics to less absolute harmonic rules in musicology to 
changeable culture-specific patterns in history. But there is also a gradual shift 
like this in the natural sciences – from the absolute laws of theoretical physics 
to the more approximate laws in chemistry to the local and variable patterns in 
biology. The eminent biologist Ernst Mayr contended that universal patterns do 
not exist in biology (1997, 62). Mayr admitted that the laws of physics and 
chemistry of course apply to biological systems at a molecular level. In a com-
plex system, though, no biological regularity has ever been observed that com-
plies with the rigorous definition of a “law” in theoretical physics. According 
to Mayr, what biologists mean by a “law” is a pattern that is usually local and 
not universally valid and is moreover often statistical. These regularities are 
widely used in the modelling of biological phenomena, without their being 
reduced to the fundamental physical or chemical laws. 
This brings me to another issue, namely the notion of autonomous levels of 
explanation, which I take from the philosopher of science Philip Kitcher 
(1984). In biology the set of principles and explanations used at cell level is 
different from that at an ecological level, for instance. This does not exclude 
the reduction – sooner or later – of complex biological processes to physical 
ones. However, it does not always make sense to reduce a biological phenome-
non to the ”deepest” principles of elementary particle physics in order to ex-
14  For an overview of this discussion, see Bod 2013a, 356-8. 
15  For an overview, see Cartwright 1983. 
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plain and understand it. In line with Kitcher I would argue that there are also 
autonomous levels of explanation, understanding and interpretation in the hu-
manities, which have their own set of principles, just like in biology and other 
disciplines. Obviously the laws of (particle) physics also apply to the human 
brain, and therefore also indirectly to the products of that brain, and thus to 
humanistic artefacts. Yet it is not the case that we need to consult biology or 
physics for the modelling of humanistic artefacts like a literary work, a painting 
or a piece of music. The cognitive and neurosciences have produced important 
insights into the study of literature, art and music,16 but it becomes impossible 
and even senseless if we try to explain, understand or interpret a play by 
Shakespeare, a painting by Rembrandt or a symphony by Beethoven in terms 
of the sum total of all brain activities relevant at the time. It proves to be the 
case that autonomous principles of literary, artistic and musical analysis deliver 
the most insightful interpretations.  
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Modeling in the Digital Humanities:  
a Research Program? 
Fotis Jannidis ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellierung in den Digital Humanities: ein Forschungsprogramm?«. 
The term modeling is used in so many different research fields that the as-
sumption that they are all conceptually connected seems quite hard to defend. 
Therefore, any research on modeling in digital humanities probably has to work 
inductively, to collect examples of all these different practices, in order to de-
termine which have essential communalities. The formal modeling of research 
data in the humanities, up to now most often just discussed under a technical 
perspective, seems to be a good starting point for this endeavor. 
Keywords: Data modeling, concept analysis, formal modeling. 
1. Model and Modeling
It has been acknowledged that modeling is at the core of the digital humanities 
(McCarty 1999, Flanders and Jannidis 2015),1 but the vagueness of the term 
has proven to be challenging for any attempt to build on this insight. Therefore, 
I will start out with investigating which concept of modeling and which of its 
features could be fruitful for the digital humanities. Let us start with a defini-
tion of modeling which is general enough to include some of the very different 
contexts the term can appear in: 
a model is a representation of something by someone for some purpose at a 
specific point in time. It is a representation which concentrates on some as-
pects - features and their relations - and disregards others. The selection of 
these aspects is not random but functional: it serves a specific function for an 
∗ Fotis Jannidis, Institut für Deutsche Philologie, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Am
Hubland, 97074 Würzburg, Germany; fotis.jannidis@uni-wuerzburg.de.
1 This short essay picks up some threads, which have been started as part of a collaborative
effort. Together with Julia Flanders I organized a conference on data modeling in the digital
humanities which resulted in a white paper on the topic: Flanders and Jannidis 2015. We
also edited a volume on data modeling which will be published in 2018 (Flanders Jannidis
2018). After so many discussions I am not able to claim any of the thoughts in this essay
purely as my own. 
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individual or a group. And a model is usually only useful and only makes 
sense in the context of these functions and for the time that they are needed.2  
Models are usually expressed in some medium, they are representations. That 
is one of the reasons why many insights from media studies about mediality or 
from semiotics about signs can be applied to them. Models are not the mod-
elled object itself, so for some aspect and under some perspective they will 
always distort some information, which is the basis for the famous dictum “all 
models are wrong”.3 But though this can be dramatized, usually this is not a 
problem for a successful use of a model. Comparing models to reality, one will 
always find some difference which can be seen as a deficiency, but this usually 
neglects the functional aspects of models. The importance of the relation be-
tween a model and its use cannot be overstated, because the functional re-
quirements a model tries to fulfill are defined by this relation. Last but not least 
it seems useful to me to include the group which will use the model into our 
model of a model. This allows us to see models in a pragmatic context and 
distinguish between semantic aspects of a model and the details of its use. 
Because this is still very general, it may help to have a closer look at what 
has been called a model in research. The term is used in natural and social 
sciences and the humanities to refer to the general theory, the theoretical 
framework behind our research, like the “standard model in particle physics” or 
the “theory of modernization”. Or we can use it to refer to some specific part of 
the general model, which we want to investigate in detail, for example the 
Higgs boson or the establishment of a self-sustained social system like the 
judicial system. To be able to do research we need an operationalization, such 
as the experiment in the Large Hadron Collider with the collisions between 
protons, or the collection of historical material to show that, according to some 
defined indicators, there is a judicial system and it is – in some sense – self-
contained. And for this part, the operationalization, the term “model” has been 
used too.  
There is the whole field of mathematical modeling which is used at many 
different levels. I just mentioned the cases whereby a model is defined as a 
“purposeful representation of reality”, usually to describe deterministic or 
stochastic processes of some sort.4 These kinds of models, which are also used 
by those disciplines in the humanities which work with statistics, are obviously 
not the same as the models we see in machine learning which are used to clas-
sify or cluster data. There is, however, a relation between the two kinds of 
models.  
                                                             
2  See Jannidis and Flanders: A Gentle Introduction to Data Modeling. In: Flanders and Jannidis 
2018. This definition is based on Stachowiak 1973. 
3  Cf. Box 1976, 791-799. 
4  Mooney and Swift 1999, 1. 
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And there is another very common use of “modeling” in the humanities: 
when we classify an item, thus ascribing it to some class, we often refer to the 
classes as models. For example, if we discuss which period a literary text 
should be ascribed to, it is generally assumed that the periods in question are 
some kind of model. In the context of computer science and DH this model is 
sometimes called an ontology.  
In the field of research, the term modeling generally refers to many different 
activities, so different indeed that the question has to be asked: Can we learn 
anything of interest, when we ask the question “what is modeling?” Or is it 
more productive to discuss specific activities of modeling like theory building, 
hypothesis creation and testing, operationalization, mathematical modeling, 
machine learning models, classification and ontology creation etc.? All these 
activities, it could be argued, are connected by a family resemblance and focus-
ing on this may shed some light on the term modeling. It is part of the defini-
tion of Wittgenstein’s concept, that the first and the last member of the family 
don’t have to share a common trait, they have nothing in common (Wittgen-
stein 1976). So looking at them will provide no deeper insight into the family.  
It seems to me that the situation with the concept “modeling” is very similar, 
maybe even worse: the term presupposes a unity, some connecting band be-
tween its different uses, but in contrast to the famous example by Wittgenstein, 
the term “game”, “model” is not used for a group of different activities in ordi-
nary language, but for different activities in different disciplinary terminolo-
gies: mathematical language, language of computer science, language of ma-
chine learning, language of philosophy etc. Trying to understand what 
modeling is, we can collect all these different uses in specific terminologies 
and thus create the impression of some unity, some shared sense of the word, 
but probably it is a questionable endeavor.  
In that light we probably should change the question and choose a new line 
of inquiry. If modeling is a cover term which refers to very different activities 
in different specialized contexts, what would be the best way to learn more 
about them and how can their role in the digital humanities be understood? If 
all these fields of modeling are important for the digital humanities, which of 
them are especially important?  
For quite some time, certainly more than three decades, the answer was: da-
ta modeling is especially important. Developing and applying data models for 
cultural heritage has been and still is a core activity in the DH community. 
Digital representations of cultural heritage objects were assumed to have a 
much longer lifespan than many other digital objects and the modeling was 
either done in the context of institutions which are used to think in very long 
time spans or it was at least influenced by this context. So, data modeling was 
not only a technical problem to solve, but also an institutional problem: how to 
keep a data model alive? And a social problem: how to build a group of people, 
a community of users, around it?  
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There seems to be only one element which distinguishes modeling in the 
humanities from modeling in the digital humanities:5 the need to formally 
model the data and at least some aspect of the phenomenon which is re-
searched. So the role of formal modeling in modeling in the humanities in 
general and the relation of the formal model to the phenomena in the humani-
ties are specific to the digital humanities.  
Data modeling is a kind of formal modeling of entities and their features and 
relations. For institutional reasons it is still a relatively under-researched field 
in computer science because there the term “data modeling” is mainly under-
stood to be the creation of a schema for a relational database. In my opinion 
data modeling is a cover term for a whole range of different “meta models” like 
relational databases, XML, graph theory, formal grammars etc. and we have no 
clear understanding of how these “meta models” can be described using a uni-
fied approach based on set theory and logic. To elucidate these connections and 
develop this unified approach seems to me to be an important step in building a 
theoretical foundation for what is nowadays very often approached as a practi-
cal engineering problem.  
Because there is no general theory of the (digital) humanities, there is no 
way to develop a theory of modeling in the digital humanities using a deductive 
approach. So at the moment at least, we have to work inductively and collect 
insights into the features and problems of modeling in this context and maybe, 
at some point, we will be able to identify some general patterns. Working from 
top down, from the abstraction to the concrete ways of modeling, expecting to 
see some common traits will probably not work for the reasons given above. 
On the contrary, we have to assume that there are no common elements. But 
looking at them and trying to understand their specific challenges in the digital 
humanities seems to me to be an interesting research program. At the very end, 
there will be no grand theory of modeling, but we will have a deeper insight in, 
for example, the challenges historical artifacts, intentional objects, pose to all 
these different ways and levels of modeling. We will understand how the 
vagueness of historical knowledge is processed in these contexts, or how the 
alterity of historical objects is handled.  
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Models and Modelling in Archaeology 
Oliver Nakoinz ∗ 
Abstract: »Modelle und Modellierung in der Archäologie«. Being a discipline in-
between natural science and humanities, archaeology has conflicting attitudes 
towards models. On the one hand the term model is currently very fashionable, 
while on the other hand there is a certain ignorance and even rejection of 
models in archaeology. This is caused by limited knowledge on models, the po-
larization of assumed paradigms, and different developments in different sub-
communities in archaeology. Models in archaeology range from conceptual so-
cial models over typo-chronological models, regression models, network models 
and 3d models to simulations. One single definition of models seemingly does 
not work in archaeology, whereas a structured set of different terms based on 
an overarching definition of models would make sense. Since most models in 
archaeology are derived from other disciplines, the field would benefit from a 
trans-disciplinary modelling framework to enable efficient knowledge transfer. 
In order to establish a fruitful application of diverse modelling frameworks in 
archaeology, the establishment of disciplinary modelling communities together 
with a trans-disciplinary modelling community, as well as a proper education in 
modelling concepts and techniques, is required. 
Keywords: Modelling, model, archaeology, theory, method, simulation. 
1.   Introduction 
1.1  About Fashions 
“This is just a model!” is a frequently heard statement in archaeology.  It indi-
cates a rather negative attitude towards models. Models are something of low 
quality, are rather hypothetical than being proper knowledge, and are inaccu-
rate, positivistic, and at best a nice visualization. 
On the other hand, “model” and “modelling” are fashionable terms in ar-
chaeology. Graphs of the key word “model” used in combination with a num-
ber of disciplines in the catalogue of the Library of Congress in Washington 
visualises the increasing popularity of the term (Fig. 1). While models became 
fashionable in mathematics in the late 1950s, caused by the introduction of 
digital computers and Tarski’s English publications on models, it took another 
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1.2  About Paradigms 
In the 1960s and 1970s archaeology was attracted by concepts adopted in natu-
ral sciences, which influenced the development of the so called “New Archae-
ology”, a flavour of archaeology which stresses approaches in the natural sci-
ences, quantitative methods, objectivity, mathematical concepts, structures and 
functions, modelling, and anthropological analogies. New Archaeology aimed 
to replace the cultural historical paradigm and was itself replaced by “Postpro-
cessual Archaeology”, a postmodern flavour of archaeology. Postprocessual 
archaeology focused on meaning, subjectivity, interpretation, individual deci-
sions, semiotics and theory. New Archaeology and Postprocessual Archaeology 
have been some of the responses to a general development, to which the rise, 
the decline and the revival of modelling in archaeology are also due. There is 
no paradigm succeeding the post-processual paradigm. “Officially” we are still 
in the postprocessual period, but the word counts of “model” reveal that the 
“ideological power” of this paradigm has decreased and perhaps, unnoticed, 
reached the status of an integrational paradigm.  
Before we are able to assess any paradigm, we need to discuss the role of 
archaeology as a discipline in-between natural sciences and humanities. It is 
obvious that archaeology is one of those disciplines in-between natural scienc-
es, social sciences and humanities, such as geography and sociology. In par-
ticular, it seems that archaeology is alternating between the two extremes of the 
natural sciences and the humanities. But what exactly is the problem of the 
divide between science and the humanities? According to Snow (1960) the two 
communities are just not able to communicate. This is certainly a serious prob-
lem, but not the main problem for archaeology. The main difference between 
science and the humanities is that science follows an approach to knowledge 
which defines meaning based on structures observed in nature, while the hu-
manities follow an approach to knowledge which negotiates pre-existing mean-
ing. Archaeology starts with the humanities. We know something about human 
beings and ask questions about historical events and social structures. Our data 
derived from archaeological finds do not have meaning attached to them, they 
just have assumed meaning. However, in archaeology there is the need to 
switch to concepts of the natural sciences. We use the natural sciences as the 
source of specific data such as environmental data, but the crucial point is that 
we need to analyse the structure of the archaeological data with scientific con-
cepts in order to reveal the meaning of the objects. At the end of this analytical 
process archaeology can switch back and answer the historical questions.  
1.3  About Integration 
This description shows that for archaeology to alternate between the humanities 
and science in the evolution of the discipline rather than within specific re-
search projects is rather problematic. Only half of the research agenda of ar-
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chaeology can be completed by adopting exclusively one of the two approach-
es.  
Both “paradigms”, New Archaeology and Postprocessual Archaeology, 
propagated paradigm shifts sensu Kuhn (1962). These paradigms do not corre-
spond exactly to a scientific or a humanities approach, but there is a certain 
correlation. While New Archaeology tends to ignore the need of the humani-
ties, Postprocessual Archaeology tends to ignore scientific methods.  
There are at least two levels of complementarity, the one concerning scien-
tific and humanities approaches, and the one related to preferred topics of New 
Archaeology and Postprocessual Archaeology. This complementarity clearly 
shows that the idea of paradigm shifts is rather absurd in this case, since they 
are not incommensurable “paradigms”. Since the publication of Kuhn’s book 
(1962), paradigm shifts have become tools for stimulating a researcher’s career. 
The conjuncture of models in archaeology has to be seen in relation to this 
social and historical background. The arguments and discussions on models are 
hence partly based on the actual content being discussed and partly on ideology 
in connection to certain assumed paradigms.  
2. Different Types of Models and Terms in Archaeology
In addition to the confusion based on the “war of paradigms” mentioned above, 
archaeology features a rather wide range of different kinds of models. Due to 
the fact that archaeology needs to borrow methods and concepts from other 
disciplines, the variation of models in archaeology matches the number of 
disciplines it borrows from. For most types of models rather small communities 
exist which deal with these models. A lot of work is invested in working im-
plicitly or explicitly with models, but although the term model is fashionable, it 
is generally assumed that modelling does not yet play a central role in archae-
ology as a whole. A modelling community covering models in general does not 
yet exist, while communities working on predictive modelling or network 
modelling are quite active. Below we will explore different types and terms of 
models. 
One of the first explicit contributions to a kind of archaeological theory of 
models is David L. Clarke’s article “Models and paradigms in contemporary 
archaeology” in his edited volume “Models in Archaeology” (Clarke 1972). He 
characterises a model by four terms: comprehensiveness, predictiveness, effi-
ciency and accuracy. This makes it clear that he had a certain type of model in 
mind concerned with prediction. Considering that his friend Peter Haggett co-
edited a volume on models in geography (Chorley and Haggett 1967) and was 
deeply involved in locational theory, this is not surprising. This friendship is 
responsible for most of the archaeological understanding of models during the 
following decades. The general idea was: to establish a relation between some 
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approach. 3D models of landscapes and archaeological documentation repre-
sents another, though related, understanding of the term model. Both types of 
model represent real world objects in order to show them as substitutes for the 
original. This approach can include the reconstruction of parts of objects.  
The next category are models producing new information. Simulations are 
similar to empirical models, but they use artificial data produced according to 
the rules of theoretical models. Monte Carlo simulations and agent based mod-
els (Kohler and van der Leeuw 2007), for instance, are used in archaeology. 
For some archaeologists model is a synonym for simulation.  
While simulations involve a random component, deterministic models pro-
duce definite results according to the applied rules. A frequent example in 
archaeology are Voronoi graphs, which produce exact borders between territo-
ries. Usually these lines are considered unrealistic and, without a comparison 
with an empirical model, this approach does not give much insight. With re-
spect to concerning the real world representation of the model, conceptual 
modes are less strict. The social rank model for Iron Age Scandinavia (Fabech 
and Ringtved 1991), for example, distinguishes three social ranks which are 
connected to certain types of artefact. The model establishes certain ideas about 
the relationship between the members of these ranks. Conceptual models in 
general define the relationship between different entities and are also used in 
practical archaeology. Examples are the definition of workflows and the struc-
ture of organizations, as are database models. Conceptual models based on high 
level theories and concerned with the ancient world can be distinguished from 
those based on low level theories, which are concerned with the research pro-
cess.  
A rather important type of model, though they are rarely addressed as mod-
els, is the latent model (Nakoinz and Hinz 2015). Latent models represent the 
idea of certain relationships between entities, which tend to be implicit in many 
approaches and is rarely expressed explicitly. The typo-chronological model 
can serve as an example. The idea that artefacts of the same type are from the 
same period and similar types are from a similar period is the main assumption 
of the typo-chronological concept. This is nothing but a regression model for-
mulated as a conceptual model, which has been used as a hidden assumption 
for many chronological considerations during the last two centuries.  
Although examples of predictive models, such as Voronoi graphs and simu-
lations, have been given above, quantitative models shall be mentioned as a 
category in its own right. The main idea of quantitative models is to establish 
or apply the relationship between different parameters using mathematical 
constructs. Frequently used methods are regression, interpolation, cluster anal-
ysis, correspondence analysis, and similar approaches. Classical interaction 
models mapping the intensity of interaction against the distance of interacting 
partners can serve as an example (Nakoinz 2013, 2014). Another well-known 
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example also imported from geography is the gravity model (Diachenko and 
Menotti 2012). 
The term model is not used with the same intensity across all of these fla-
vours of models. A laser scan of an archaeological site would be called a mod-
el, while traditional documentation, comprising drawings, photos, and descrip-
tions, which in fact produce a kind of empirical model, is not considered a 
model. The frequency of the use of the term model is much higher for predic-
tive modelling and quantitative models than for conceptual models such as data 
models. Therefore, the frequency of the use of the term model reflects the 
history of research with a certain bias. The use of the term model starts, in 
archaeology, in the 1960s and reaches a peak in the 1970s, due to the success 
of New Archaeology. The nadir of occurrences of model appears in the 1980s 
and 1990s because of the postprocessual critique which made use of different 
types of models while consistently avoiding the term model. Since the end of 
the 1990s, the usage of the term model has been increasing.  
Currently, different kinds of models are in use in archaeology. The main 
categories are: predictive models, representative models, simulations, concep-
tual models, quantitative, and latent models. The different classes of models in 
archaeology are connected to different terminologies, and some are not even 
referred to as models at all. Different communities use different types of mod-
els for different purposes, based on different assumptions and the adoption of 
different terminologies. A definition of model or even a theory of model is 
required, which considers the social component of modelling and addresses the 
hidden assumptions. This idea is not only emerging from archaeology. In Kiel, 
the computer scientist Bernd Thalheim established an interdisciplinary group of 
researchers interested in models. This group developed a bottom up approach 
to modelling theory which solves some of the problems mentioned above 
(Thalheim and Nissen 2015). A model is defined as an artefact representing a 
part of the world. There is an analogy between model and original. A model is 
used in a certain community of practice as a tool for a certain purpose. Each 
community of practice shares some assumptions around the models it adopts, 
methods for developing and using models, and ideas for validating them. The 
shift of focus from the methodology of modelling and representative objects 
toward a practice of modelling in a certain community certainly supports the 
formation of a general theory of models as well as a common terminology in 
archaeology.  
This short survey of the field of archaeological models reveals a heteroge-
neous set of models connected to different sub-disciplines and fields of re-
search. Figure 3 is an attempt to locate different concepts of models in a disci-
plinary set diagram. Social models are placed in the field of theoretical 
archaeology, while typo-chronological models belong to traditional archaeolo-
gy. Network models and simulations belong to both quantitative archaeology 
and digital archaeology. Regression models are associated with quantitative 
archaeolo
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function is particularly promising for the advancement of the discipline. Mod-
els stimulate the creative process and give fast access to a certain topic? Mod-
els allow archaeologists to play with different points of view and to combine 
different ideas with nested models.  
4. Conclusion
4.1  Which Term for Model? 
Does it make sense to ask for a general definition for models, which covers all 
disciplines? The case of archaeology with various models borrowed from dif-
ferent disciplines shows the difficulties of developing a general definition of 
models. In addition, reducing the heterogeneity and using a specific term for 
models would minimise the integrative power of the model approach. A gen-
eral term for models would, however, establish a basis for common understand-
ing and communication. On the other hand, a very general definition, covering 
all possible types of models, would lack the precision required for many mod-
elling tasks.  
It is possible to benefit from both, the lack of an overarching terminology 
and the specificity of modelling practices at the same time. This requires a very 
open and general terminology for models to be subdivided into specific terms 
for different types of models. We already have a lot of specific terms for mod-
els, but we lack an accepted general terminology and in particular we lack a 
structure which establishes the connections between the different specific terms 
for models, a kind of family tree of models. In addition we lack the acceptance 
of specific terms for models used by diverse communities, since most commu-
nities assume that they are in possession of the right, most general and mean-
ingful definition.  
4.2  Four Levels of Using Models 
In addition to problems with the definition of the term “model”, we have to 
face the fact that there are some completely different ways of using models. We 
can define four levels of using models:  
1. Models as Ontological Objects 
The wax-model of a prehistoric man as it is exhibited in a museum and treated 
as an object representing another one might serve as an example. Constructing 
a model means producing an object which resembles something else and can be 
used to represent the original object. A model is used to communicate features 
of the original object by showing some similar features to its audience. The 
mapping or analogy is the key feature for this approach. 
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2. Models as Epistemological Model-Objects 
The shift towards an epistemological perspective allows us to focus on the 
process of deriving new knowledge from models. Constructing a model is to 
produce something which has certain properties. The models are mainly used 
for comparison and hence the reduction of the original information to a set of 
important elements is the key feature of models in this approach. 
The reconstruction of prehistoric houses from one area can be compared 
with those from another area. Digital elevation models are used to understand 
the ancient topography of an archaeological site. Regression models are used to 
establish dependencies of parameters of the location of settlements. 
3. Modelling as a Practice of Solving Problems 
The shift to a practical perspective characterises this use of models. Construct-
ing a model means taking something and using this construct as a model for a 
certain task. Anything can be used as a model, but it is required that certain 
activities, when using the model, allow the modeller to complete a certain task. 
The model can be used as a replacement for the original in order to explore 
internal mechanisms and external relationships. Models as tools or instruments 
which can be used for a certain purpose is the key feature of models for this 
approach.  
Simulations of social or environmental processes help us to understand the 
nature and possible outcome of these processes. Which parameters are leading 
to which types of settlement patterns? Which activities are required to grow 
certain crops? Is a population of x individuals for a settlement a reasonable 
assumption?  
4. Modelling is a Research Framework 
Finally, the shift of focus towards the communities of practice using certain 
models facilitates the formation of a research framework. Which assumptions 
are made by the relevant community of practice? How do they construct and 
use models? What exactly do the terms used in this community mean and how 
do they differ from similar terms in other communities? How are the models 
understood inside and outside the original community of practice? 
Comparing the empirical models of archaeological evidence with the theo-
retical model of building structures such as houses or graves allows archaeolo-
gists to interpret the original data. This is usually done in archaeology without a 
reference to models. The modelling approach offers a clear and concise termi-
nology and even a workflow which enables researchers to involve colleagues 
from other disciplines and other regions without extensive training in the spe-
cific terminology in use. 
All four levels of the use of models make sense for specific purposes and we 
should not assume that one level is better than others. It seems to be much more 
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useful to find the right level for a certain objective. For instance, it does not 
make any sense to force all research into the “modelling as research frame-
work” approach. This is certainly a concept from which many research projects 
can benefit, but for some research projects working in a well-established and 
efficient research environment without any need to communicate with other 
communities might reduce productivity and efficiency.  
5.  Perspectives 
As long as “This is just a model!” is heard in archaeology, we are far away 
from a proper understanding of models and even further away from a fruitful 
adoption of models on a broad scale. Currently a rather small community in 
archaeology is working with different kinds of models and so contributing to 
modelling in archaeology.  
In order to maximise the benefits of the modelling approaches in general 
and in archaeology, we need to complete some organizational, communicative 
and educational tasks: 
1) Establishing a transdisciplinary modelling community. This community 
would ensure that knowledge transfer between communities is made pos-
sible. In particular, for archaeology, the exchange with other disciplines 
is essential. The present HSR Supplement as well as some other activities 
in recent years show that the development of this community is a work in 
progress.  
2) Discussing a general terminology for models. Actually, it is not necessary 
to come up with a proper and universally accepted definition. Although it 
would be nice to have the perfect definition, the discussion itself devel-
ops transdisciplinary communication skills. 
3) Connecting the different communities of practice to this transdisciplinary 
community. A small transdisciplinary modelling community without con-
tacts to the disciplinary communities does not improve the scientific sys-
tem as a whole. Since not all researchers can be involved in the transdis-
ciplinary exchange, the communication between disciplinary modelling 
experts and transdisciplinary modelling experts is essential, in particular 
for the concept of modelling as a research framework. 
4) Developing trans-disciplinary and disciplinary educational frameworks. 
The process towards modelling as a tool for trans-disciplinary communi-
cation and as a research framework starts with individuals, but needs to 
be based on the whole community. While the students of some disci-
plines receive a rather good education in modelling, an education on a 
trans-disciplinary level and in specific disciplines (such as archaeology) 
in still lacking. The basics of modelling must be part of the curriculum 
for archaeologists. This does not mean we must educate all archaeolo-
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gists as modellers but it does mean we must ensure that everybody can 
communicate with modelling experts.  
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EVERYTHING IS TRANSLATION (Including the Art of 
Making New Boots out of the Old Ones) 
Gunnar Olsson ∗ 
Abstract: »Alles ist Übersetzung (einschließlich der Kunst, aus alten Stiefeln neue 
zu machen)«. Presented here is a map that does not look like a map but as a 
sculpture, a glass tetrahedron sunk into a square slab of granite, three gold 
threads and a red ruby; nothing less than an attempt to capture what it means 
to be human. A creation epic of our own time, a pictured story of how the se-
miotic animal – a species blessed with the faculty of imagination –sacrifices an 
original difference by turning into a set of alternative identities. All told, the 
intricacies of power-and-knowledge captured by the interplay of the Peircean 
signs of symbol, icon and index, the paradigmatic lines of power (/, —, =) em-
bracing each other in a perpetual ménage à trois. Everything cast onto the cul-
turally prepared projection screens of religion (ideology), the arts and the sci-
ences. Ethics and aesthetics two sides of the same coin, the tetrahedron the 
most beautiful of all geometric forms. 
Keywords: Imagination, geography and geometry, identity and difference. 
Man dansar däruppe – klarvaket 
är huset fast klockan är tolv. 
Då slår det mej plötsligt att taket, 
mitt tak, är en annans golv.  
Nils Ferlin, “Infall”  
Every modeler knows that the entrance to Plato’s Academy was adorned with a 
well-wrought sign, at the same time inviting and forbidding. Not, as in the case 
of Auschwitz, Arbeit macht frei, but HERE NOBODY ENTERS WHO DOES 
NOT KNOW HIS GEOMETRY. The message was, of course, that the rules of 
geometry and the rules of thought are one and the same, the implication that 
whoever holds the keys to the former automatically knows the way also to the 
latter. Likewise, critics of cartographic reason believe not only that geography 
is best defined as a geometry with names, but that the Academy had both a 
public entrance and a secret exit. And next to that worm-eaten door was a 
penciled note: HERE NOBODY LEAVES WHO DOES NOT KNOW HER 
GEOGRAPHY.  
Easier said than done. For whereas naming the cornered points is daily 
business, baptizing the lines (the relations between the points) is like chasing a 
chameleon, capturing the planes (the taken-for-granted projection screens onto 
                                                             
∗  Gunnar Olsson, Thunbergsvägen 22, 752 38 Uppsala, Sweden; gunnolss@gmail.com. 
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which the points and lines are cast) nothing less than a struggle with Gödel’s 
impossibility theorem. 
The roots reach deeply into the issue of what it means to be human, hence 
not only into Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s laws of 
thought but into the Ten Commandments as well. One could go crazy for less, 
especially as tragedy teaches that whatever fate there is we bring onto 
ourselves. To do otherwise would therefore be to be dishonest to one self, to 
break the rules of one’s own game, to be utterly lost. In the long run that is 
impossible, for everyone is one with his own map, the indicative and the 
imperative thoroughly entangled. Beware, though, for just as geometry is a 
form of rhetoric, so geography is a form of imagination. No wonder that the 
map is such a power-filled creation, a flying carpet, the contraband par 
excellence. 
And for that reason I must now briefly return to the sculpture Mappa Mundi 
Universalis (Olsson 2007, 412-437; Jensen 2012), in the same expression a 
mapping of power-and-knowledge and a self-referential presentation of the fix-
points, sight lines, and projection planes of understanding, in every respect the 
joint effort of myself and my friend and former student Ole Michael Jensen. So 
close was in fact our cooperation that in the end we reported our findings not 
with our individual names but under the amalgamated imprint of Gunnael 
Jensson. Seemingly not a map at all, just a tetrahedron of transparent glass 
grown out of a square slab of granite. 
Figure 1: Gunnael Jensson, Mappa Mundi Universalis. Glass Tetrahedron on 
Granite Base, 25 ´ 25 ´ 19¼ in. Mixed Media (Kalmar Granite, 
Weissglass, Gold, Ruby) 
 
Source: Museum Gustavianum, Uppsala. First Exhibited in the Uppsala Cathedral, September, 
2000. Photo by the Artist. 
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Not much, yet enough to last us for a lifetime. 
To understand why, imagine how a long time ago a drama was set in 
motion. The stage-floor is a flat rock that gently slopes into the sea, the actors 
some strange creatures emerging out of nowhere, aimlessly spreading across 
the homogeneous plain. A foot gets stuck in a crevice and for the first time ever 
there is a difference different enough to make a difference. The others notice, 
they point and they mutter, every gesture an attempt to force the bothering 
difference into graspable identity. An event of tremendous consequences, for 
what we are now about to witness is the very first sacrifice, the act through 
which the indefinable creatures are eventually changed into human beings, a 
species whose individuals are held together and kept apart by their use of signs, 
every sign an ironic expression of Signifier and signified merged into one 
(Olsson 1993; Jensen 1993). 
When the difference is pulled out of the rock, a well of blood springs up, a 
constant reminder of what happened when the original deviance was turned 
into a non-willing scapegoat, the baring of the navel of what it means to be 
human. In the materialized version of Jensson’s sculpture the place of this 
remarkable event is marked by a red ruby, a godly symbol which in the 
accompanying text is called A. Not because it is A but because as semiotic 
animals we must call it something. 
In the definitional struggle that now follows, the mute difference is 
transformed into a set of communicable identities, like every translation an act 
of violence. More precisely, the foot in the crevice splits into a trinity of 
reformulations, a set of provisional reincarnations that in the chaos of mimetic 
desire find their positions in the corners of an equilateral triangle. Each of these 
aliases is then given a name that reflects the pain with which it was born: the 
shadowy a; the tautological a=a alternatively the perfect sign ௔௔; the informative 
a=b.1 
                                                             
1   Rephrased, the unknown THIS is captured in one of the alternative nets of this, this is this, 
and this is that, the this closely related to the slanted line of dialectics (/), the this is this to 
the horizontal line of the Saussurean Bar (––), the this is that to the parallel lines of the 
equal sign (=). 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  116 
Figure 2: Mappa Mundi Universalis with the Prophets’ Ceiling and the Peoples’ 
Floor 
 
 
As the initial difference is sacrificed, atoms of understanding are captured in a 
mushroom cloud of perpetual fission. 
When the tension reaches its limit, the rock bursts and out of the lava grows 
a glass tetrahedron, a crystal palace sometimes known as the crucible of man, 
sometimes as the prison house of language. The floor and the three walls of this 
enchanting structure are all built as equal-sized equilateral triangles, the walls 
transparent, the foundation sunk into the granite ground, the ruby-covered well 
at its center. In a twist of cultural survival, the three reformulations (a, ௔௔, a=b) 
now rise from the base, stretch upwards and meet again at the tetrahedron’s 
top, the multitudes of Greek polytheism converging in the singularity of 
Abrahamic monotheism. Like every mapping, also this one is a triangulation, 
the A and its three restatements coming together in the vanishing point of the 
pinnacle, the locus of a tautological entity that by definition is what it is – [(a) / 
( ௔௔ ) / (a=b)] – not merely a contradictory condensation of Aristotle’s 
difference and identity, but a transcendence of the law of the excluded middle, 
in its totality nothing less than a rephrasing of God’s name (if a name it is). 
And from its inception this Absolute speaks. Let there be! And there is. A 
universe flowing out of the creator’s mouth, in James Joyce’s conception a 
commodious vicus of (p)recirculation. 
In the coolness of the evening, the utterer (also known under the tautological 
pseudonym A=A) listens back to what he has heard his tongue say, claiming 
first that it is very good, then that he alone has the right to judge. Tolerating 
neither idols nor false prophets, he declares that all usurpers will be killed and 
that every critique will be censored. Hereafter, there shall be neither pictures 
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nor stories, hence no maps either. Impressed by his own achievements, he then 
proclaims a day of rest, a Sabbath without work, twenty-four hours devoted to 
the glorification of himself and his faithful. Mandatory presence, no excuse 
accepted. 
Such is the subjection of subjects. Such is the structure of power. Such are 
the techniques by which we are made so obedient and so predictable. The three 
(or is it four) words of Moses’ first stone tablet (the prototype of constitutional 
law) in its eternal context. 
The crystal palace is a well-guarded castle, its ruling resident the tyrant of 
tyrants. Admittedly a rhetorical exaggeration, for no Absolute is absolutely 
absolute, no crook crooked enough to live on forever. 
But the palace is also a marvelous movie theater, one projector in each of 
the basement corners, golden rays carrying the alternative translations from the 
machine rooms to the screens of the opposite walls: the limestone wall of 
Plato’s cave; the wood panel of Fra Angelico’s Annunciation; the glass of 
Marcel Duchamp’s La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même; all found 
again in the mappa of cartographic reason. And when the projections of the 
imagined identities hit the sheets of glass they miraculously change into a set of 
Peircean signs, no longer the private fantasies of their inventor but 
communicable bits in an evolving discourse. To be technical, the a becomes the 
symbol of a, the a=a the icon of  ௔௔, the a=b the index of a=b. But just as the 
painter’s canvas must be properly prepared for the paint not to crack or run off, 
so must our minds be indoctrinated to ensure that all that is solid does not melt 
into air. Three grand institutions have risen to the task: religion (the / with its 
belief in the a of shared conventions), art (the –– with it’s  ௔௔ striving for perfect 
resemblance), science (the = with it’s a=b, the as-if of provisional truth). Each 
mode of understanding entrenched within its own self-supporting power 
structures, rules, and regulations. 
If these rituals could be perfectly performed, then the projection lines would 
strike the screening planes at 90o angles, every message going straight back to 
the cornered restatement it came from, nothing learned in the process. But even 
though the Saussurean/Lacanian sign is steeped in mimetic desire, the diverse 
ontologies of Signifier and signified guarantee that this perpetual urge can 
never be satisfied. Hence the fortunate consequence that no translation can ever 
be perfect. It follows that in actuality the inclination of the (en)lightening rays 
is never right on and that the projections, instead of returning to the original 
identities unchanged, start bouncing between the walls. In turn, this slight 
deflection means that whatever I happen to think, say and do is never pure and 
simple but always a non-dissolvable blend of religion, art and science. And 
suddenly I see where the trigger of tragedy lies: in the purifying spirit of the 
right angle, in the hatred of the other which is built into the desire of every 
identity formulation – the iconoclastic controversy, Hitler’s Lebensraum, 
Stalin’s Gulag, Rwanda, Srebrenica – all variations on the same theme of 
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translation. Out of bounds. Murderous is our history, murky the connections 
between Signifier and signified, knowledge and action,  
In turn, this is why tragedy for forty years has occupied such an important 
place in my own conception of what it means to be human, indeed why I take it 
to be the most insightful of all available conceptions of thought-in-action and 
action-in-thought. The original setting is crucial, for Sophocles – a Janus-like 
figure who with one eye was scanning the old, with another imagining the 
future – lived his long life in the abyss between the mythos of Homer and the 
logos of Plato. What he then discovered was that the greatest tension of his 
time lay in the attitudes to predicament, for while the archaic poets had taken a 
person’s social standing to reflect his or her ability to handle contradiction, the 
new philosophers defined paradox as the greatest threat to the cohesion of 
human reason, an enemy to be fought by all means. As Wittgenstein ([1921] 
1961) later put it, “without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and 
indistinct: its task to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries” 
(4.112). But in Sophocles’ eyes religion was itself nothing but a human 
invention designed to keep people in place, like other laws issued by the 
humans of the polis rather than the gods of Olympus. 
In my mind this pre-Christian circumstance explains both why the 
tragedians assigned such a crucial role to the chorus and why the recurring 
convulsions of the last centuries are essentially a political crisis, an orgy in 
promises that cannot be kept and therefore should never be given, the election 
results bought with junk bonds issued in the voters’ own names. Whereas the 
problem for the tragedians was the exact drawing of the boundary between the 
humans and the gods, the problem for the post-democrats is that although all 
animals are equal, some pigs are more equal than the others.  
In my reading it is exactly these relations between religion, arts, and science 
that are brought to life in the imaginary space of Jensson’s Prophets’ Hall, its 
floor located on the same level as the intersection of the right-angled projection 
rays and its ceiling supported by the Peircean signs of symbol (a), icon (௔௔) and 
index (a=b). 
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Figure 3: Traces of the first sacrifice 
 
 
A most remarkable event, for without these signs there would never be a 
semiotic animal blessed with the faculty of imagination, by definition the 
ability to make the absent present and the present absent – nothing less than the 
birth of what it means to be human, the blood-stained embryos from the 
original sacrifice cast onto the reflecting walls, the Hall itself (a fusion of 
Plato’s cave and the Sistine Chapel) turned into a picture gallery, a staff of 
prophets serving as expert guides – Pope Francis and Karl Marx, Albert 
Einstein and Alan Turing, Paul Cézanne and Marcel Duchamp presently 
foremost among them.2 
And what do the prophets tell me? That for my own sanity I should leave 
this echo chamber where I do not belong and proceed to the next floor of the 
Plotinian house, a hypostatis where I might better understand what it is to be 
human. Accordingly I now find myself in an enchanting Hall of Mirrors, a 
                                                             
2  Fastened to the wall of religion, but like the other paintings flowing over to the nearby 
ceiling, are Mark Rothko’s large canvases, thin layers of red upon red, many appropriately 
titled Untitled, by all indications the artist’s way of capturing the breathing a, his subse-
quent suicide a foregone conclusion. Moving on to the wall of art we are then directed to a 
ceiling of orthodox icons (including Kazimir Malevich’s Black Square and his Suprematist 
Composition White on White); to the non-initiate a set of mysterious pictures of the holy, 
to the believer something holy in and of itself, hence the very essence of the tautological 
a=a and the Saussurean aa Finally the wall of science and the Peircean index a=b, in the 
ceiling shown as a montage of the expression E=mc2 flipping first into the atom bomb and 
then into the double helix declaring that I am what I am, uniquely different from everyone 
else, the original sacrifice in reverse. And at the nave of it all are Michelangelo’s nine scenes 
from the Book of Genesis, The Creation of Adam the most famous among them. 
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place better known as The Peoples’ Ball Room, its floor tiles made of solid oak 
fetched from the Kantian Island of Truth, its ceiling one with the upper limit of 
language. Centrally placed in that room (its architecture a blend of the stately 
Versailles and a folksy amusement park) is a platform with a throne reserved 
for the ruling ruler and a stage set aside for the entertainers, the sommeliers, 
dance bands, clowns and jugglers, all of them cogs in the propaganda machine 
– bread and circuses, panem et circenses. And even though the children in the 
gutter keep shouting that the emperor is naked, the lackeys continue to carry 
the trail that does not exist. 
Much can be said about the Ball Room happenings, not least about the 
dialectics of one and many, truth and trust, knowing and believing, power and 
submission, law and order, terror and unpredictability, touchable things and 
untouchable relations, the five senses of the body and the sixth sense of culture 
– every conversation a medley of mixed metaphors, every exchange an exercise 
in translation. Looking back at my own work I can now see that I have been 
spending half a century in this fascinating space, an epistemological adventure 
well captured by the titles of the three books Birds in Egg/Eggs in Bird (1980 
[1975]), Lines of Power/Limits of Language (1991), and Abysmal: A Critique 
of Cartographic Reason (2007). In the present context there is little to add 
except that already the preface of the Abysmal (ix) confesses that ”the present 
volume may be read as a record of the silent conversations I have subsequently 
had with [the Jensson sculpture], this material expression of desires non-
suppressed.” Yet I am astonished to see how the once lonely Ball Room is 
getting crowded with a group of trend setters, Giorgio Agamben, René Girard, 
Bruno Latour, Peter Sloterdijk, Slavoj Zizek presently most noticeable among 
them. So tell me now, you mirrors on the wall, who’s the fairest of us all? 
Searching for an answer I lift my eyes. And when I do, I see that above the 
Hall of Mirrors there is a mezzanine, by no coincidence located exactly 
midway between the well in the granite basement and a replica of the Nicaea 
palace at the tetrahedron’s top. A crawling space filled with the implements of 
ontological transformations, including not only the glue of the copula (usually 
symbolized by the parallel lines of the equal sign), but also the paper-thin 
wands of the Divided Line of Plato’s Republic, the Bar of Saussure’s Cours de 
linguistique générale and the coolers of Duchamp’s La mariée mis à nu par ses 
célibataires, même (the clothesline on which the bride hangs her white garment 
and the artist his uncolored self-portrait); the paradigmatic lines of power (/, –, 
=) embracing each other in a fascinating ménage à trois.  
Stuck in that in-between space, a place that feels more like an attic than a 
balcony, I am overwhelmed by the roar of thunder and hammering of heavy 
rain, everything accompanied by the music and stomping feet of a fiddler on 
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the roof.3 Nothing less than the third Commandment confirming itself, six days 
of work and one day for honoring whoever broke your chains and brought thee 
out of Egypt (Deutoronomy 5, 12-5). Serious business, for most exegetes agree 
that the Sabbath was as unique an invention as Israel’s worship of one single 
god, hence a crucial part of the socialization processes through which we are 
made so obedient and predictable. As the musical has it, “like the drip, drip, 
drip of the raindrops, when the summer shower’s through, so a voice within me 
keeps repeating you, you, you. Night and day you are the one, only you beneath 
the moon and under the sun” (Porter 1932).  
Fiddling is the fiddler as untouchable ideology is stirred into a concoction of 
material things and social relations. Abrakadabra, simsalabim! Pogroms in the 
making. 
In the history of longue durée, these musings deserve little but a footnote. 
Yet they too spring from the tension of trust and verification that lies at the 
heart of European culture, perhaps of all cultures, the tales about Oedipus’ foot 
and Odysseus’ scar pulling in one direction, the paragraphs of Moses’ first 
stone tablet in the other (Auerbach 1953). In the cleft in-between hides the inter 
esse of everything inter-esting, including the scientist’s testable theory and 
operationalized model, in the same breath a reified deification and a deified 
reification, the potentially informative a=b turning into the tautological I am 
who I am. In that context the lawmakers’ grasp of human action as a magic 
game of ontological transformations is truly remarkable:  
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing 
that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water 
under the earth; Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them 
(Exodus 20, 4-5; Deuteronomy 5, 8-9). 
Well decreed. For in the empirical now-here of the utopian No-where, nothing 
is more inhibiting than our inability to be abstract enough, presently a threat to 
our very survival. As Abraham responded on his way to the akedah (Genesis 
22, 1): “Here I am.” And the two went on together, world literature’s most 
pregnant silence, translation at the edge. H.C. Earwicker (also known as “Here 
                                                             
3  To my astonishment I also notice that the roof is leaking, the water almost certainly coming 
from the point where the invisible pillar that stretches from the A in the palace basement 
to the A=A of the godly penthouse breaks through the Ball Room ceiling. At issue is the 
alternative interpretations of this hol(e)y place, in the Mappa Mundi Universalis baptized 
A=B, by some congregations revered as “Mohammed” by some others as “Jesus Christ”, the 
former a reporter of what he has heard, the latter the incarnation of what he has been seen 
to be. A universe left to explore, a Mappa Mundi Nicaenum on its way to the drawing board.  
For just as mapping is triangulation, so triangulation is a geometry of power. And just as the 
geometry of power is the practice of cartographic reason, so the practice of cartographic 
reason is the critique of mapping (Olsson, 2007, p. 434). And so it is that the Nicene Creed is 
a codification of a belief system as power-filled as anything ever chiseled onto the first 
stone tablet, as logical as anything ever uttered in the Greek Academy. Astonishing is the 
richness of the tetrahedron, often called the most beautiful of all geometric forms. 
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Comes Everybody” and “Haveth Children Everywhere”) in search of himself, 
the cobbler as well (Joyce 1939). 
 Boot for boot, difference for difference. And Babble’s walls come trumping 
down. 
Discussion 
My Answers to Claas Lattmann’s Questions 
In his insightful discussion Claas Lattmann noted the connections between my 
Mappa Mundi Universalis and Plato’s Republic. His remarks were highly ap-
propriate, for while in my mind Plato’s dialog is in fact a map, its overriding 
purpose to charter the way to the good life in the good city, my crystal palace is 
an attempt to grasp how the semiotic animal straddles the abyss between identi-
ty and difference. In both cases an illustration of how we are relying on the 
faculty of imagination to make sense of the world. 
To be more precise, the connections to the allegory of the Cave are striking, 
even though my attention focuses more on the cave wall than on the perform-
ing puppeteers or the chained prisoners. The reason is, of course, that without 
the projection screen of the wall, there are no shadows either; in the Mappa 
Mundi the three screens of religion (/), art (––), and science (=), serve exactly 
the same purpose. Even more immediate, though, are the parallels to the Plato’s 
Divided Line, in my case often symbolized by the fraction line of the Saussure-
an Bar, the latter nothing less than the magic wand of human action: Let there 
be! And there is. The Swedish epigram speaks for itself, here literally and 
without the rhymes: They’re dancing upstairs / wide awake is the house. / Then 
it suddenly strikes me: / my ceiling is someone else’s floor. 
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Iconizing the Digital Humanities. Models and 
Modeling from a Semiotic Perspective 
Claas Lattmann ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Ikonisierung der Digital Humanities. Modelle und Modellierung aus 
einer semiotischen Perspektive«. Models are ubiquitous in the digital humanities. 
Against the backdrop of the recent discussion in the philosophy of science 
about what models are and what they do, this paper presents a semiotic per-
spective on models in the framework of Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs that 
sheds light on the practice of modeling in the digital humanities. As a first step, 
it is argued that models are icons, i.e. signs that represent their specific objects 
by being regarded as similar to them; and that there are, in all, three basic 
types of model, namely “images,” “diagrams,” and “metaphors.” A second step 
explicates relevant implications of this model-theoretic approach, especially as 
they relate to the digital humanities. In particular, it is shown that models are 
not identical to the things they represent and that they only represent them 
partially; that the representation operates on the basis of a mapping relation 
between select properties of the model and its object; that each model and 
each instance of modeling has a theoretical framework; and that models are 
the true basis for genuine creativity and progress in research. 
Keywords: Models, icons, images, diagrams, metaphors, C. S. Peirce, Digital 
Humanities. 
1.  Iconic Perspectives on Digital Humanities 
Modeling is as ubiquitous in the digital humanities as it is in today’s scientific 
research.1 Scholars use models for creating an ever-growing number of compu-
tational tools that expand the breadth and depth of humanities research. The 
traditional objects of study are transferred into the digital realm by being 
“modeled” by computers so that computations can be done that provide new 
and, if possible, exact insights. Modeling in the digital humanities opens up 
                                                             
∗  Claas Lattmann, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Klassische Altertums-
kunde, Leibnizstraße 8, 24098 Kiel, Germany; clattmann@email.uni-kiel.de. 
1  Models play an ever-growing role in contemporary science: see Bailer-Jones (2009) and 
Frigg and Hartmann (2017); cf. Thalheim and Nissen (2015a) with case studies from a di-
verse range of research fields. On models in the digital humanities, see McCarty (2005, 20-
72), and Ciula and Marras (2016); for a general perspective, see Schreibman, Siemens and 
Unsworth (2004, 2016).  
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new avenues of research and at the same time reshapes the way scholars do 
their investigations.  
This computational turn, or at least digital expansion of traditional method-
ology, takes place all over the humanities and, to a varying degree, affects all 
fields of study, both in research and in teaching. In particular, this holds true 
for Classical Studies, an area that was among the first to embrace the digital 
age.2 To give just a few examples, scholars of Greco-Roman antiquity have 
created digital 3D models of ancient buildings;3 interactive mapping tools to 
explore ancient landscapes and travel routes;4 network models of the axiomat-
ic-deductive relations among proofs in ancient mathematics;5 models of the 
materiality of the medieval manuscripts that contain the ancient texts;6 models 
of citation networks of references to ancient texts in modern scholarly litera-
ture;7 large-scale databanks that contain analyses of the syntactic structures 
ancient texts exhibit;8 digital editions of Greek and Latin texts;9 and corpus-
                                                             
2  For the early development of computational approaches in Classical Studies, see Solomon 
(1993); for a more recent account see Crane (2004). One of the first and most long-lived 
projects in the digital humanities is the “Thesaurus Linguae Graecae” (TLG), a databank of 
ancient Greek literature that began in 1972 (<http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu>); for a history of 
the project see Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (2017). Another long-lived project in Classical 
Studies is the “Perseus Digital Library,” which began in 1985 (<http://www.perseus. 
tufts.edu>); its core is a large-scale collection of texts and other testimonies from ancient 
Greco-Roman culture, including pictures of material remnants and scholarly literature. In-
terestingly, the systematic use of models in order to acquire objective, “scientific” 
knowledge seems to have been invented in ancient Greece itself; see Lattmann (2015). In 
any case, the first attestation of a word for model, “parádeigma,” belongs to an inscription 
in the so-called Tunnel of Eupalinos on the Greek island of Samos, which was built in the 
6th century BCE; see Käppel (1999).  
3  E.g., of the Athenian Acropolis: see Tsingas (2012). Cf. The Digital Institute for Archaeology’s 
“The Million Image Database” project (<http://www.millionimage.org.uk/>). 
4  Cf. the “Ancient World Mapping Center. ‘À-la-carte’” project that allows the GIS-based 
creation of custom maps for ancient Greece and Rome on the basis of historical cartograph-
ic material (<http://awmc.unc.edu/awmc/applications/alacarte/>). For the modeling of an-
cient travel routes see, e.g., “ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman 
World” (<http://orbis.stanford.edu>). Cf. interaction models as described by Nakoinz (2013); 
see also Nakoinz and Hinz (2015). 
5  Cf. Schiefsky (2007). 
6  Cf. Campagnolo (2015). 
7  Cf. Romanello (2016). 
8  Cf. the efforts relating to building large-scale treebanks, with the goal of creating a basis 
for comprehensive computational linguistic analyses: see, e.g., the “Ancient Greek and Latin 
Dependency Treebank (AGLDT)” (<https://perseusdl.github.io/treebank_data/>) project that 
was started in 2016; cf. Mambrini (2016) and see Bamman and Crane (2010, 2011).  
9  See the “Homer Multitext” project (<http://www.homermultitext.org/>); cf. Crane (2010) 
and Almas and Beaulieu (2013). Often these editions allow various analyses of the textual 
material; cf. the “Digital Athenaeus” project (<http://digitalathenaeus.org/>) that aims at 
providing the tools for analyzing text reuse and sources of quotations; for the latter, cf. 
Bozia (2016), Celano, Crane and Majidi (2016), and Gorman and Gorman (2016). For another 
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based digital lexica that use sophisticated statistical methods.10 Despite the 
apparent diversity of these tools that provide new perspectives on, and methods 
for investigating, the traditional objects of research in Classical Studies,11 it is 
clear that they are nothing but, or at their core rely upon, digital versions or 
“models” of those objects proper which they are meant to stand for.12   
As essential as models are for the digital humanities, they are not mere tools 
that do not exert any influence on what scholars are investigating. Quite the 
contrary, models shape what we see to a considerable degree, and it is arguably 
the case that they even determine what we can see. For example, if we create a 
digital political map of ancient Greece, by investigating this model we might 
only find out what the borders of the Greek states were, but we cannot discern, 
e.g., which cultural relations existed between the single parts of Greece, be-
yond and independently of the political landscape; moreover, this model might 
be understood as implying that there actually was something in antiquity that 
was identical to “borders” in the modern sense. To give another example, if we 
model ancient travel with direct distance as the only criterion for choosing 
routes, we cannot see that the primary factor in making a travel decision might 
instead have been the travel costs in terms of time and expenses.13  
In principle, it is not the original, “real” object that we access in the digital 
humanities, but a substitute, i.e. the “model,” which we ourselves create, ex-
plore, investigate, and manipulate. But how exactly do digital models relate to 
their original objects? What are the conditions under which we may use them? 
What are, after all, the advantages and disadvantages, the limitations and bene-
fits of models? In view of the ever-growing importance of digital models in the 
                                                                                                                                
example, see Bernstein, Gervais and Lin (2015); cf. the “Tesserae Project” (<http://tesserae. 
caset.buffalo.edu/>).  
10  See, e.g., Bamman and Crane (2009), in particular for their discussion of some of the differ-
ences in scope and method when compared to traditional lexica, such as the standard 
“Greek-English Lexicon” by Liddell et al. (1996 [1940]). 
11  Another example of how digital technologies might change traditional research and teach-
ing is the “Perseids” Project, which is nested into the “Perseus Digital Library” and imple-
ments crowdsourcing approaches: cf. the project homepage (<http://sites.tufts.edu/ 
perseids/>) and see Almas and Beaulieu (2016). 
12  Cf. Ciula and Marras (2016) as well as McCarty (2004) who locates “modelling” at the core 
of the digital humanities and contends that it “points the way to a computing that is of as 
well as in the humanities: a continual process of coming to know by manipulating represen-
tations.” However, McCarty’s position differs from the perspective taken here insofar as he 
sees modeling only as a heuristic tool and “essentially a quest for meaningful failure”: “The 
best model of something, that is, comes as close as possible to what we think we know 
about the thing in question yet fails to duplicate perfectly that knowledge” (both quotes 
McCarty (2003, 1232)). For a more in-depth discussion of this position, see McCarty (2005, 
20-72).  
13  See Scheidel (2014) on the rationale of the “ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model 
of the Roman World” project (<http://orbis.stanford.edu>). 
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humanities, it is of paramount importance to be able to give sufficient answers 
to these questions.  
Seldom though do the practitioners of the field seem to be interested in ex-
ploring such abstract and at their core philosophical issues.14 To a certain de-
gree, this is to be expected and, admittedly, justified, for modeling is an inher-
ently practical activity and as such it does not necessarily require that we have 
a sophisticated theory of models. Moreover, there is a confusing variety of 
model-theoretic approaches in the scholarly literature from divergent and often 
incompatible perspectives.15 In consequence, it seems to be all but impossible 
to adequately define and comprehensively explore the notions of “models” and 
“modeling,” even if only in order to sharpen our methodological toolkit for 
practical purposes.  
This situation should not be surprising. Apparently, it is caused by the spe-
cific nature of the subject matter itself. As the small number of examples of 
digital models in Classical Studies given above already suggests, it does not 
seem to make much sense to try to apply the label “model” to all the divergent 
things that are commonly called “model.” After all, there does not seem to be 
“the” model, but only “models,” and this only in a very loose sense; after all, it 
is hard to see what all these “models” could have in common. What, for exam-
ple, does a digital map have in common with a treebank; or what does a biblio-
graphical model have in common with a 3D reconstruction of an ancient temple 
or a robot model of a Roman gladiator? Apart from being something “digital,” 
there does not seem to be any single characteristic property (or set of proper-
ties) that these things share with one another. The word “model” might just be 
a highly polysemous word so that the search for a general theory of model 
might be futile and, in any case, not worth the effort. 
This paper disagrees. It will, first, sketch an answer as to whether there is a 
universal definition of model that covers all the models used in the digital 
humanities (and beyond) in the affirmative.16 This model-theoretic approach 
operates in the semiotic framework of Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs and 
proposes that models are a specific form of sign, namely icons, i.e. signs that 
                                                             
14  However, cf. McCarty (2005, 20-72). To be sure, the situation is similar to that in theoretical 
science: see Gähde and Hartmann (2013).  
15  For an overview, see Bailer-Jones (2009), Frigg and Hartmann (2017), and Frigg and Nguyen 
(2017); for a brief account of the history of model theory, see Morrison and Morgan 
(1999b). Cf. Thalheim and Nissen (2015b, 2015c) as well as Nissen and Thalheim (2015a, 
2015b, 2015c). 
16  I have put forward this model-theoretic approach together with Björn Kralemann else-
where; here I can only present the outlines of this theory and, especially in section 3, point 
out some ramifications for our understanding of digital humanities as a genuinely model-
based field. For a fuller account, see Kralemann and Lattmann (2013a, 2013b) and cf. 
Lattmann (2012, 2015, 2016); cf. Gallegos (2018). Nonetheless, I will take the opportunity to 
more fully explicate some of the relevant implications of this approach, especially as they 
relate to modeling in the digital humanities. 
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are defined as being similar to what they represent.17 A second step will trace 
relevant implications of this understanding of models that will provide insights 
into what we can and cannot hope, and try, to achieve by modeling and thus in 
digital humanities at large. This section will demonstrate that it is not only 
possible to give a universal definition of model, but that it might also be helpful 
to do so.  
2. Iconizing Models 
Modeling is an essential feature of using computers as a research tool, whether 
in science or in the humanities. In order to compute anything, one has to build 
and use models that resemble those things outside the computer about which 
the sought-for computations shall be made, whether these things are physical 
objects or theoretical concepts or whatever else.18 The inherent reliance of 
computing on models is readily apparent at the higher levels of computing, for 
example in object-oriented programming languages, for they are based on the 
idea of modeling software objects that are, due to some sort of similarity, re-
garded as equivalent to things existing in the “real” world, here those things 
scholars are interested in investigating in the first place, such as the original 
Greek and Latin texts themselves.19  
It directly follows that digital models are categorically different from their 
original objects and, in principle, not identical to them. Rather, they stand for 
                                                             
17  There are certain similarities to other approaches that understand models as signs in the 
framework of Peircean semiotics; cf., e.g., Ljungberg (2016). Among the main differences, 
though, are the following two points: here, the notions of model and icon are strictly iden-
tified; and second, other model-theoretic approaches are integrated into the overarching 
semiotic framework. These are, first, the model-theoretic approach of modern logic (see, 
e.g., Balzer (1997); cf. Hodges (2013); for an account of its earlier development, see Chang 
(1974) and Vaught (1974)); and second, those model-theoretic approaches that describe 
models from the viewpoint of the concept of mapping (see, e.g., Stachowiak (1973); cf. 
Giere (1999, 2004), Suárez (2003, 2004), Frigg (2006)). 
18  For clarity’s sake and to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to stress that the notion of 
“reality” shall be understood in a broad sense as implying that something has the capacity 
of actually affecting and/or acting upon another thing. In the terms of Peirce’s theory, this 
amounts to something’s being a phenomenon of “secondness.” The intricate question, 
though, as to what “‘reality” exactly meant for Peirce has been controversially discussed; for 
some insights see Mayorga (2007) and cf. below. 
19  This is the case even at the most basic level of computing, for the electric states of comput-
ers represent, and stand for, those numbers (etc.) that make up the relevant (abstract or 
specific) data structures (etc.). That computers have a basically semantic (or semiotic) nature 
is evident in view of the general characteristics of the Turing machine, as which each com-
puter can be described, for the two core components of the Turing machine, “program” and 
“data,” are conceived of as categorically separate, with the “data” by definition having a 
“symbolic” (and that is semiotic) nature; cf. Barker-Plummer (2016).  
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and “represent” these objects as their ontologically separate substitute in the 
digital realm.20 Insofar as representations are nothing but signs and signs can be 
investigated via semiotics, the general theory of signs, we have to take a semi-
otic perspective and explore models as signs. For this aim the sign theory de-
veloped by the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce is well-suited, especial-
ly because it is embedded in a comprehensive and powerful epistemological 
framework.21  
What then is a sign? Peirce defines it as “something which stands to some-
body for something in some respect or capacity” (Peirce CP 2.228), that is, a 
sign is conceived of as something that is an element of a relational structure 
that is established by an intentional action, that is, by someone’s using some-
thing as a sign. Anything can (and does) act as a “sign” if and insofar as, for 
some person (or, more generally, entity that is capable of establishing a sign 
relation, including computers) it represents some “object” and, to continue 
quoting Peirce’s definition, “creates in the mind of that person an equivalent 
sign, or perhaps a more developed sign,” the so-called “interpretant” (Peirce 
CP 2.228).22  
                                                             
20  For clarity’s sake, I should stress that a representation does not necessarily need to be 
(whatever that means) “realistic” or “naturalistic,” e.g., as one might conceive of a photog-
raphy. If something represents another thing, this just means that, in someone’s judgment, 
the one thing stands for the other thing. Evidently, this can be the case even if there is no 
resemblance at all, such as when we use the demonstrative pronoun “this” in order to deic-
tically point to something. On the other hand, neither a representational nor a similarity 
relation implies that one of the relata must be a simplified version of the other; for this 
widespread view see, e.g., McCarty (2004). In effect, models can be as complex as their orig-
inal objects and maybe even more complex; for example, an exact replica of a human being 
could be classified as a model, even if under most circumstances it probably might not be a 
very useful one for research purposes.  
21  This is not meant to imply that there are no other sign theories. Quite the contrary. Howev-
er, taking Peirce’s theory as the basis for formulating a model-theoretic approach is justified 
by the fact that it is sufficiently well-suited for describing models as representational (and 
thus) semiotic phenomena; and that it allows us to neatly integrate other model-theoretic 
approaches. For an overview of sign theories, see, e.g., Copley (2001); for more detailed in-
sights into Peirce’s theory of signs, see Short (2007), Atkin (2013), and cf. Colapietro and 
Olshewsky (1996).  
22  Cf. the full quotation at Peirce CP 2.228: a sign “addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which 
it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It 
stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have 
sometimes called the ground of the representamen.” Cf. Peirce CP 1.564: “A representation 
is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, 
it may stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representa-
men, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its ob-
ject.” Cf. Peirce MS 318 (1907) where Peirce defines the object as the antecedent to the sign 
and the interpretant as the subsequent to it: “The object is what the sign finds; the meaning 
[or Interpretant] is what the sign leaves.”  
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It directly follows that the things used as signs as well as their objects are, 
on the one hand, not confined to physical objects (i.e., qua physical object). 
Among other things, we can use words such as “unicorn” to let them stand for 
non-physical, abstract concepts and imagined things like a unicorn.23 On the 
other hand, the notion of sign is not confined to “linguistic” signs either as they 
are commonly understood. For example, a wind rose can, by pointing some-
where, “stand for” and “represent” the actual direction of the wind at a given 
moment in time. By definition, anything can be a sign if and insofar as it is 
used to “stand for” and thus “represent” something else. Something being a 
sign is no inherent property of any specific thing, but belongs to, and is due to, 
the realm of semiotic practice.  
In sum, Peirce’s definition of sign provides a broad conceptual understand-
ing of signs. They are not bound to any specific form of manifestation or medi-
um. Not only words, but also images, sounds, feelings and so on can be used as 
and, thus, be signs. The definition of sign in particular applies to all those 
things that are commonly classified as models, among them smaller or larger 
replicas of things, mathematical formulas, computer simulations, and digital 
visualizations.24  
Given the general definition of sign, though, it is obvious that models cannot 
be signs simpliciter. While it is clear that every model is a sign, there evidently 
are signs that are not models. For example, the word “word” is, when used as 
such, a sign, but it is not a model for anything, at least not for its meaning 
proper, “word.” It follows that we have to determine whether there is any spe-
cific and clearly-defined sub-form of sign that can be called “model.”  
At first sight, this does not seem to be the case, given the vast variety of 
things that are called “models.” This impression, however, is mistaken, for 
actually, there is one type of sign that can be identified with models, namely 
“icons.” Icons are one of the classes of sign resulting from Peirce’s exhaustive 
classification of all signs into the three classes of “icons,” “indices,” and “sym-
bols” by way of differentiating the specific quality of the relation between the 
sign and its object.25  
                                                             
23  Of course, distinguishing degrees (or modes) of reality prompts quite intricate philosophical 
questions. As mentioned above, “reality” shall here just be taken to mean that, loosely 
speaking, something has an actual effect on something else; for this to be the case it does 
not matter what the specific mode of being of these things is. Cf. Peirce MS 339 (note of 
April 3, 1906). 
24  It should be stressed that all direct relata of the sign relation are signs; cf. Peirce CP 2.303 
and see Peirce MS 318 (1907) and MS 339 (note of October 23, 1906). Signification, there-
fore, has a genuinely semiotic nature; cf. Peirce CP 1.339. A consequence is that we have to 
distinguish between different types of objects (two) and interpretants (three), explicating 
which aspect of Peirce’s theory would lead too far here; for some details, see Jappy (2016).  
25  As according to Peirce CP 2.243, the basic criterion for this classification is whether “the 
relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign’s having some character in itself, or in 
some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant.” It would lead 
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Let us briefly review these three types of sign in order to understand the 
specific characteristics of icons and, thus, models: first, a “symbol” represents 
its object by standing for it because of convention or habitualization. Examples 
are regular words, for they represent their objects because they are commonly 
used in order that they represent them. The word “word” stands for a “word” 
only because it has been made to do so at some point in time and people have 
continued using the word in that way ever since. Second, an “index” represents 
its object by standing for it because of an actual connection to it. A wind rose, 
for example, is an index that represents the direction of the wind at a specific 
moment in time, if and insofar as it is at this given moment in time actually 
affected by the wind. Third and finally, an “icon” represents its object by being 
regarded as possessing a similarity or resemblance to its object. It is defined as 
“a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. 
That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, 
anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like” (Peirce CP 2.276).26 
An example is a photograph, because it represents its object qua being sup-
posed to be perceptually similar to what it shows and is therefore deemed fit for 
serving as a substitute for it. 
Insofar as this classification of all signs into icons, indices, and symbols is 
exhaustive, it is not only the case that models must be classified as icons, but 
also that they have to be identified with them, that is, as long as we grant that 
they are “signs” at all.27 But signs they are, because, evidently, insofar as mod-
els are “models,” they are supposed to stand for or represent “something,” that 
is, semiotically, an object. Furthermore, the relation between this object and the 
model must necessarily be conceived of as a similarity relation, because a 
model, first, does not have the primary purpose of showing that something 
exists or exerts an actual influence, as an “index” does; nor does the relation 
between model and object primarily exist because of an arbitrary or habitual 
connection between these things, as is the case with “symbols.”28 Rather mod-
els are supposed to directly “show” what they stand for and, accordingly, we 
                                                                                                                                
too far to explicate the intricate details relating to this classification; for some insights, see 
Peirce CP 2.247-249 and 4.447-448 and cf. Peirce CP 1.369. There are different (though not 
incompatible, but complementary) classifications of all signs according to different criteria; 
for a thorough and insightful discussion see Jappy (2016, 2017). 
26  This definition is based on Peirce’s theory of categories; see, e.g., Peirce CP 1.417; 1.300-
353; 1.545-567; and 7.327-332; as well as Peirce L 104 (1904). For the conceptual role of 
Peirce’s three fundamental categories for the definition of sign, see Peirce CP 2.242. 
27 This is one of the main differences to approaches to understanding models from a semiotic 
perspective that have been put forward. Cf., e.g., Ljungberg (2016) who equates models with 
“diagrammatical models” exclusively (on this form of model, see below). 
28  That an icon (model) is defined as having a similarity relation to its object does not imply 
that the similarity relation itself is sufficient for letting something be an icon (model), pace 
Frigg and Nguyen (2017, ch. 4). It has been denied that models are necessarily similar to 
their objects, e.g., by Suárez (2003); on this position, however, see Poznic (2016).  
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want to “inspect” them in order to gain acquaintance with, and knowledge 
about, what they represent as well as use them as a more accessible “substitute” 
for their objects that mediates between theory and “reality.”29  
In effect, models are icons, and icons are models. We can further refine this 
insight by availing of Peirce’s, once again exhaustive, classification of all icons 
into three separate classes (Peirce CP 2.277).30 The criterion for this classifica-
tion is the specific type (or “quality”) of similarity that is involved in the iconic 
sign relation. There are exactly three types: in principle, a similarity can either 
relate to simple (“monadic”) qualities, that is qualities as such, such as the 
quality an object has with regard to its color; or, second, to qualities that are 
expressible in the form of two-term (dyadic) relations, that is relations that 
have, according to Peirce, an “existential” or “real” nature and are supposed to 
actually belong to something; or, third, to qualities consisting of three terms, 
which are, according to Peirce, nothing but “semiotic” qualities, that is, quali-
ties that involve a “sign” relation. Evidently, this differentiation is based on the 
minimal number of relata involved in describing the respective qualities, in 
accordance with Peirce’s relation-based notion of category:31 monadic qualities 
are what they are in and of themselves (“firstness”); dyadic qualities are what 
they are due to some form of pairwise or, in another word, direct interaction 
(“secondness”); and, finally, triadic qualities are what they are due to involving 
something that connects two other things (“thirdness”). The single relata of 
these relations, however, do not have to have a simple constitution themselves. 
For example, also a composite variegated pattern of different colors can be 
classified as monadic quality insofar as each partial color is what it is due to 
itself and not because it stands in a specific direct relation to any other color of 
the pattern. 
The resulting types of icon/model are “images,” “diagrams,” and “meta-
phors”:32  
1) “Images” represent their objects by representing simple qualities of their 
objects by way of exhibiting equivalent simple qualities of their own. 
This could be, for example, photographs, toy models, or our perceptual 
content in general. “Images” therefore are not confined to visual images, 
despite their name. There are also audible images, tactile images, audi-
ble-tactile-visual images and so on; there is no restriction as to the medi-
um (or media) in which these icons manifest themselves. “Images” as de-
                                                             
29  On models as mediators, see the essays collected in Morrison and Morgan (1999a), especially 
Morrison and Morgan (1999c); see also Blättler (2015).  
30  For a detailed explication of this classification, which Peirce only gives at this place in a 
notoriously dense and obscure formulation, see Lattmann (2012). 
31  On the notion of quality in general, see Peirce CP 1.422-6.  
32  See Ciula and Eide (2017) for an application of this classification to models in the digital 
humanities. 
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fined by Peirce, therefore, need not be image-like in the common sense at 
all.33  
2) “Diagrams” represent their objects by representing dyadic qualities of 
their objects by way of exhibiting equivalent dyadic qualities of their 
own, that is qualities that can be described by way of direct or pairwise 
relations. Examples are mathematical diagrams as we find them in Eu-
clid’s Elements, for their representational quality is the sum of all the 
mathematical relations among its elements, but each of these elements 
has a specific direct relation to any other element of the diagram that can 
be expressed independently of the relations to all the other elements. For 
example, in a diagram that features a circle that is bisected by a diameter, 
the diameter has a specific direct relation to the circumference for which 
the specific direct relation of the circumference to, say, the center of the 
circle is of no relevance.34  
3) “Metaphors” represent their objects by representing triadic, that is semi-
otic, qualities of their objects by way of exhibiting equivalent semiotic 
qualities of their own. An example is the metaphor “Achilles is a lion,” in 
the framework of which sentence the sign “lion” is assigned an uncom-
mon representational quality for what the name Achilles habitually stands 
for.35 Insofar as metaphors necessarily involve another icon and thus 
model, they can be regarded as meta-models that allow us to experiment 
with the consequences of using something as a model for another thing, 
here of using the (image) icon implied by the symbol “lion” for repre-
senting Achilles.36  
Of these three types of model, it is mainly diagrammatical models that are 
relevant in scientific and digital humanities research. In these contexts, models 
are often used to represent, show, and bring to light qualities that are supposed 
to be essential relational properties of their objects that belong to their “real” 
constitution. Accordingly, diagrammatical models are supposed to lay open the 
objective nature of things and, at the same, time make it accessible to direct 
perception.  
                                                             
33  It is a pervasive feature of Peirce’s terminology that he often uses traditional names for 
objects that he redefines in a most abstract sense, but for which the things denoted by the 
terms as commonly understood can serve as an example. As is obvious in the case of “imag-
es,” this method can lead to severe misunderstandings, for it seems to be implied that this 
type of sign is restricted to only visual images. This impression, however, would be mistaken. 
34  See Lattmann (2018) for a model-theoretic analysis of those diagrams that were used in 
ancient mathematics and especially Euclid’s Elements. Peirce’s theory of the diagram has 
been subject to lively discussion in recent times, especially in semiotic studies; see, e.g., 
Stjernfelt (2007), Queiroz and Stjernfelt (2011), and Krämer and Ljungberg (2016). 
35  For an explication of Peirce’s metaphor theory, see Lattmann (2012). 
36  Cf. Ciula and Eide (2017, i35). 
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However, as is the case with “images,” the class of “diagrams” is not re-
stricted to visual or even mathematical diagrams.37 The notion of “diagram” 
includes any icon that is meant to exhibit dyadic relations. In particular, this 
also applies to mathematical formulas and most computer simulations, for they, 
too, directly represent and exhibit (and not only express or describe) quantita-
tive direct relations that are relevant for what the respective things are supposed 
to be in “reality” (see Peirce CP 2.282 and 4.530). As such signs they are noth-
ing but icons, even if they are composed of, and formulated by way of, “sym-
bols,” namely the mathematical symbols as defined by the theory of mathemat-
ics. Accordingly, a map can still be regarded as an icon, and especially a 
diagrammatical model, if it also includes the non-iconic conventional names of 
the places depicted on it graphically. In short, any representation acts as a “dia-
grammatical model” that is used to iconically make accessible some sort of 
(static or dynamic) “structure” (or “pattern”) that a thing is supposed to have or 
show, irrespective of which semiotic nature its constituent parts have.38  
Evidently, “diagrams” as defined by Peirce play a central role in research. 
However, the two other classes of model are important, too. On the one hand, 
“images” can, among other things, convey a (so-to-speak) first-hand impres-
sion of the objects of study, for example, small replicas or reconstructions of 
ancient buildings, such as digital 3D models. On the other hand, metaphors 
allow us to create new concepts and explore hitherto unknown areas, in particu-
lar by transferring ideas from one area to another by semiotically equating them 
on the basis of postulating that they are similar, in whatever way it may be. For 
example, the methods developed in Classical philology by Karl Lachmann and 
others for creating stemmata of texts for editorial purposes were fruitfully put 
to use in the middle of the twentieth century in a biological context for describ-
ing evolutionary processes in the then new field of genetics.39 Given this, meta-
phors are one of the most fundamental bases of human creativity, and they play 
an important role in modeling, too, especially as heuristic tools in the context 
of exploring new fields of research.40  
                                                             
37  This is a most important point for understanding Peirce’s theory of diagrams. Cf., e.g., 
Bechtel (2017) and Abrahamsen and Bechtel (2015) who, despite demonstrating the im-
portance of diagrams for scientific research, presuppose that the notion of diagram is con-
fined to (loosely speaking) visual diagrammatical (in the traditional sense) drawings.  
38  The equivalence (or at least, similarity) of the notions of “structure” and “pattern” in this 
regard might be particularly interesting from the perspective of the history of the humani-
ties, which can be aptly described as a history of pattern-seeking: see Bod (2013a); cf. brief-
ly Bod (2013b). 
39  For this example, see Bod (2015). 
40  This can already be observed at the beginning of Western science in ancient Greece: see 
Lattmann (2015, 2016). 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  135 
3. Modeling Icons 
In the final section of this paper, I want to point out some of the implications 
that follow from the understanding of models I have sketched in the previous 
section. In so doing, I hope to contribute to shedding light on the practical 
dimension of modeling, in particular in the field of digital humanities. In short, 
the train of thought is the following: (1) Models are not the things themselves; 
(2) from which it follows that models do not represent their objects completely, 
but in a complex way; (3) that is, in modeling we establish a mapping relation 
between the properties of the model and its object, which mapping relation 
depends upon a specific theoretical framework; (4) because of which models 
are not theories; (5) but nonetheless they are, due to the similarity to their ob-
jects, the only basis of genuine creativity and, therefore, progress in research.  
(1) Models are non-identical to what they are a model of; they are not the 
things themselves. For example, a computer-generated 3D model of the Parthe-
non is not the Parthenon itself; a social network model of the Athenian elite of 
the 5th century BCE is not the historical social network itself; and a map of the 
ancient world is not the ancient world itself. At first sight, this seems to be a 
trivial point to make, but actually this is not so. We all too often forget that we 
are just investigating the model and not the original thing itself. The reason for 
this misapprehension is obvious: one of the fundamental presuppositions of 
modeling is that the model is similar to its object and therefore a well-suited 
substitute for it. But as similar as the model might be to its “real” object, it will 
in principle never be anything but a substitute. 
This fact has far-reaching consequences, in particular with regard to the va-
lidity of the results that can be achieved by modeling: all the knowledge mod-
els can provide primarily and in principle relates only to the models themselves 
and not to their objects, that is, those things we are interested in investigating in 
the first place. Accordingly, models cannot provide per se true insights into 
these objects. Instead they provide only potentially true insights, which always 
have to be vetted and validated. The general way of doing so consists of, after 
having completed an abductive step by creating the model itself, a deductive 
step by which we explore what must be true if the results given by the model 
were true indeed; and an inductive step by which we check these implications 
against “reality” (amounting to some sort of “experiment”), that is, of course, 
as far as this is necessary and possible at all. This process might lead to a better 
model, if need be by iterating it until the model is judged to be sufficiently 
good enough.41 Of course, especially in historical studies, one of the main 
                                                             
41  According to Peirce, this is the general method of acquiring knowledge: Peirce CP 2.773-8; 
2.641-4. Cf. Liatsi (2006) on the application of this method in historical and especially Clas-
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problems and challenges consists in implementing the last, inductive step, 
given the scarcity of data as well as the fact that we can only use historical 
sources and are not able to do any direct experiments.42  
(2) This leads to the second point. Because models are not the original ob-
jects themselves, but independent things of their own right that are intentionally 
used as “models” by treating them as similar to, and thus a substitute for, the 
original objects,43 models do stand for, and represent, their objects, but in prin-
ciple they do not do so completely. Instead they stand for their objects, as every 
sign by definition does, with respect to only select properties. For example, a 
treebank that consists of, and represents, sets of syntactical dependencies as 
they manifest themselves in ancient Greek sentences does, on the one hand, 
contain representations of the sentences themselves, but these representations 
only relate to their syntactical structure, and this without even taking into ac-
count their combination in texts beyond the single sentence. In view of this, it 
is in principle mandatory to always be clear about what a model is supposed to 
represent; in the case of treebanks, this would only be the syntactical depend-
encies the single sentences exhibit, not the sentences in their complete com-
plexity or their comprehensive meaning in their pragmatic context etc.44  
Furthermore, the fact that models represent their objects only with regard to 
select properties is not only a matter of including and excluding some of the 
properties in the model; in the process of modeling a more complex process 
takes place. For example, a political map of the ancient world and its semiotic 
object do not share the property of size; furthermore, the map displays proper-
ties that the original object does not possess, such as lines denoting borders; 
and it lacks properties that the original object does possess, such as the differ-
ent heights of the terrain. Models, therefore, are not merely simplified, abstract 
versions of their original objects. Modeling often involves a sophisticated 
transformation of properties between original thing and model. Of course, this 
can have non-intended, non-trivial consequences, beyond just, e.g., looking for 
a line on the ground at the border of the “real” city of Athens. For example, in 
                                                                                                                                
sical Studies. For computer simulations of this epistemological model, see Pauwels and Bod 
(2013). 
42  The same problem exists in several other fields of study and in particular in many areas of 
science: for example, an “experiment” is as impossible in astrophysics as it is in historical 
studies. 
43  See Ciula and Marras (2016) on the pragmatic dimension of modeling in the digital humani-
ties. 
44  Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that the single sentences contain infor-
mation that points beyond the sentences themselves and could be fruitfully analyzed by 
sophisticated methods to yield insights into relevant properties of the whole text; cf., e.g., 
van Cranenburgh and Bod (2017). The integrative combination of the tools and methods of 
current digital humanities research with the traditional hermeneutical toolbox might be the 
future goal of the development of the humanities at large; Bod (2013b) aptly calls this 
“Humanities 3.0.” 
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treebanks there is no way to adequately represent syntactical ambiguities; in-
stead, one has to make a clear-cut decision as to which syntactical function 
each element in a sentence has. This approach, however, fails at places where 
the ambiguity is an integral part of the meaning of the sentences, such as in 
those jokes or riddles whose very being a joke or a riddle essentially depends 
on the actual ambiguity of their syntactical structure. 
(3) Using something as a model requires that one choose properties of the 
original that are to be represented by the model. How then does one choose 
these properties? In principle, this choice is arbitrary and subjective. As per the 
general definition of sign, it always depends upon that person (or entity) for 
whom (or which) something serves as a model. For example, someone may 
choose to regard a freehand drawing of some lines as a map of ancient Greece, 
even if no one else agreed; or one person might prefer to have the map repre-
sent political borders while another one might prefer to have it represent road-
ways. However, as arbitrary and subjective as this choice in principle is, it is 
always guided by, and takes place within, a theoretical framework, most broad-
ly construed.  
According to this framework, first, those attributes are selected that the 
model is thought to possess (“model attributes”); second, those attributes are 
selected that the model as a sign is thought to exhibit as the representation of its 
original (“syntactical attributes”); and, finally, a specific mapping relation is 
established that maps these two sets of attributes onto each other. This mapping 
relation (implicitly or explicitly) defines what the iconic similarity actually is 
that is thought to exist between the model and the original. Accordingly, the 
iconic similarity between the model and its object is only postulated by using 
something as a model, and, in effect, the judgment on how exactly the model 
and its object are similar is arbitrary and subjective, too, and does not depend 
on any “objective” similarity between them.  
The theoretical framework within which the modeling process takes place 
need not be a full-fledged “theory,” e.g., a sophisticated linguistic theory in the 
case of treebank analyses. Rather, any “theoretical” perspective, most broadly 
construed, can serve as a framework, even if only the (set of) notions provided 
by the natural language. As a rule, there is no necessity to choose any one 
specific theoretical framework; for example, we may decide to draw a map in 
accordance with what the natural language implies are features of a “map,” or 
we can decide to draw a map according to strictly technical cartographic stand-
ards. Either map, however, will be a “map” and as such a model; and in any 
case, what each specific “map” means and what its semantic content is will be 
determined by the theoretical framework within which the mapping relation is 
established.  
The choice of the theoretical framework all but determines the results we 
can achieve by using a specific model. For example, in treebanks we can use 
different grammatical frameworks for describing the syntactical dependencies 
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in a sentence and each choice provides us with a different set of options for 
classification.45 In effect, the explicit and implicit theoretical frameworks we 
have to use in modeling not only enable the building and use of models, but at 
the same time also determine their meaning and heuristic value. An important 
consequence in the digital humanities is that the basic setup of computers and 
the theoretical presuppositions of computer science become (implicit or explic-
it) presuppositions of digital models, too. For example, since we do not use 
analog computers and no infinite-precision real numbers can be used, in com-
puter simulations of physical processes the parameter of time is in effect con-
ceived of as being not continuous, but discrete, with all the obvious ramifica-
tions as to the precision and validity of the results, especially in non-linear 
contexts.  
(4) Though models always have a theoretical framework, they are neither 
“theories” nor “descriptions,” even if, of course, theories can imply and de-
scriptions can describe (and thus effectively establish) models.46 This is implied 
by the fundamental definition of models as icons, which rules out that they are 
truth-apt signs, since icons are (so-called) “rhemes” which are in principle non-
truth-apt. Theories, on the other hand, are to be classified as complex truth-apt 
“symbolic” signs, namely (so-called) “arguments” or at least “dicisigns.”47  
It directly follows that what models stand for, and therefore a part of their 
“meaning,” is not determined by the constitution of the thing acting as the 
model itself, because the relation between sign and object is by definition nei-
                                                             
45  To give an instructive example from Classical Studies, the “Ancient Greek Dependency Tree-
bank” (<https://perseusdl.github.io/treebank_data/>) uses an annotation scheme that is 
based on Smyth (1956); see Celano (2016). However, this grammar is, with regard to the 
syntactical phenomena that are covered, less suitable from a scholarly perspective than, e.g., 
both Kühner and Gerth (1898-1904) whose classificatory scheme is arguably more detailed, 
complete, and adequate (cf., e.g., the description of conditional sentences) and Schwyzer 
(1988/1990) who describes the phenomena from a linguistically more up-to-date perspec-
tive. Even if, as Celano (2016) holds, the syntactical categories provided by Smyth’s gram-
mar (1956) might be relatively easy to implement, it is evident that the choice of this 
grammar will not in a few cases lead to non-trivial differences in the results of the syntacti-
cal analyses, with obvious consequences for the outcome of any further statistical analyses.  
46  For the latter, an instructive example is Euclid’s Elements, one of the first and for the history 
of science most important and influential exemplars of systematic mathematical modeling; 
see Lattmann (2018); cf. Asper (2007) on the general characteristic of this treatise and its 
cultural-historical context at large. 
47  The details of the threefold classification of all signs into rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments 
are not relevant here; see Peirce CP 2.250-253. This classification is independent of, and 
orthogonal to, the one into icons, indices, and symbols, for it does not relate to the relation 
between sign and object, but to the relation between sign and interpretant: see Peirce CP 
2.243. On propositions (“dicisigns”/”dicent signs”) see Peirce CP 2.309-388 and Stjernfelt 
(2015). An icon is by definition a rheme (see Peirce CP 2.250 and 2.255) and in particular 
not a dicisign (see Peirce CP 2.314). An obvious implication of the fact that theories are ar-
guments (or dicisigns) is that theories are (composite and complex) semiotic representations 
and therefore signs, too.  
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ther independently fixed by an actually existing relation between these two 
things nor habitualized as in the case of “indices” and “symbols,” respective-
ly.48 Technically, the object of the model is what the object of the model could 
be, for models are signs of potentiality.49 In consequence, all our interpretations 
(and “uses”) of models, insofar as they are applied to anything beyond the 
model itself (its object etc.), are not pre-determined by the model itself; trans-
parent examples are obscure metaphors. However, the theoretical framework of 
a model often acts as a counteracting force that guides our interpretations of the 
model. For example, whereas the natural language in most cases allows a large 
number of different and competing interpretations of a mathematical diagram, 
our theoretical understanding of mathematical diagrams suggests a more or less 
rigid and technical interpretation of any mathematical diagram, at least with 
regard to those aspects that are deemed relevant from the viewpoint of mathe-
matics. Nonetheless, this lack of interpretative freedom is probably a sign of 
rather mature theories, whereas especially in new fields of research we might 
expect to witness a heuristic use of models that, by applying the general meth-
od of acquiring knowledge as described above, successively reduces the vast 
number of possible interpretations of the models in question. Especially in such 
a context, the use of models can be regarded as a substitute for experimenta-
tion, especially in the (digital) humanities.50 
(5) This finally leads to recognizing what, arguably, the greatest benefit of 
modeling is. Even if models cannot exhibit any reason for why they might be 
adequate or not, what they can do is, as some form of embodied knowledge 
that can be directly inspected and investigated, mediate between theory and 
“real” thing, and this by iconically displaying and showing those properties of 
the original thing that would otherwise not be perceivable at all, even if only in 
                                                             
48  It is worth stressing that models in principle have a “meaning.” As Ciula and Marras (2016) 
remark, it directly follows that models are not only tools, but also genuine objects of study 
for the humanities. This also relates to the models that are used in scientific research. 
49  Cf. Peirce CP 2.247: “An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by 
virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Ob-
ject actually exists or not.” On the connection between the notions of monadic quality and 
potentiality see Peirce CP 1.422-426. Describing models as signs of potentiality is preferable 
to regarding them as something similar to (literary) fiction: see, e.g., Frigg (2010a, 2010b). In 
effect, this invalidates the criticism raised against the similarity view of models; cf. Frigg 
and Nguyen (2017, ch. 4). Another point worth noting is that Peirce’s definition of icon im-
plies that the widespread use of the term “ontology” in computer science in the context of 
modeling is misleading, all the more so as it ignores the fact that any model relation is de-
pendent on the pragmatic use of something as a model, with the consequence that any sim-
ilarity between model and object depends on the judgment of the model user; cf. Ciula and 
Marras (2016). 
50 Cf. Stjernfelt (2011), especially on the usefulness of diagrams for experimentation. This is 
one of the reasons why Peirce developed the theory of “existential graphs”; cf. Peirce MS 
514 (1909) and, recently, Sowa (2000) who took up that theory for a comprehensive theory 
of knowledge representation from a contemporary perspective.  
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the mode of potentiality and in the framework of a theory that guides our expli-
cations of the model. Given this, models can count as the most basic, if not 
only, source of genuine creativity. This is made clear by Peirce himself when 
he states the following regarding the usefulness of icons (and thus models) in 
general: “[A] great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct 
observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those 
which suffice to determine its construction. […] Given a conventional or other 
general sign of an object, to deduce any other truth than that which it explicitly 
signifies, it is necessary, in all cases, to replace that sign by an icon” (Peirce CP 
2.279).51 Though simple or complex “symbols,” such as definitions, proposi-
tions, descriptions and theories, can represent and convey analytic knowledge 
and “truth” proper, only models can lead to genuinely novel insights. Models, 
therefore, form the fundamental and indispensable basis for progress in scien-
tific as well as in digital humanities research.  
4. Discussion 
Gunnar Olsson’s Questions 
Gunnar Olsson addressed the importance of translation for being a human. He 
describes the human being as a genuinely semiotic animal whose life consists 
of translating signs between the areas of the arts, science, and religion. To each 
of these areas, he assigns one of the three fundamental types of sign according 
to Charles S. Peirce, namely icons to the arts, indices to science, and symbols 
to religion. In so doing, Gunnar Olsson locates the activity of translation at the 
core of the human condition, for we are doing nothing but constantly exchang-
ing signs for other signs in a never-ending interplay of identity and difference. 
My answers 
I find Gunnar Olsson’s perspective engaging and stimulating, especially from 
the viewpoint of model theory. If we understand models as icons on the lines of 
my position statement, it is just and only modeling, conceived of as thinking in 
the mode of iconicity, that provides us with, and actually is, the very source of 
the contents of human thought. Models are the first starting-points of each and 
every enquiry, and they are genuinely situated in the realm of creativity, that is 
the arts, most broadly construed. As such, these iconic signs are subsequently 
transformed by the activity of “translation,” not only into other models, but also 
into scientific “knowledge” and/or religious “belief.” But, as Gunnar Olsson’s 
position implies, the relevance of modeling does not stop there. The secondary 
indexical and symbolic signs do not serve as the final products of the semiotic 
                                                             
51  See Ciula and Eide (2017) on the creative aspects involved in modeling in the digital hu-
manities. 
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activity of human beings, but they can be, and actually are, used to create new 
signs in turn, in particular in the mode of iconicity. These new models provide 
us with further, ideally more advanced, starting-points of scientific and/or 
religious enquiry. In effect, models not only are the ultimate source of human 
thought and creativity, but, insofar as we cannot escape our being humans and 
thus living beings in space and time, they are, in principle, also informed and 
shaped by our previous states of mind; that is, in short, by who and what we 
are. Modeling, therefore, turns out to be an integral as well as indispensable 
part of what it means to be a human being indeed. 
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Modelling Practices and  
Practices of Modelling  
Giorgio Fotia ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellierungspraktiken und Praktiken der Modellierung«. Modelling 
represents a core method of investigation in the sciences. Relying on a number 
of case studies, I want to explore the main concepts that denote the practice of 
modeling in pure and applied sciences. I argue that these concepts could be 
seen as metaphors to reflect upon when exploring how the practices of model-
ing are characterised across different disciplines. 
Keywords: Mathematical models, numerical models, computational science, 
scientific discovery, data-science. 
1.  Introduction 
Modelling is pervasive in the sciences, where it represents a core method of 
investigation as well as a subject of research per se. This paper considers some 
concepts that characterise the practice of modeling in pure and applied science. 
I argue that these concepts could be useful metaphors in trying to understand 
how models are used to investigate or represent reality. 
2.  Topics in Modelling 
There are many examples of how mathematical models are exploited in science 
and engineering. Effectively, J. T. Oden points out that mathematical models 
“provide the vehicle with which precision is given to theory and to the mental 
processes used to establish and perpetuate what is known in science and engi-
neering” (Oden 2002, 13).  
Use cases include, among others, fluid dynamics and turbulence, wave 
propagation in complex layered media, and the prediction of the behaviour of 
complex engineered systems. With reference to this latter application area, in 
Fig. 1 some results of an integrity analysis simulation for a component of the 
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN in Geneva are shown. The numerical 
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This remark suggests that the concept of reliability of predictions is essential to 
the practice of computational modelling. In fact, it is generally agreed that the 
reliability of a computer simulation (i.e the measure of confidence that can be 
assigned to it) 
depends upon the assessment and control of errors inevitable in the computa-
tional process – modeling errors due to the impossibility of capturing all of na-
ture with mathematical abstraction and approximation error due to the impos-
sibility of solving exactly the mathematical models. (Oden 2002, 15) 
Another concept that is worth further methodological investigations is the use 
of computing as an heuristic tool (Lax 1999, 24-8 passim). In a recent inter-
view, P. D. Lax reports that John Von Neumann already realised in 1945 that 
computing, that is the practice of running a numerical model on a computer,  
[...] gives us those hints without which any progress is unattainable, what the 
phenomena are that we are looking for.” In other words, computing may be 
used not only for solving concrete problems “but rather to explore which way 
science should be developed (Lax 2004, 3). 
Not surprisingly, computational models are now well established as a tool for 
theoretical investigation in science, (see e.g. McCurdy et al. 2002). For exam-
ple, massive computation of turbulence – performed by solving the exact equa-
tions of hydrodynamic turbulence – have provided new quantitative data and 
enhanced the understanding of this area (see e.g. Yeung, Zhai, and Sreenivasan 
2015). This suggests to us that it is worthwhile to further investigate the con-
cept of computing as an instrument for discovery in the sciences and to under-
stand how computational models are used in this endeavour.  
Further opportunities to reflect upon the way to describe the practice of 
modeling in the sciences are provided by examining how these practices are 
viewed from the perspective of the now emerging data-driven science.  
In recent years, in fact, data driven science has emerged as a novel frame-
work, due to recent developments in the technology of experimentation and 
measurement. This trend has forced scientists to change their attitudes toward 
data, and data methods are leading to transformative changes across the engi-
neering, physical and biological sciences as well as the social sciences. Striking 
examples include, among many others, data-intensive computing systems 
(Mattmann 2014), genomics and systems biology (Stephens et al. 2015), medi-
cine and health (Rotmensch 2017), urban informatics (Ota et al. 2016, Zhao et 
al. 2016), political and social sciences (Alvarez 2016), and social media and 
computer-mediated communication (Olshannikova et al. 2017, Barberá 2015). 
Indeed, in most cases the term data-driven modeling seems to have rele-
vance as opposed to a-posteriori validation (or optimisation) of models (Efron 
2016, Hastie 2015). But this is not necessarily true. Interestingly enough, the 
use of such rich data sets has been recently proposed in conjunction with more 
traditional analysis, modeling, and computation. In fact, on one hand, numeri-
cal simulation of large complex systems can easily strain available computa-
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tional resources. Similarly, experiments can generate overwhelming amounts of 
data. On the other hand, recent advances in data-driven methods are allowing 
for significant advances in the prediction and control of highly complex, often 
networked, systems.  
This approach, known as Dynamic Data-Driven Applications Systems 
(DDAS), represents an emerging paradigm in computational science, in which 
“simulations and experiments (or field data) interact in real time to dramatical-
ly improve the fidelity of the simulation tool, its accuracy, and its reliability” 
(NSF 2006, 37). Homeland security, control of hazardous materials, environ-
mental remediation, manufacturing processes, and vehicle flight control are just 
a few of the recent applications of this technology (Darema 2004). As recently 
pointed out (Kuske at al. 2017), it is expected that the combination of these 
approaches may provide a transformative mathematical framework for model-
ing the behaviour of complex systems. This interesting remark suggests that it 
might be useful to investigate how, and in what sense, these different modelling 
techniques are interconnected.  
To sum up, there are a number of concepts that characterise the practice of 
modeling in the sciences. What emerges is a practice-based overview of what 
modelling in the context of different domains of applied sciences means in 
operational terms and a glimpse of what could be entailed if the practice of 
modelling is analysed from this viewpoint. 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, I attempted to explore the concept of modeling in the context of 
different domains of applied sciences from the perspective of modeling as a 
practice. However, there are a number of issues that would need further analy-
sis. For instance, it would be useful to further explore the relationship between 
theory and practice that emerges as a consequence of resorting to computations 
for discovery in the pure sciences. 
Further opportunities to reflect upon the way to describe the practice of 
modeling in the sciences can be elicited by examining these concepts from the 
perspective of the emerging domain of data-driven science. To this end it 
would be important, for example, to compare a number of use cases across 
different disciplines.  
Exploring how practices of modeling are characterised across disciplines 
seems to me a promising way to examine how, and in what sense, practices of 
modeling are interconnected, and whether and how the concept of modelling in 
the sciences can be appropriately (re)defined.  
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4.  Discussion 
Paul Fishwick’ questions 
Paul Fishwick was the respondent to my talk. While agreeing that computation 
is undoubtedly a pillar of contemporary science, Paul pointed out that models 
can also be seen as ways of physically encoding information using a specific 
technology, with associated analogies and metaphors. As such, they can be 
considered to be informational representations of our world. He considers that, 
if one wants to characterise exhaustively the practice of modeling, diagrammat-
ic and physical representations, and mathematical notation, should be consid-
ered as well, and he asked me to comment on this issue. Another question he 
raised was about the potential connections between the concepts and the prac-
tices I discussed and the arts and humanities. 
My answer 
I consider that while information representation may be part of the effort of 
building a computational model, whether their role is essential or not is strong-
ly dependent on the particular goal of the model building process and of the 
application problem one may want to solve. However, I do agree with Paul in 
considering that these representations should be taken into account if one wants 
to unravel how modeling is used in practice. As far as the potential connections 
between the concepts and the practices I discussed and the arts and humanities, 
we both agreed that data science can provide the appropriate framework for 
non-traditional research and discovery in the humanities. In this same frame-
work, we posit that the concept of computing as an instrument for discovery in 
the sciences I described can be a useful metaphor to reflect upon when trying to 
unify the description of the practices of modeling in many different domains, 
both in science and in the humanities.  
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A Humanities Based Approach to Formally  
Defining Information through Modelling 
Paul A. Fishwick ∗ 
Abstract: »Ein geisteswissenschaftlich begründeter Ansatz zur formalen Be-
schreibung von Information durch Modellierung.«. A traditional, and reasona-
ble, way of thinking about the digital and modelling within the context of the 
humanities is to begin with humanistic inquiry and then explore the world of 
information processing and management through digital technologies, such as 
virtual reality, computers, smartphones, and tablets. This chain of thought re-
volves around the idea that information is part of the world of computing with 
its technological methods and marvels. However, through traditional humani-
ties topics such as language and sensory arts, we claim that the idea of infor-
mation and information processing is part and parcel of the humanistic tradi-
tion. Seeing the world as information is a matter of interpretation, and not of 
technologically-motivated implementation, even though such implementation 
provides us with efficient tools for managing information.  Written and pictori-
al languages are a basis for formalizing information and models, independent 
of technology. 
Keywords: Information, flow, semantic network, finite state machine. 
1.   Definition of Modelling 
Modelling represents the activity of designing, manipulating, and testing mod-
els. We characterize three types of models that cover wide territory: 
knowledge, shape, and behavior. A model of knowledge is characterized in 
natural language, and can be expressed in logic or in a diagrammatic syntax 
(e.g., semantic networks, concept graphs, mind maps). These model forms may 
be augmented with multimedia in the form of static or time-varying imagery. A 
model of shape reflects the goal of using scale to make the model target more 
accessible, or it reflects models that capture shape and geometry of the target. 
A child’s toy and doll house are early-age examples of scale modelling, where-
as a scene graph is an example of a geometric-based model of objects compris-
ing a scene. A model of behavior is a structure that captures how objects change 
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state over time. A state machine, Markov chain, Petri net, and differential equa-
tions are examples of behavior models.  
The simplest sorts of models have come from the humanities. If we consider 
the arts as divided into language arts and sensory arts, models in the language 
arts are formed from natural language. For example, “I am going to get the 
mail” contains specific parts of speech that can be linked to the formation of 
dynamic models. The word “going” is a gerund and was formed by taking the 
verb “go” and adding an “ing,” thus forming an activity. Since states within a 
system are captured by activities over a duration of time, “going” is a state 
within a state machine yet to be formulated. By parsing natural language, we 
can transition to ever more formally specified dynamic models. As for sensory 
arts, we find craft, design, and fine art. The sensory arts include all sensory 
modalities such as vision, sound, and touch. Visually specified states, events, 
and functions can be drawn or can be interpreted from a drawing. 
Models can be considered to be information representations of our world – 
they are ways of physically encoding information using a specific technology, 
with associated analogies and metaphors. Consider the System Dynamics mod-
elling framework of Jay Forrester. The flow graphs employ the analogy of 
flowing water that is restricted by valves, which model rates and tanks, which 
model capacities.  System Dynamics models can be expressed using different 
technologies. These models can be created with purely mechanical compo-
nents, hybrid mechanical-electrical components, or on the digital screen where 
one moves circles, rectangles, and arrows around to design the model. There-
fore, the model is based on one or more analogies, and is independent of the 
technology used to manifest it–digital or otherwise. 
2. Information Modelling within the Humanities 
The humanities are a broad area encompassing the studies of human culture. 
Cultural artifacts that are produced consist of numerous materials that may be 
written or crafted. To the extent that an artifact has been produced by writing 
using the technology of print, this writing can be modelled in many ways. A 
semantic network can be drawn for a chapter in Melville’s Moby Dick, for 
instance.  The network becomes a model of the chapter. An artist might paint a 
scene from the novel, with the painting serving as a model of the text capturing 
that scene.  
Models are viewed as artifacts that we create to understand other artifacts 
(Fishwick 2017). Models frequently capture the information content of the 
artifact. The model becomes a vehicle for framing the artifact in terms of in-
formation–seeing the artifact through an information lens. This connection 
between the humanities and modelling differs from the classical notion within 
the digital arts & humanities where the “digital” is seen as a utilitarian facet for 
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arts and humanities. We posit that the ideas behind information are situated 
within the humanities and so, connecting information and the humanities is less 
about tools, and more about reframing our understanding about the nature of 
information in culture. 
3. Interpreting a Cultural Artifact through an 
Information Lens 
The following exposition is reprinted from Section 3 of Fishwick (2016) de-
scribes how we may view a 500-year old Incan tunic from the standpoint of 
information. In this description, the tunic becomes a catalyst for a discussion of 
information management and processing. The role of digital technology be-
comes merely an accelerant of information processing rather than a tool for 
traditional humanistic research. The idea of information is couched in terms of 
a fundamentally information-specific interpretation of the tunic, rather than as a 
digital tool for supporting interactive exploration. 
An art museum was chosen as the venue for considering systems thinking in 
a Fall 2015 class in Modeling and Simulation. Students were each given a 
choice of an object at the Dallas Museum of Art (DMA). With some guidance, 
they interpreted these objects through thinking of them from a systems perspec-
tive. The guidance consisted of heuristics such as: (1) represent knowledge 
about the objects and their representations, resulting in a concept map; (2) 
consider any processes or techniques associated with the object, what is repre-
sented in the object, or in the object’s material; and (3) model the object with 
digital or physical materials. Systems thinking is atypical in an art museum, 
which is why it was chosen. The goal was to illustrate variety in object inter-
pretation that ventured beyond art history explanations. Consider the Inca tunic 
in Figure 1, which was highlighted within a recent exhibit (DMA-Inca 2016).  
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Figure 1: Tunic with Checkerboard Pattern and Stepped Yoke. Courtesy of the 
Dallas Museum of Art, Public Digital Media Collection. 
 
Additional Information: Inca Tunic (<https://www.dma.org/collection/artwork/pre-columbian/ 
tunic-checkerboard-pattern-and-stepped-yoke>) (DMA-Tunic 2016). 
 
For this tunic, there are many possible questions we may ask: 
- How was the tunic originally woven? 
- How would the tunic be woven today? 
- Can a computer program reproduce the tunic pattern? 
- How was the red fabric dyed? 
- What are the population dynamics of the alpaca or llama? 
- Can the colored, square motifs be used to encode information? 
- What were the behaviors or rituals of the tunic wearer? 
- How was the tunic exhibit installed within the museum? 
- What workflow process can be used to obtain a list of all tunics? 
- What is the global timeline for Inca tunics across all museums? 
 
These questions can be answered through dynamic models of the sort em-
ployed in the field of simulation.  We will cover the example of dynamic mod-
els, but first approach the study of the tunic with a concept map (Novak and 
Gowin 1984). The concept map is a directed graph of concepts linked by rela-
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tions. For example, “Inca is a type_of culture” and the tunic is processed_with a 
loom, with two types of loom indicated: upright and backstrap. The concept 
map is a type of semantic model (Sowa 1983). A concept map of the tunic is 
depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Concept Map of Knowledge about the Inca Tunic 
 
Source of Images: tunic image is from the public DMA digital media collection. Map in the 
upper left is from Wikimedia Commons: public domain. Remaining images from Shutterstock, 
Inc., standard license. 
 
The next step in seeing the tunic through the lens of systems thinking is to map 
out the dynamic relations. We do this by focusing on verb-based relations in 
English. The diagram in Figure 3 represents a finite state machine (Fishwick 
1995), as it is termed in computer science (FSM 2016). Each state has a parti-
ciple verb form indicating state. For example, to craft a tunic, we begin by 
shearing an animal from the camelid family, such as an alpaca. Thus, the sys-
tem that indicates how the tunic is made can be seen as a sequence of activities 
(i.e., states) of different people in a sequence-based pipeline. 
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Figure 3: Four Connected States Comprising a finite State Machine (FSM) for 
the Tunic Process 
 
Source of Images: Shutterstock, Inc., standard license. 
 
Figure 4 presents the dynamics of making the tunic using a data flow graph. 
For data flow, information is processed from one functional node (e.g., spin) to 
the next. Starting on the left of Figure 5, an alpaca is sheared. In a more de-
tailed model, there would be an arrow input to “shear,” but this is left out for 
simplifying the diagram. There are two outputs from shear: one going to the 
wool, which subsequently must be spun, and another representing the alpaca 
minus the sheared wool: the shorn alpaca. Spinning can be done in one of two 
directions termed S ply versus Z ply. 
Figure 4: A Data Flow Graph that Represents Material flowing from Left to 
Right. Each Node is a Function or Process, as indicated by a Verb 
 
Source of Images: Shutterstock, Inc., standard license, with the exception of the S/Z image 
(public domain, Wikimedia Commons) and the tunic (courtesy of DMA). 
 
Figures 2 through 4 illustrate three model types, where there is a design effort 
to ensure that each model component is denoted by text and some graphical 
cues, such as photographs. This approach to model design is deemed necessary 
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where the visitor is belonging to a general population, rather than coming from 
a highly technical domain such as engineering. 
Figure 5 shows how programming can be considered modelling (of a deci-
sion procedure). A partial Processing program on the left side indicates a piece 
of the program, with the synthetic tunic image on the right side obtained from 
executing the program. The code is a textual model that captures a computer 
science type of interpretation of the original tunic. 
Figure 5: A Processing Program Excerpt (left), which Produces an Image similar 
to the Inca Tunic (right) 
 
Numerous other models are possible for the tunic such as the one in Figure 6 
where a data flow model takes the original tunic image on the left and then 
applies this image, through a left-to-right flow via functional image filters. 
Figure 6: A Data Flow Model that Processes Images using Filter Nodes 
 
Program: Filterforge (<https://www.filterforge.com/>) (Filterforge 2016). 
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4.  Discussion 
I have met many colleagues with an intense interest in modelling. Examples of 
related research by some of these colleagues are defined by the shared concern 
for the possibilities of modelling, and how models compare, contrast and differ 
between science and engineering versus the humanities (Bod 2016; Ciula and 
Marras 2016; McCarty 2004). I found that, collectively speaking, we had more 
in common than we had differences with respect to modelling. Even though the 
phrase “modelling and simulation” is commonly employed in science and 
engineering, it was useful to separate out modelling from simulation since 
modelling represents a broader enterprise that cuts across all disciplines.  
Giorgio Fotia was the respondent in my talk and he surfaced many interest-
ing issues. Fotia’s focus on modelling was related to modelling within the 
biological sciences. Most of Fotia’s models were “mathematical models,” 
meaning that the models were represented using mathematical notation.  I 
discussed how this type of notation was one type of model notation with others 
coming from areas such as discrete event modelling, conceptual modelling, and 
modelling text. Many models are represented in diagrammatic rather than sym-
bolic form. Figures 2 through 6 exemplify this difference. 
My most important moment of learning dealt with the need for those en-
gaged in the practice of modelling to spend more effort in dealing with model-
to-model translation.  Take mathematical models as an example.  When a sci-
entist uses a mathematical model, they rarely think in terms of the symbols. 
Instead, the symbols aggregate to correspond with laws of conservation. It is 
more important to see equations based on Newton’s laws with natural language 
such as “force from ball impact” or “torque from wooden wheel.” The symbols 
are efficient and economic, but modellers see beyond them to natural language 
forms, common to the language arts. Therefore, future computer interfaces that 
begin with natural language, or that allow these symbols to coexist with the 
mathematical symbols would be useful when reasoning across disciplines.  
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Some Remarks on Modelling from a  
Computer Science Perspective 
Günther Görz ∗ 
Abstract: »Einige Bemerkungen zur Modellierung aus der Sicht der Informatik«. 
One of the basic tasks of computer science is to rewrite models derived from 
other scientific disciplines so that they can be represented and processed on 
computers. If such a reconstruction process is only partially successful or fails 
entirely, the modification of the initial model becomes an interdisciplinary re-
search task. The modelling task is to be seen as an application of knowledge 
representation and processing. We distinguish between aiming at models of 
something or models for some purpose. Modelling of given domains starts with 
the construction of a formal ontology. To support issues such as modularity and 
interoperability, in particular in a web-based environment, the idea of refer-
ence ontologies came up. For object-based research in the humanities, the 
Conceptual Reference Model (CRM) by ICOM/CIDOC is such a reference ontolo-
gy which has become an ISO standard. 
Keywords: Modelling, computer science, ontologies. 
1.  Methodological Preliminaries 
My general assessment of modelling results from a general view on the human-
ities and the sciences, which appear in two forms: a propositional (“textbook”, 
theory) form and a research form. The latter is a form of (methodological) 
action. Based on experience from interdisciplinary research, we can observe 
that problem orientation replaces disciplinary constrictions, which can lead to a 
reconstitution of the unity of science – i.e. of scientific rationality rather than 
systems. This unity, transcending disciplinary borders, can be seen as a unity of 
language, where in both cases we have similar procedures of verification and 
justification (giving reasons), which constitute meaning. That is a practical 
(pragmatic) unity, including the distinction between the context of discovery 
and the context of justification. So, it is essential for modelling to provide a 
linguistic framework for conceptual modelling and justification. That will 
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comprise the identification of common generic concepts and relations / proper-
ties from an event, process or action perspective, respectively. 
2.  Computer Science and the Concept of Model 
One of the basic tasks of computer science is to rewrite models derived from 
other scientific disciplines so that they can be represented and processed on 
computers. More specifically, this means that given models have to be trans-
formed into versions for which effective procedures can be given. A key appli-
cation area of reconstructed models is simulation (see Wedekind et al. 1998). If 
an initial model cannot be translated directly into the language of computer 
science, a reconstruction step is required. In the humanities in particular, under-
standing and explanation of actions in terms of reasons and intentionality pro-
vide challenges to operationalized representations.  
If such a reconstruction process is only partially successful or fails com-
pletely, the modification of the initial model becomes an interdisciplinary re-
search task. Key issues for success include making the disciplinary terminology 
more precise, modifying the modelling approach, and extending the range of 
computer science methods. This offers opportunities not only to refine existing 
knowledge, but also to develop new epistemological interests (“Erkenntnis-
interessen”) in the respective disciplines as well as in computer science. That is 
the basic meaning of computational science and computational humanities, 
whereby it is essential that both parties speak a common language. 
When studying the creation of models and its methodological and technical 
foundations, the precise introduction of metalevel terms such as model and 
simulation becomes indispensable. In computer science we find two elaborate 
uses of the term model, one derived from mathematics and physics, the other 
influenced by empirical applications in natural and social sciences and in engi-
neering. 
In mathematics and theoretical computer science, the concept of model is 
used only in the context of structuring theoretic approaches. Such structural 
models sensu stricto exist only in logic and mathematics. The idea is often 
applied to physics, but there the axiom systems contain not only schematic, but 
also interpreted parts from the very beginning. The second understanding of 
model deriving from application areas means a certain way of describing em-
pirical processes, mostly within a naive realistic epistemic framework. Talking 
about modelling some external reality is in fact dealing with discipline specific 
experimentation and observation contexts, i.e., about descriptions of relevant 
states of affairs. The claim that a model simplifies some part of reality does in 
fact refer to the simplification in such descriptions – linguistic means can only 
be applied to linguistic objects.  
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The level of detail of the initial description is determined by the research 
program (Lakatos) of the respective theory in which context the model is to be 
created. Such a research program provides the language of the description, the 
description standards, and the explanatory schemata. Last but not least the 
expectations which precede the construction of a model are formulated within 
this framework. Hence, modelling is an activity that has two aspects: A model 
must satisfy the empirical descriptions, but also the theoretical specifications. 
For model construction, comprehensive descriptions of states of affairs as they 
result from observations, etc., run through certain modifications, so called 
idealizations: values are being smoothed, different expressions of a feature are 
replaced by mean values, and certain influences are regarded as negligible. 
These modifications aim to achieve relatively simple and clear representations 
of empirical states of affairs as well as adaptability to pertinent theoretical 
structures. The result of such an idealization is called a descriptive idealized 
model. If it is a structural model of a theory at the same time, then the hypo-
thetical assertive claim (“Geltungsanspruch”) is regarded as confirmed and the 
state of affairs is seen as described, or explained, by the theory. In engineering 
the theoretical structure is often complemented by technical (functional) stand-
ards–this is the case of technical idealized models such as construction plans 
and schedules. 
Simulation models are special descriptive models of technical or natural sys-
tems, which are confined to certain material restrictions. A system in general is 
given by a set of elements, which are bound together by certain relations and 
are separated by clear boundaries from its environment. A system is a technical 
system if its external effects as well as its internal relations are determined by 
objective functions (“Zielfunktionen”). The abstraction steps involved in the 
construction of a simulation model do not aim at the generation of a class of 
cases (as in the descriptive idealized model), but at the generation of a class of 
variations of a base case. 
3. Modelling, Knowledge Representation, and Formal 
Ontologies 
Computer science has a special role in the construction of idealized or simula-
tion models: First, it has to organize the initial descriptions of the models in 
such a way that the required modelling steps can be carried out, and the de-
scriptions and models have to be transformed into an appropriate representa-
tion. This comprises determining how objects can be represented by features or 
feature groups in general, which relations can be set up among them and how 
certain feature values are assigned meanings such that these can be processed 
as data; i.e. the design of data structures and processing rules. 
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In more detail, this means that the modelling task is to be seen as an applica-
tion of knowledge representation and processing, which in my view consists of 
a purpose-driven formal reconstruction of a body of knowledge and its imple-
mentation in a (logical) language. Initially we can already distinguish whether 
our theoretical enterprise aims at models of something or models for some 
purpose(s). Hence, the construction of a knowledge base (“knowledge engi-
neering”) requires at least the determination and delimitation of the domain of 
discourse, a determination of the relevant concepts and properties (“what?” as 
opposed to “how?”), where properties are represented by relations (“has-”), and 
a hierarchical ordering of concepts and properties (“is-a”). This simple frame-
work already allows for the representation of particular objects (individuals) as 
instances of concepts. Of course, in most cases there are many desirable exten-
sions to what can be expressed such as constraints restricting properties in 
various ways, or the specification of properties of properties. To express further 
relationships between concepts and between particulars, rules (“axioms”) are 
often introduced. Although it sounds trivial that implicit knowledge cannot be 
processed algorithmically, ontology construction is a good exercise to enforce 
the development of methods for the explicit representation of implicit 
knowledge. To summarize: modelling of a given domain starts with the con-
struction of a formal ontology, which in turn can serve as the basis for the 
construction of a theory, often in the form of a critical reconstruction (see Görz 
2016). 
At this point, a short remark about semantics seems appropriate: The logical 
framework provides the structural part, and the meaning of content words (con-
cepts) is given by a network of relations even if we include controlled vocabu-
laries; but in an empirical setting reference must be provided by external 
grounding. Nevertheless, semantics is meant to refer to the logical framework, 
i.e., an inference relation. Reasoning should be performed by sound and com-
plete inference rules as in, e.g., Description Logic. How to deal with vagueness 
and imprecision in such a framework is still a research question. Another chal-
lenge is to take account of conflicting information, such as diverging ascrip-
tions of dates or places or authorship. And, of course, deductive reasoning is 
only one side of the coin, and must be complemented by an ars inventoria, i.e. 
heuristic procedures, as Leibniz has already stated (1679/1999). 
With formal ontologies, several issues arise such as modularity and interop-
erability, in particular in a web-based environment. Therefore, the idea of ref-
erence ontologies, which contain generic concepts and properties relevant for 
many applications, came up. Specifically for object-based research in the hu-
manities, the Conceptual Reference Model (CRM) by ICOM/CIDOC is such 
reference ontology, which is now an ISO standard. Its characteristic feature is 
that it is event-based and easily extensible: a series of extensions for geograph-
ic data, archaeology, and scientific observations have been suggested as well as 
many domain-specific ontologies, e.g. from the museum, library (FRBR) and 
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archive domain, fostering the development of standardized components and 
libraries. Methodologically, the CRM allows for a chronotopological modelling 
of data. With CRM as a common reference a high level of interoperability can 
be achieved.  
With the CRM, semi-formal representations are also possible as it allows the 
inclusion of (uninterpreted) text in its representations, which are in principle 
open for semantic disclosure at a later point in time. Our implementation in 
OWL-DL (Görz et al. 2008) allows us to deploy CRM-based ontologies to the 
Semantic Web and to publish Linked (Open) Data. Because OWL is a very 
expressive Description Logic, powerful reasoning engines are available. There-
fore, such models can serve as explanation models, as opposed to pure func-
tional models which result from existing popular and successful machine learn-
ing algorithms. To support cooperative research and communication, in 
particular for object documentation and object-based knowledge generation and 
processing, so-called Virtual Research Environments (VREs) have been devel-
oped. WissKI (Görz 2011; Scholz and Görz 2012; Scholz, Merz and Görz 
2016) is such a VRE with special support for data acquisition in the mentioned 
event-base style through its ontology-based modelling component. Actually it 
has more than 20 applications in the field of cultural heritage, mostly in muse-
um documentation, but also in providing semantic frameworks for epigraphy 
(Scholz et al. 2014) and the history of cartography (Görz and Scholz 2013). 
To conclude with a remark on simulation: Logic-based models can serve for 
discrete (qualitative) simulation in a rather immediate fashion using the reason-
er. From a theoretical perspective, there is an immediate connection via proofs 
as programs (Curry-Howard correspondence). The domain of continuous simu-
lation models (System Dynamics, etc., as used in social sciences) is beyond the 
scope of this presentation. 
4.  Discussion 
In the discussion with my opponent Francesca Tomasi, clarification questions 
have been raised which I hope to have answered by rewriting some formula-
tions present in the text of the presentation. I had the impression that our posi-
tions are quite similar. However, I would like to take up some questions that 
remain. First, Francesca questioned my emphasis on justification. To me it 
seems clear that giving reasons is fundamental to scientific discourse from the 
perspective of the philosophy of science, and this includes the humanities.  
The conditions and rules of argumentation may be different, but justification 
is essential for knowledge, as opposed to pure opinion. She then asked why 
understanding and explanation of actions in terms of reasons and intentions are 
a challenge for operationalized representations.  
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Besides a few clarification questions which I hope to have answered by re-
writing some formulations in the text of the presentation. I had the impression 
that our positions are quite similar. The following questions by Francesca re-
main: 
Francesca Tomasi’s questions 
1) Why do you emphasize justification? 
Answer: Giving reasons is fundamental for scientific discourse from the 
perspective of the philosophy of science, and this includes the humani-
ties. The conditions and rules of argumentation may be different, but jus-
tification is essential for knowledge, as opposed to pure opinion. 
2) Why is understanding and explanation of actions in terms of reasons and 
intentions a challenge for operationalized representations? 
Answer: The question is whether and, if so, how intention can be opera-
tionalized. Of course, this depends on our definition of intention. Alt-
hough there is a highly controversial philosophical discussion about in-
tentionality, I cannot see any viable method to formalize intention 
completely in line with physical terms. So we need some way to deal 
with it on the computational level: that’s the challenge. 
3) Is a model not an explanation? 
Answer: Yes, in a sense. I would prefer to say that an operational model 
such as a deductive or simulation model can provide explanations. 
4) Do you think that the construction of the theory is next to the construc-
tion of the ontology? 
Answer: Yes, at least insofar as a formal ontology is a necessary condi-
tion for the construction of a theory in the strict – not postmodern – 
sense. The ontology defines the concepts, at least. 
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Modelling in the Digital Humanities: Conceptual  
Data Models and Knowledge Organization  
in the Cultural Heritage Domain 
Francesca Tomasi ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellieren in den Digitalen Geisteswissenschaften: Konzeptuelle 
Datenmodelle und Wissensorganisation für das kulturelle Erbe«. This paper ex-
plores the role of model and modelling in the field of Digital Humanities, pay-
ing special attention to the cultural heritage domain. In detail, the approach 
here described adopts a bi-dimensional vision: considering the model as both a 
process of abstraction, an interpretation from a certain point of view, and a 
formal language to implement this abstraction in order to create something 
processable by a machine. The role of conceptual models – to be converted into 
ontologies – as a semantic deepening of controlled vocabularies, is the transla-
tion of this vision. Ontologies are the models used in domain communities in 
order to share classes and predicates for conceptual interoperability. Thinking 
of data models as a knowledge organization system is the core of this reflec-
tion on Digital Humanities domain. 
Keywords: Ontologies, knowledge, interpretation, data structures, controlled 
vocabularies. 
1.   Introduction 
Model and modelling in the domain of Digital Humanities (DH) is a huge and 
challenging topic. It is not trivial to find a common and shareable definition, 
because the concept of model/modelling is related to multiple facets, integrat-
ing the humanistic point of view with the computer scientists’ approach. Also, 
DH have their own notion of models and modelling (see in particular Orlandi 
1999; Buzzetti 2002; McCarty 2004); concepts that also reflect a core method 
in DH in general and in my research on domain ontologies – or better on con-
ceptual data modelling in the cultural heritage – in particular. But let us start 
from the beginning, from the attempt to find an appropriate definition. 
We could say that the activity of modelling consists of choosing the features 
of the observed reality (e.g. an object in a domain) to be formally represented 
(the abstract model). This formalization requires the adoption of a data struc-
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ture related to a language useful for the description of the abstraction. Thus, a 
model refers to the declaration of the selected properties of an object, e.g. a 
plain text, to be translated into a machine-readable form by using a descriptive 
language as a representational method. Following this definition, a model is 
firstly a matter of extracting properties of an object as the result of an interpre-
tation. And an interpretation is, naturally, the expression of a point of view.  
In this sense, a model can never be exhaustive. Each point of view is only 
one of many ways to interpret the observed reality. The more viewpoints on the 
same object we have, the more models might be collected. So each abstraction 
is a possible, individual representation of an object in a domain, which is able 
to replicate the original object: “to an observer B, an object A* is a model of an 
object A to the extent that B can use A* to answer questions that interest him 
about A” (Minsky 1995). 
But models have to be able to aggregate viewpoints. In fact, modelling also 
means to identify common features of a collection or extracting those patterns 
that could be recognized in similar resources. The similarity is a matter of 
sharing, i.e. sharing a genre, a type, a computational objective, a scope or a 
function. In this sense, modelling reveals a crowdsourced idea: sharing some-
thing within a community that decided to advocate a common idea. 
By using this approach, we recognize two interrelated levels of modelling: 
on the one hand, the model as an abstraction, as the interpretation of the object 
through possibly shared and potentially multiple “lenses” (Peroni et al. 2014); 
on the other, the model as the choice of a language useful to implement this 
abstraction by creating something that is processable by a machine. 
2. Controlled Vocabularies as an Abstraction 
The representation of common features of the observed reality is then a matter 
of communicating a specific vision of the domain.  
For example, a digital scholarly edition is a model because it represents the 
choices of the editor in creating the digital objects at each level of the represen-
tation: the transcription, the annotation or markup, the para-meta-intra-inter-
textual elements, eventually the textual tradition, but also the interface, the 
criteria for browsing data and documents, etc. (Tomasi 2013). When the editors 
choose how to transcribe a document (e.g. in a diplomatic, interpretative or 
critical manner), or to define which features they want to be managed by the 
machine, they thereby define a model of the text, which they want to reproduce 
in a digital dimension. Each step of this process involves computational conse-
quences. 
In general, modelling, as the result of an interpretation, has to be in dialogue 
with a shared vision of the observed domain. This is the reason why each cul-
tural heritage domain (from libraries to archives, from museums to galleries) 
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endeavors to define strategies for a semantic dialogue within and between 
cultures that use different standard reference models.  
The choice of the content model, i.e. a metadata vocabulary for describing a 
collection, is a matter of sharing. And sharing a model is what it takes to guar-
antee a basic semantic interoperability. Dublin Core (DC)1 is, for example, a 
content model chosen for describing the reality through an abstraction: 15 
categories able to collect all necessary features of the observed domain (a cul-
tural heritage collection, a web page, an institutional repository, the papers of a 
journal, etc.). 
The Text Encoding Initiative (TEI)2 is a model expressed in embedded 
markup, i.e. a controlled vocabulary, a grammar or, better, a Schema (a set of 
elements, attributes, rules and constraints), for describing objects related to a 
domain, namely, the humanities. So, TEI is a common model for representing 
the observed reality (i.e. texts and documents in the humanities domain), but it 
also leaves the interpreter free to define his or her own model of the 
text(s)/document(s) by choosing the features to be in focus in the computation-
al representation. 
The Encoded Archival Description (EAD)3 and the Encoded Archival Con-
text – Corporate Bodies, Persons and Families (EAC-CPF)4 are, again, firstly 
Document Type Definitions (DTDs) and Schemata created to describe archival 
finding aids and authority records. They are models in the archival domain, 
reference systems for the community. And they are both the result of the at-
tempt to formalize the two related methodological standards, namely ISAD 
(International Standard for Archival Description)5 for the archival description, 
and ISAAR-CPF (International Standard Archival Authority Records for Cor-
porate Bodies, Persons and Families)6, for the description of authority records. 
Despite the different implementations, DC, EAD, EAC-CPF, and TEI are all 
examples among others of metadata element sets used in cultural heritage to 
resolve ambiguities by sharing a domain vocabulary. They want to present 
themselves as models, through elements and attributes, conventions, and decla-
rations.  
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Metadata models (and controlled vocabularies) take up the need to define a 
common conceptual architecture for a domain. It is worth noting that in the 
literature “metadata modelling” refers to a type of metamodelling used in soft-
ware engineering and systems engineering for the analysis and construction of 
models applicable to and useful for some predefined class of problems. The 
activity of metadata modelling is reflected in a concept diagram. Unified Mod-
eling Language (UML)7 is the language used in the object-oriented paradigm to 
represent a model as a diagram. Concept, generalization, association, multiplic-
ity and aggregation are all keywords for creating the model. So, a diagram is a 
model of the reality, able to represent objects in a context. 
We move from controlled vocabularies to diagrams; and from diagrams to 
languages. 
3. Languages, Data Structures and Data Types 
It has indeed been said that modelling is also a matter of language. And a for-
mal language, from a computational point of view, is a question of data struc-
ture and abstract data types, i.e. graph (the network), tree (a hierarchy), table (a 
relation), sequence (a list). They are, in fact, models. For all data to be orga-
nized in a digital environment one of these models is chosen to represent the 
observed reality. Some examples will help make this point clear: 
- indeclarative markup languages, e.g. in XML, the model of the document 
is a tree-like structure. So the content (actually the structure) of the doc-
ument is represented as a series of features hierarchically organized and 
nested; 
- in database systems (DBMS), the more common model adopted is the re-
lational one, namely the table. Objects are records (and thus data) and 
each value is related to one of the attributes (properties) that describe the 
reality of the objects; 
- the network is the structure – the model – of the Web; but the network is 
also the hypertextual representation of documents (in the Web 1.0 envi-
ronment), and now of interconnected data (from a Linked Open Data 
[LOD]8 perspective); from the sequence (a list of documents) to the graph 
(a network of data). Hypertext is then a model organizing data objects 
through their relationships. 
We have to keep this aspect in mind. The formal language is another way to 
conceive the concept of model. The choice of the language, and of the related 
                                                             
7  UML: <http://www.uml.org> (Accessed April 20, 2017). 
8  W3C official page on Linked Data: <http://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/data> 
(Accessed April 20, 2017). 
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structures, depends on the observed domain: e.g. documents (i.e. non-structured 
objects) or data (i.e. structured objects). With the markup, e.g. with XML as a 
formal meta-language, we model documents as semi-structured objects. And 
the aim is to reduce the narrative, in order to model content (or, better, struc-
ture) as a collection of atomic interconnected pieces to be managed as data. We 
move from the property-value pairs through the tree (the declarative markup 
language as XML) to the graph (a model as Resource Description Framework 
[RDF] for creating LOD). 
As it has been said: in computer science, the concept of model is related to a 
data structure, i.e. a possible representation of a digital content or a particular 
way of organizing data. In this sense, the choice of the logical model (e.g. a 
relational database instead of a markup language) determines the computational 
results or, better, the computational activities and operations on the data as 
based on the chosen model. Hence, models play an important role in moving 
from theory (the abstract model) to practice, understood as the actions that can 
be performed (the formal language). 
3.1   A Conceptual-Oriented Position 
In the document community, the markup is the model, i.e. the language to 
represent the structure of the reality. In the data community, the model, i.e. the 
traditional way to represent the content of the domain, is the database. In data 
modelling theory, used especially in database design (although it holds true 
also for other contexts), we recognize three possible models, also described as 
three levels of abstraction of a DBMS: 
- a conceptual data model 
- a logical data model 
- a physical data model (or better a Schema). 
We begin with the latter.  
At the physical level, we deal with physical means by which data are stored, 
which is not our level of interest.  
At the logical level, we deal with structures of models again: hierarchical, 
network, relational and object oriented. The importance of this level lies in the 
fact that each chosen data structure affects the possible computational activi-
ties: even if the model is theoretical, it involves the kind of operations that we 
could perform with data based on one of these abstract structures (the tree, the 
graph, the table, the class). So the model in this case is the content, not just the 
structure.  
Now, let us move to the first level: the conceptual data model, i.e. the ab-
stract conceptual representation of data. On this level, data are defined from a 
conceptual point of view. The meaning of data depends on the context of the 
interrelationships with other data. 
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There are several notations for data modelling. The most common model is 
the “Entity relationship model” (E/R), because it depicts data in terms of the 
entities and relationships described in the data. The E/R notation yields a mod-
el, because its aim is to represent the reality as an abstraction: “this model 
incorporates some of the important semantic information about the real world” 
(Chen 1976). The conceptual model then represents concepts (entities) and 
connections (relationships) between them. The notation itself is an abstraction. 
3.2   Ontologies and Knowledge 
The same approach is adopted by ontologies, i.e. conceptual data models trans-
lated through a formal language. Again, we range between database theory and 
markup languages: the data-centric approach of the DBMS, the formal declara-
tive language (XML) and the assertion (the triple) as a graph (RDF). We could 
say that we are dealing with the Semantic Web approach and the LOD perspec-
tive (Bizer, Heath, and Berners-Lee 2009). 
In ontology design, the model is the conceptual framework. The ontology is 
the conceptualization of an abstraction by identifying those features, in the 
form of classes and predicates, which enable us to describe a domain, observed 
from a specific point of view. And the aim is to move from data to information 
in order to extract knowledge, i.e. to reveal the latent, the yet unknown. Reveal-
ing knowledge through the analysis of, for example, the context, is necessary in 
order to enable inferences (Daquino and Tomasi 2015). Modelling, for in-
stance, persons, dates, places or events is an attempt to standardize a conceptu-
al approach through relationships (Gonano et al. 2014).  
EDM9, CIDOC CRM10 and FRBRoo11, SKOS12 – just to give some hetero-
geneous examples (see, for example, Doerr 2009) – are nothing but points of 
view on reality. We could assert that ontologies are the shared ideas concerning 
a domain, expressed with classes and properties, relationships between con-
cepts, rules and constraints. A domain ontology is a formal, abstract representa-
tion, useful in order to semantically describe, i.e. to model, a collection of 
resources and to reason on data, with an inferential aim and a problem-solving 
approach. Another attempt to model the reality is the translation of an XML 
Schema, e.g. TEI, into an ontology (see, for example, Eide 2014; Ciotti and 
Tomasi 2015). 
                                                             
9  Europeana Data Model: <http://pro.europeana.eu/page/edm-documentation> (Accessed 
April 20, 2017). 
10  CIDOC Conceptual Reference Model: <http://www.cidoc-crm.org/> (Accessed April 20, 
2017). 
11  FRBRoo: <http://www.cidoc-crm.org/frbroo/home-0> (Accessed April 20, 2017). 
12  SKOS: <https://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/> (Accessed April 20, 2017). 
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So, ontologies are models, and I think that conceptualization is the core of 
modelling, with reference to the issue of knowledge organization.13 In fact, 
ontologies are both a way to express the semantics of a domain and a method to 
organize knowledge through concepts. I personally believe that in the DH 
domain, ontology engineering is the most effective and persuasive modelling 
strategy: it is a method enabling us to reproduce the brain’s reasoning, i.e., the 
humanistic approach to interpretation. 
The act of moving from controlled vocabularies to ontologies reflects the 
need to express the semantics that are hidden because of the absence of a con-
tent model. The creation of an interconnection through typed links is the key to 
solve relationships between entities in order to reveal real knowledge.  
4. Final Remarks 
Another definition, from the Linked Open Data perspective, is the concept of 
model as a conversion method: 
Linked Data modelling involves data going from one model to another. For 
example, modelling may involve converting a tabular representation of the data 
to a graph-based representation. Often extracts from relational databases are 
modeled and converted to Linked Data to more rapidly integrate datasets from 
different authorities or with other open source datasets.14 
So, the act of converting data into a different format, or using another data 
structure, is again a practice. The model gives the theoretical basis for a practi-
cal activity. 
Finally, a model is also a question of interface. The template for a web page, 
for instance, is a model. The design of a page in a Content Management System 
(CMS) is a model. The architecture of information, understood as the position 
of logical components of a page, is a model. The iconic symbols are models of 
the reality. So, when we model a web resource, we chose a way to represent 
information in the visual interface: we define spaces for components and we 
use icons as an abstraction of an idea, we adopt glyphs as a representation of 
graphemes. 
In conclusion, models are a guideline, models are shared by a community, 
models are the representation of a domain, models refer to languages and data 
                                                             
13  An interesting event related to these themes is the “three-day workshop held at Brown 
University on data modelling in the humanities, sponsored by the NEH and the DFG, and co-
organized by Fotis Jannidis and Julia Flanders”. Knowledge Organization and Data Modeling 
in the Humanities: An ongoing conversation, 2012 <https://datasymposium.wordpress.com> 
(Accessed April 20, 2017). 
14  Best Practices for Publishing Linked Data. W3C Working Group Note 09 January 2014: 
<http://www.w3.org/TR/ld- bp/#MODEL> (Accessed April 20, 2017). 
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structures, models are a visual and iconic abstraction. Ontologies are models. 
Modelling is my favorite job. 
5.  Discussion 
Günther Görz’s questions (Q) and my answers (A) 
Q1. I plead for a more restricted and terminological use of the term “model”. 
As Nelson Goodman already wrote in “Languages of Art”: “Few terms are 
used in popular and scientific discourse more promiscuously than ‘model’” 
(171). 
A1. The scope of this paper is to reflect on the concept of model by using 
multiple perspectives. So, yes, the term is used here in order to refer to differ-
ent levels, but this is exactly what I would like to get across: the ambiguity, the 
multiplicity and the polysemy of the word “model”. 
Q2. It is true that modelling in DH is a challenging topic, but I can't see that 
DH already has its own notion of models and modelling compared with other 
interdisciplinary enterprises with computer science such as the social sciences, 
(cognitive) psychology, or economics. 
A2. The literature in DH regarding the concept of model and modelling is so 
vast that I could assert that DH is elaborating its own definition. 
Q3. For the formal language, the distinction between abstract data types, 
(concrete) data structures and their implementation should be noticed. Never-
theless, e.g. in the mentioned case of digital scholarly editions, we should dis-
tinguish between a model (the concepts, properties, constraints, structures, 
rules, etc.) and a particular result.  
A3. In digital scholarly editing, the concept of model refers to the choice of 
the features to be formalized at each level of the scholarly activity. In this 
sense, the edition is a model: it represents the interpretative act of the editor.  
Q4. I see a similar problem in calling TEI a model. In my view, TEI is first 
of all a formal language with an informal semantics. This view imposes several 
severe constraints, e.g. a fundamental tree structure due to its commitment to 
XML. So, I still see a deficit on the theoretical side; for me, TEI is yet more a 
representational framework than a model. 
A4. From the formal point of view, TEI is not a model. It lacks semantics. 
But, from the point of view of models as a shared definition of elements and 
attributes related to the classification of hermeneutic aspects of a domain, TEI 
is a model. 
Q5. Another issue is the depth of semantic modelling. In this respect, EDM, 
CIDOC CRM + FRBR and SKOS are not on the same level. I think we are in 
substantial agreement on what is said about formal ontologies: the question of 
semantics is tightly connected to a well-defined inference relation. Taking up 
TEI again, marking up named entities such as place names and representing 
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places in a formal ontology such as CIDOC CRM are on reasonably different 
abstraction levels. The anything but simple question is then, how the relation-
ship between TEI elements and CRM concepts can be formally recorded and 
mapped into a (partial) semantic and interoperable representation in terms of 
CRM, expressible in RDF/LOD. In the actually used formal systems, the most 
advanced of which are Descriptions logics (cf. OWL), we can deal with under 
specification, but not with vagueness. This is one of the very big challenges of 
the humanities and science. 
A5. EDM, CIDOC CRM, FRBR, and SKOS are not on the same level, I 
agree. The semantic depth is surely different. But they are all models, i.e. point 
of views: how to integrate metadata vocabularies (EDM), how to use an event-
centric approach in the cultural heritage (CIDOC CRM), how to document the 
stratification of object descriptions (FRBR), how to express structured subjects 
in a domain (SKOS). So, again, they are not all models from the viewpoint of 
formal languages to describe concepts, i.e. ontology, but because of their at-
tempt to define a shared conceptualization. Translating the TEI Schema into an 
ontology (e.g. an OWL representation), or thinking on TEI as a CRM, is a 
challenging issue (see, for example, Eide 2014; Ciotti and Tomasi 2015).  
Q6. Finally, reasoning with formal ontologies is, up to now, deductive rea-
soning. But for reasoning in the humanities and in science other forms are also 
needed, something that Leibniz called “ars inventoria”. 
A6. Yes, formal reasoning is the final aim. And the role of ontologies is to 
enable inferences through description logic formalism. But this is just one of 
the various ways to interpret the concept of model. 
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How to Recognize a Model When You See One. 
Or: Claudia Schiffer and the Climate Change 
Patrick Sahle ∗ 
Abstract: »Woran erkennt man eigentlich ein Modell, wenn man einem begeg-
net? Oder: Claudia Schiffer und der Klimawandel«. “Model”, at first sight, is a 
non-academic word with a wide circulation in a variety of conversational and 
non-technical written discourses. In, but also beyond that it is used in different 
situations, in different fields, by different disciplines. It changes its meaning in 
these respective contexts. But how far? If there remains a common conceptual 
core, we would learn a lot about the essence of the notion of model as a widely 
shared concept. If it turns out that the usage of the word makes model a hom-
onym with completely distinct meanings, we have to sharply distinguish who is 
using it in which context. To further research these questions, we need to ob-
serve where and how we encounter models in our daily and scholarly life. 
Keywords: Word and meaning, phenomenology, kinds of models. 
1.  Intro 
”Model” is a notoriously hard concept to grasp. In looking back to the work-
shop that took place at Wahn Manor House in February 2017 and trying to 
connect the interdisciplinary, yet scholarly, discussion that happened there to 
the even wider scope of “real life”, I will open up some rather loosely connect-
ed approaches or strategies to illuminate the possibilities and restrictions of a 
comprehensive perspective on models and modelling.1 
2. Model is just a Five Letter Word 
Words have a birth and then they grow up. They develop and change over time. 
Maybe they are like families. Words as family names. Over time, they branch 
out. Same name, different character. They split into polysems or are just meto-
nyms. They may be used as homonyms. Sometimes we even nickname them 
teapots. Some words are like twins, which can sprout in different directions. In 
                                                             
∗  Patrick Sahle, Cologne Center for eHumanities (CCeH), University of Cologne, Albertus 
Magnus Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany; sahle@uni-koeln.de. 
1  For the context of this contribution see Ciula et al. 2018. 
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the end, they can even end up as antonyms.2 Starting from one meaning, they 
can build a semantic distance up to the point where they seem to lose any 
common ground. Words and their meanings are formed by the context they 
move into and they are used within. Words are innocent; they are used and 
abused, formed and deformed, adopted and appropriated. We use them as we 
like. Our pleasure is to play with them. We are justified by the understanding 
that we share with our communication peers: as long as they see what we 
mean, decode what we send, we do nothing wrong. Across our own domains 
meaning differs, trenches grow. The family tree, the etymological connection, 
is not an explanation for the current/actual/present state of a word. It does not 
necessarily tell us something authoritative about its meaning. Yet we can only 
borrow, cultivate or educe words by building upon the meaning they bring with 
them to the here and now. There once must have been a common ground as a 
starting point. There must have been a commonality that grounded their devel-
opment and that might have survived that evolution, that transfer. When we use 
the same words in different contexts with different meanings they still refer to 
that common base.3 Maybe. In a stronger or weaker way. 
Model is just a five-letter word that is used in various fields of life, in sci-
ence and outside of science, and in different disciplines of scholarship. It is in 
such wide use that it is hardly ever defined formally or precisely. Moreover, if 
it is defined, the scope of the consensus regarding that definition is disputable. 
Still, what we are looking for is the remaining common ground: the shared 
meaning that we can find in uses of the word “model” in the various scholarly 
(and non-scholarly) domains. The common sense that explains the transfer 
(why did they adopt this word?) allows for some mutual understanding and 
asks for the productive refinement of our own deployment of the word – in the 
end the deployment of models and modelling, for example in the Digital Hu-
manities (DH) and its neighbouring fields. Maybe this can be a starting point 
for those interdisciplinary and inclusive/integrative metamodels the metadisci-
pline DH is so much interested in. 
                                                             
2  An example of a homonymic antonym from the German language is the word “billig“. 
Originally signifying rightly, fair, reasonable, appropriate, just (like in the expression “recht 
und billig” – where it still persists!) it now stands for cheap, inferior, overly simple, tawdry, 
cheesy. One of the most obvious examples of homonyms in the English language that has 
developed in very different directions is “bank”. 
3  Except for a coincidental homonymy without direct etymological connection. But as soon as 
you talk to scholars from Indo-European linguistics or other global-historical linguistics, you 
learn that there are no unrelated words. 
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3. Models in the Disciplines, Models in Situations 
Real life situations, fields of discourse, and academic disciplines are operation-
al communicative frameworks that provide for an advance in understanding. A 
default meaning addition. A tacit accord. A framework for reference: if you use 
“model” in this situation, I understand (or at least assume) that you mean this 
kind of model!4 Qualifiers, what linguists call determinants, are helpful in 
understanding the different notions and specializations of a word, but most 
often, they are left out of the local situation of communication. A word like 
“model” is used without qualifiers the more prominent, central, stable and clear 
its use is. Only in cross-field communication or if alternative meaning within 
one field exists is it necessary to specify the sense of the word. 
Empirical data on language usage is easier to obtain than ever. Lots of cor-
pora are out there. The whole internet can be used as a corpus – if you take it as 
a source for sampling data that you maybe clean up a little bit. Tools like the 
Google Books n-gram viewer make use of such a corpus representing a more or 
less arbitrarily pooled corpus of our digitized written heritage as a mirror of our 
language usage. Despite all of the biases of its underlying data it suggest in-
sights for the chronological development of the birth and growth of compound 
words in the domain of written books. A first harvest of compounds yields a 
wild collection of fruits like these: analytical model, architectural model, busi-
ness model, causal model, cognitive model, computational model, computer 
model, conceptual model, data model, descriptive model, economic model, 
fashion model, formal model, graphic model, iconic model, internal model, 
logical model, mathematical model, mental model, object model, physical 
model, predictive model, process model, role model, scale model, scientific 
model, semantic model, social model, statistical model, structural model, trans-
actional model, technical model, and 3D model.5 While the use of some com-
pounds is rather stable over time, others seem to show some trends as they gain 
or lose prominence.6 
                                                             
4  “Football has become more athletic in the past decades” – without further specification this 
would usually refer to professional men’s football as the default reference. If you want to 
talk about youth football or women’s football, you have to add the specification. 
5  One of the simpler approaches is the use of the “Corpus of Contemporary American English“ 
(COCA), see <https://corpus.byu.edu/coca>. 
6  The graphic shows the Google Books Ngram Viewer results as of November 15th, 2017, data 
for 1958 to 2008, corpus of English, smoothing factor 3, words economic model, role model, 
scale model, data model, computer model, conceptual model, theoretical model, computa-
tional model. Note that in a next step of enquiry we could ask for changes in the meaning 
of the words by looking at their definitions or co-occurring concepts to see whether and 
how they become simpler, or more complex, neater, more controlled and canonized. 
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Figure 1: An Unreliable Impression of the Prominence of Words and Concepts 
 
The mere collection of words do not lead to a classification or taxonomy as 
these words signify different ontological layers. They operationalize different 
perspectives. Some instances of the word model above ask for a property (an 
iconic model has to have a visual representation), some relate to processes or 
goals (like a business model). Some of them can be grouped (conceptual, theo-
retical), some divide a perspective (physical versus conceptual), some address 
domains (fashion). It should be possible to map the words or put them onto a 
coordinate system – maybe with abstraction and domain specificity as axes. 
The question remains: Is there a common ground shared by these com-
pounds? Where are the borderlines of meaning? Where is inclusion, where is 
exclusion? A fashion model is not a conceptual model. But a conceptual model 
can also be an iconic model. And a fashion model is an icon! Some domains 
are rather distinct and seem to exclude other notions. If you claim that models 
should only be structural or mathematical models, it follows that the use of the 
word model in other circumstances is plain wrong, as they are not models in 
this sense.7 But as we often don’t have clear definitions; notions are most often 
made up of a fuzzy set of meanings. There will be partial overlap between 
these meanings. Thus, we have to ask which of these partial meanings are 
comprehensive and which are exclusive? An important property of models in 
the sciences is the possibility of giving a formal notation to them, while other 
domains do not need formalization or are uninterested in pursuing it. Are we 
only lacking a routine of formal description for all kinds of models, taken to-
                                                             
7  “Such structural models sensu stricto exist only in logic and mathematics" - Günther Görz 
(2018, in this HSR Supplement), p. 164.  
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gether? While a narrow understanding may exclude models that have no formal 
notation, would it have to integrate them as soon as we have found that formal 
language? 
There are some formal languages out there: mathematical formula, Unified 
Modelling Language (UML), entity-relationship models (ERM), various XML 
schema languages etc. But are they really universal? Or only applicable to 
certain domains, realizing only a certain view on modelling? How can we find 
the commonalities in understandings of modelling if notation systems are al-
ready too specific and exclude most cases where the term model is used? Re-
garding distinction and overlap, maybe we can look for:  
1) The practical and theoretical use of “model” in certain domains or disci-
plines. 
2) Interdisciplinary approaches toward the understanding of overlap be-
tween them 
3) Metamodels that integrate as many disciplinary aspects as possible (with-
in their scope of interest). 
4) Underlying common sense understandings of properties of modelling. 
To understand better the proliferation of meaning as well as common roots and 
references, I would like to propose a phenomenological approach and an empir-
ical experiment: where and how do we encounter models, not only in our aca-
demic, but also in our “normal life”? 
4.  Models in the Wild 
One morning at the breakfast table I say to my son (14 years): “Boy, as you go 
out and spend your day, could you please watch out for models, collect them 
and bring them home for me?” This might be a small selection of what he 
would report for a typical day: 
1) Reading the newspaper at the breakfast table, I saw an advertisement 
with a fashion model. Claudia Schiffer, acting as a model, advertising a 
fancy dress. A model in flesh and blood? 
2) On my way to school, my friend pointed to a car passing by: “look, the 
brand new BMW model”. An instance of a model? 
3) In a mathematics lesson, I was asked to answer a word problem: “Please 
solve this exercise by modelling the situation with a quadratic equation,” 
the teacher said. A model as an abstract description of a part of the 
world? 
4) In a history lesson, we saw a diagram of feudalism as a model for the or-
ganisation of power and governance in the middle ages. We learned that 
vassalage is a central concept in that model – a word that I had never 
heard of before. A model as the supposed structure of a past society? 
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5) In a German lesson, we talked about “Wilhelm Meister’s Apprentice-
ship”, a novel by Goethe. It was said that this follows the model of the 
“Bildungsroman”. I had the impression that what the teacher wanted to 
talk about was not the novel itself, but the question of literary genres. A 
model as a classification of types of (literary) art? 
6) In a politics lesson, we had to discuss the model of “representative de-
mocracy” as we examined the German political system in comparison to 
others. A model as a blueprint for a political system? 
7) In a geography lesson, we worked with different kinds of maps present-
ing models as simplified and systemised representations according to cer-
tain views of the world. A model as a visual scheme of geographical rela-
tions? 
8) When I had to go to the toilet facilities during a break, I recognized the 
dichotomous nature of our gender model by the two icons on the doors. A 
model as an icon become conventional? 
9) In my free time in the afternoon, I assembled a scale plastic model of a 
space shuttle. A model that can fit in my pocket? 
10) After that, I ordered something at an online shop. I wondered what 
model lay behind the system that organized its data and processes. A mo-
del as information architecture? 
11) At the end of the evening news, there was a weather forecast based on 
meteorological models. The weatherman said that the upcoming weather 
would be much too warm for the season but that it would match models 
of ongoing climate change. A model as a prediction of the future of our 
planet? 
In all of these situations, we find models in very different senses of the word. 
In different “behaviours” and functions. In different relationships to the world 
that is modelled and to the world where objects as instances may refer back to 
these models. For every given case, we could discuss in which way the respec-
tive model is a model, acts like a model or is used as a model. 
5.  How to Recognize a Model 
What can we learn from that? Models occur in situations; they are presented as 
models, recognized as models or underlie things we engage with. Models can 
be observed as themselves or by their effects. Models can take many forms and 
shapes or be of different substances. They can be made of plastic or metal, or 
flesh and blood. Paper that carries diagrams. Drawings, icons, symbols. Some 
are word based: narration or explanation, or verbal description. Some are ab-
stract concepts: equations, formula, or formal notations. Mental models in the 
strict sense are even hidden in people's brains. These are models, we cannot 
talk about (unless we do) but could observe them by their effect (like the be-
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haviour of these people). The relationship between world, model and instances 
of the model that we observe move in at least two directions: sometimes we see 
something as an instance or an effect of a model. Sometimes we see the model 
itself, representing something. In these situations, we recognize the model. In 
others, models present themselves more actively. Overall, we may not only ask 
what a model is, but also when it is. It seems there are four basic situations in 
which we encounter models. 
Figure 2: How to Encounter Models 
 
6.  Semantic Fields 
Back to language. In all situations, using the word model to describe what we 
have or which effects we can observe points to some semantic characteristics. 
Sometimes words have neighbours. Words with close meaning, synonyms, and 
replacements to avoid repetition. They share partial meaning and at the same 
time add further explanation. Exploring this neighbourhood can reveal mean-
ing. But we have to keep an eye on the differences to get a sharper image. We 
may ask which words fulfil these sentences: “a model is a kind of …” or “a 
model is like … - but different”.8 This is my first collection: A model is some-
times like a definition, an explication, an explanation, an interpretation, a gen-
eralisation, an abstraction, a description, a depiction, an image, a drawing, a 
diagram, a visualisation, a symbolisation, an icon, a map, a (critical) represen-
tation, a reproduction, a miniature, a replica, a mock-up, a simulation, a func-
tion, a system, a tool, a draft, instructions for constructing something, a method 
for organizing knowledge, an experiment, an example, an ideal, a specimen, a 
type, a prototype, an analogy, a metaphor, a paradigm, a pattern, a structure, a 
theory, a concept. If we go through all of the potential pairs and ask ourselves, 
what is the difference between these words and “model”, we should come up 
                                                             
8  See McCarty (2004) and Goodman (1968, 171) for similar approaches. 
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with a rather precise description of what model actually means and what it 
doesn’t. 
Another helpful approach might tackle the problem from the opposite direc-
tion. Learn from the counterpart. Maybe the common core meaning lies in the 
distinction. Good definitions tell things apart. They explain what is “specific” 
about a thing. Can we tell what models definitely are not? Although models 
certainly are not most of the things or concepts in the world, the outcome of a 
first unsystematic survey was rather poor. What we can say, however, is that 
the model is neither the modelled object (or a part of the world) nor an instance 
based on the model. But this elementary difference is true for many other 
things. 
Maybe there is no connection between Claudia Schiffer and Climate Change 
as they are models representing an understanding of the term and concept as it 
has evolved in different directions. Maybe there is a connection as they still 
share some basic properties, since they relate to certain domains in the world 
and as they explain something – even with predictive power. 
7.  Back to Basics 
To find a common core in the understanding of the concept of “model”, we 
have to look for commonalities. Trivialisation may be the prize we have to pay 
for this. But trivialisation is only the backside of the medal where extreme 
abstraction is the more shiny one that may enlighten our navigation through the 
landscape of models. Are there properties that all types of models share? That 
are shared in all domains and by all understandings? 
As the model is not the modelled object or domain, we use models to refer 
to something, to talk about something else, to show, to simulate something else. 
A model stands for something. It is a placeholder, a proxy. Furthermore, mod-
els are a means for understanding, communication, and exchange. For testing, 
analysing, producing something. To this end, they have to fulfil some minimal 
requirements: Models must be either smaller, less detailed or more abstract 
than ... . They must be idealized and de-individualised.9 They must contain 
entities, properties of elements and relationships between elements in a way 
that relates to the modelled object. 
On this basis, we can see that even Claudia Schiffer and climate change are 
things of the same type.10 Both are examples of models. Claudia Schiffer is (or 
was) a fashion model while models of climate change refer to global patterns of 
weather. Both stand for something else and are abstractions – of other “real 
                                                             
9  On the aspect of idealisation see for example Morgan and Knuuttila (2012). 
10  For a more thoughtful approach towards clustering of models and common properties see 
the contribution by Lattmann (2018, in this HSR Supplement). 
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women” and of “weather that can be observed”. Both present a scenario that is 
based on idealisation. Both can be seen as icons. But what about formalisation? 
Both kinds of models operate with measures and numbers! Maybe, in the end, 
the only difference is in the degree of formalisation and explicitness. Climate 
models are highly formalised while fashion models as real persons are obvious-
ly very explicit. On the other hand, even for Claudia Schiffer, a formal descrip-
tion of properties and measures can be given to explain why she was chosen to 
act as a model and how she relates to the modelled part of the world. We could 
even say that both models are similar in their predictive purpose and force: “the 
weather will be like this …” – “people will buy this dress …”. And both predic-
tions are purely statistical! 
8.  Outro 
Our concerted workshop tried to assemble and contrast views on models and 
modelling from different perspectives within academic discourse. Although 
STEM and life sciences were underrepresented or not represented at all (with 
the exception of computer science and mathematics), the differences already 
seemed to dominate over the common ground. Some participants might have 
felt out of place. They thought the workshop would be about models in the 
digital humanities and that could only mean “data models” – while others were 
not interested in explicit formal models at all. In this seeming misunderstand-
ing, the workshop proved useful and productive. It revealed the differences, 
trenches and gaps between academic disciplines that initially seemed to be 
positioned relatively close to each other. We could now conclude that every 
field has its own understanding and its own model of model and modelling. 
That it would be best to leave them alone in following their own agenda to 
reach their own respective goals. Maybe an understanding of models as icons is 
useless in computer science where algorithmic solutions are needed. Maybe 
formal mathematical models do not help literary scholars in conceptualizing 
close reading and interpretation. But to me, it is exactly in the differences and 
the apparent incommensurability of the various perspectives that good starting 
points to think about mutuality and to look for the common ground between 
disciplines can be located. If we see how diverging practices rely on common 
principles and how different fields have turned them into successful strategies, 
maybe we can develop a new and fruitful methodology for modelling across 
the disciplines. And this is, what Digital Humanities is about: we have to create 
metamodels all the time to make concepts and methods from the humanities 
operational by using approaches from engineering and computer science. We 
need to bridge the seeming gap between these worlds and to do so, we must 
understand their respective foundations. 
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A Metaphorical  
Language for Modelling 
Cristina Marras ∗ 
Abstract: »Eine metaphorische Sprache des Modellierens.«. The workshop 
“Thinking in Practice” aimed to integrate both theoretical and practical meth-
odologies. Therefore, we organizers decided to combine free discussions with 
more playful moments, along with some focused confrontations. These playful 
moments were intended to establish each workshop participant’s position with 
respect to modelling, as well as to grasp and stress the most salient concepts 
emerging during the different sessions and discussions. This was in fact a pur-
poseful methodological choice that allowed us to correlate the use of certain 
metaphors as models for the discussion, and as paths and guidelines for the 
various focus-exercises. 
Keywords: Metaphor, model, modelling, discussion, exercise. 
1.  Some Notes on Metaphors 
The workshop “Thinking in practice” to which the contributions in this HSR 
Supplement go back, aimed to integrate both theoretical and practical method-
ologies. Therefore, we organizers decided to combine free discussions with 
more playful moments, along with some focused confrontations.1 These playful 
moments were intended to establish each workshop participant’s position with 
respect to modelling, as well as to grasp and stress the most salient concepts 
that emerged during the different sessions and discussions. This was in fact a 
purposeful methodological choice that allowed us to correlate the use of certain 
metaphors as models for the discussion, and as paths and guidelines for the 
various focus-exercises.  
I strongly believe that metaphors, as figures of speech, have the capability to 
reveal the multiple aspects involved in a discussion; they express the necessity 
for any philosophical activity, and for any scientific discussion more generally, 
to find a balance between creative freedom and the precision and formality of 
philosophical and scientific discourse. Moreover, metaphors involve the double 
aspect of the philosophical constitution of discourse: institution discoursive (a 
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1  See for example Dal Lago and Rovatti 1993. 
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mediation between “text” and context) and instauration discoursive (the rela-
tion between forms of expressiveness and speculative schemes) (Maingueneau 
1995, Cossutta 1995). In this way, metaphors express the close relationship 
between ways of talking and ways of behaving in a discussion (Cattani 2001). 
It is certainly restrictive to narrow the investigation of metaphor to fields like 
poetry or literature, just as it is restrictive to understand metaphor exclusively 
as a synonym for trope, or to consider tropes as a sort of violation of the max-
ims of cooperative communication. I hope it is no longer necessary to demon-
strate, as Mary Hesse (1966) pointed out, that metaphors are not decorative 
literary instruments but rather essential processes of knowledge. Therefore, an 
essential part of their “nature” is that they function as arguments in philosophi-
cal discussions.  
I consider philosophical discourse as constitutive; therefore, language is not 
only an instrument for philosophical communication.2 In this sense metaphors 
are conceptual processes that contribute to structuring our world.3 They are 
more than imaginative structures: they are not used just to remedy a conceptual 
insufficiency, but also to enrich argumentation. In no way does metaphor play a 
subordinate role. Following contemporary research on metaphor, I see meta-
phors as the result of an interaction between a word or an utterance and a con-
text: they create new similarities, rather than only showing and expressing a 
similarity that already exists.4 A simple juxtaposition between two domains or 
two terms is not sufficient to produce a metaphor. A metaphor is not a conver-
sion into simile (whereby a metaphor is considered a form of comparison) or 
vice versa the simile converted into a metaphorical form. Metaphors open up to 
new contexts of meaning and become fruitful lenses and models with which to 
analyze and guide scientific discussions and the rationale underpinned (Tagli-
agambe 1997, 291). 
Using Fauconnier and Turner’s theoretical model for analyzing metaphors in 
Conceptual integration network (1998), I begin by discussing the common 
                                                             
2  "Contemporary philosophies, have not only recognised the role of language as in indispen-
sable instrument of philosophical communication, but have understood that the choice of a 
linguistic form is neither purely arbitrary nor simply a carbon copy of reality. (...) The form is 
not separable from the content" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1991, 45). 
3  See the "Introduction: why metaphor matters to philosophy" in Johnson 1995, in particular 
p. 159: "we human are metaphorizing animals". 
4  The status of metaphors takes a fundamental shift between '500 and ‘600. Abandoning the 
prevalent line that saw metaphors as pure ornaments of discourse, metaphors became a full 
part of cognitive processes even if they were still undermined by imaginative elements: 
"quasi in miraculoso modo gli ti fa travedere l'un dentro l'altro... mirar molti obietti per un 
istraforo di prospettiva, che se gli originali medesimi successivamente ti venisser passando 
dinanzi agli occhi" (Tesauro 1978 [1654], 331), “as if by miraculous means it shows one 
thing inside the other... look at several angles from one hole of perspectival lens, as if the 
originals themselves would pass in front of your eyes” (translation courtesy of Arianna Ciu-
la). 
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notions of “target” and “source” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), referring to them 
in terms of space/domain. This type of analysis considers the entire process of 
generating metaphorical concepts. I will use it as a basis for looking at the 
dynamic integration between the “target domain” (in the case of the workshop 
the discussion on modelling) and “source domains” (aquatic and terrestrial 
metaphors) by crossing their properties. The metaphorical process is in fact 
multi-directional in that it involves cognitive, conceptual and cultural levels. 
From the interaction and intersection of different properties and dynamics a 
new conceptual space is created: a blending space.  
2. "Thinking is an Explorative Journey" 
The whole body of science can be viewed as an ocean, which is continuous, 
and without any interruption or partition, even though men distinguish in it 
parts, to which they give names for their own use. Furthermore, just as there 
are unknown seas, or seas which have only been navigated by a few vessels 
thrown there by mere chance, so too there are sciences of which we have 
known something only by chance and without any planning (G.W. Leibniz, 
De l’usage de l’art des combinaisons, 1690-1716). 
In the spirit of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and his idea 
of collaborative knowledge (as described in the above quotation), the workshop 
was navigating in the open sea, aiming to explore the concepts of modelling 
and model, their different applications, but also their limits: their disciplinary 
specificities as well as their common ground.  
“Thinking is an explorative journey” was the metaphorical frame chosen to 
guide the workshop discussion. To investigate the different applications of this 
frame we mainly focused on the interplay of some related metaphors, in partic-
ular the ship and the island. To do so, the workshop exercises referred to aquat-
ic, as well as to terrestrial metaphors. These conceptual metaphors are inter-
connected not only because they share the same semantic field and some 
properties, but also because they often occur when we talk about research, 
research investigation, and knowledge organization. In the history of thought 
they have become models for structuring and mapping knowledge, for the 
organization of disciplines, and for modelling research practices (Marras 2017, 
2014, 2013; Blumenberg 1960; McCarthy 2006). They also vehiculate a partic-
ular vision and idea of knowledge organization and acquisition, namely a sys-
tem in which different types of scholarship (in this context I would use the 
French word savoirs) are seen as an interconnected net rather than as hierar-
chical or pyramidal structures.  
Nowadays, aquatic and maritime metaphors have become integral parts of 
the lexicon of the digital era. The most obvious examples are seen in the use of 
maritime metaphors connected to the web, such as surfing and navigation. The 
assumption behind the workshop’s approach of “thinking in practice” is that 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  196 
metaphors have a cognitive and a conceptual role and that they build, or can 
guide the building of, models of thinking and of knowledge organization. The 
properties of these maritime and terrestrial metaphors seem to be adequate for 
capturing the nature and the characteristics of engaged discussions: fluid, dy-
namic investigation and confrontation aimed at exploring the surface as well as 
plumbing the depths. The ship (exercise 1) is supposed to be well organized; 
navigation has to be made with everyone’s contribution (from the chef to the 
skipper, from the simple sailor to the officers, to the mechanic, etc.); the on-
board equipment is crucial and many different things are needed (food, scien-
tific instruments, etc.). 
As the workshop was interdisciplinary, the crew included people with dif-
ferent competences, visions, expertise, and experiences. The route for the 
workshop was plotted but was also adjusted during navigation to cope with all 
the unforeseen events and the different routes envisaged during the discussion. 
While sailing (workshop), the crew was invited to find an island and to think 
about how to populate it, what to bring in, and what to build (exercise 2). 
Through the analysis of the use of these metaphors in the workshop debate, 
once more, not only can metaphor be conceived as a “rhetorical ornament” but, 
in spite and in virtue of its informal character, it can also function as a method-
ological and non-conventional way to structure discourse in analogical terms. 
3. Exercises 
Exercise 1: Ship (time 20´) 
Figure 1: The Workshop Ship – Day 1 
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Figure 2: The Workshop Ship – Day 2 
 
Description 
A ship and its parts (detailed) were drawn on a flipchart. Each participant was 
asked to position him/herself in the ship according to the role he/she thinks 
he/she will be taking vis a vis the topic being discussed. Each participant was 
asked to briefly describe their reasons for choosing their role. The questions 
used to guide the exercise were related to those addressed in each participants’ 
presented papers and to the main issues that emerged from the discussion be-
tween the pairs of paper presenters. 
The “positioning phase” was followed by a brief comment or discussion 
once all participants had chosen their roles on the ship. 
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Exercise 2: The Island of Modelling (MetaMaps) (time 30’) 
Figure 3: Island of Modelling 
 
Description 
Somewhere in the Ocean of Knowledge there is the Island of Modelling: a 
destination for the ship? A place to dock the ship? The boundaries and the 
shape of this island had to be drawn. The island could be the ship’s destination 
and be populated by its crew. Each participant was therefore asked to imagine 
the Island of Modelling, and to indicate what should be brought in and what 
should be built on it (infrastructures, structures, tools, etc.). 
Exercise 3:  Drag-and-Drop (Suitcase, Night Table, Wastebasket) 
(time 40’) 
Description 
At the end of the workshop each participant was asked to indicate what he/she 
wanted to bring with them in a suitcase for travel to and life on the Island. They 
were also asked what they would put on a night table to reread, review, or 
reflect on, and what they would like to throw away. 
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The exercise was intended to gather together the most salient elements, con-
cepts, or words that emerged during the two-day workshop, to select what 
should further be reflected upon and investigated, as well as what was redun-
dant or wasteful in that it did not improve our understanding of and research on 
modelling. 
4.  Conclusion 
Figure 4: Puzzle 
 
The workshop was an opportunity to experiment with different forms of lan-
guages and communication for research and science as part of its main objec-
tive to reflect on models and modelling. The conceptual metaphor, “thinking is 
an explorative journey”, guided the discussion and the workshop activities. The 
purpose was to explore different forms of meta-reflection on modelling using a 
participatory methodology. Different resources (reading, writing, pictures, 
games) were used to organize and produce shared knowledge. Participants, 
who came from different disciplines and research backgrounds, actively and 
directly contributed, individually or as groups, to the development of different 
perspectives and shared methodologies and definitions. We wanted to avoid the 
risk of bring everybody together on the “same” understanding of what model-
ling is. Therefore, the discussions and the common reflections and analysis 
stressed the importance to preserve the richness deriving for the disciplinary 
multiperspectivism of model and modelling. 
With these exercises we in fact wanted to address a double methodological 
principle: transferable criteria and plural practices. Both are tentative answers 
to some questions the project has been investigating, namely: under which 
conditions and through which procedures is it possible to reproduce a model in 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  Ň  200 
a different context from the one in which it was originally produced? What 
distinctive elements should the experience of modelling (for example in a lab) 
have in order to meet the criteria of transferability? 
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Setting the Space: Creating Surroundings for an 
Interdisciplinary Discourse and Sharing of 
 (Implicit) Knowledge 
Zoe Schubert & Elisabeth Reuhl ∗ 
Abstract: »Bestimmen des Raums: Schaffen des Umfelds für einen interdiszipli-
nären Diskurs und Austausch von (implizitem) Wissen«. The international work-
shop “Thinking in Practice” was organized to explore scholarly modelling from 
the perspectives of researchers belonging to various disciplines. This focus on 
interdisciplinarity made the workshop unlike other academic meetings. There-
fore it was important to build an environment and create a surrounding to 
share not only explicit knowledge connected to the ordinary scholarly work of 
the participants, but also to invite them to share their implicit knowledge, 
which often happens in a complex secluded network of relationships, removed 
from conscious knowledge sharing. Taking these aspects into account, this arti-
cle reflects upon the created workshop model from an abstract view, outlining 
the selection of participants, location and format and how the planning con-
tributed to a notably successful event. 
Keywords: Scholarly event organization, academic meetings, workshop format, 
interdisciplinarity, knowledge sharing, implicit and explicit knowledge, model-
ling, collaboration. 
1.  Introduction 
Exploring scholarly modelling as a formal and informal reasoning strategy 
across disciplinary boundaries requires gathering a diversity of concepts, meth-
ods and views. To consider modelling as the object of such an interdisciplinary 
investigation, and to see it as the subject matter itself, means finding ways to 
share appropriate knowledge and experiences from different perspectives. For 
this, a face-to-face meeting was needed where everything was organized in a 
way that allows for the transfer and sharing of knowledge and knowledge pro-
duction, not only in theoretical and scientific reflection, but also in a direct 
confrontation of contrasting viewpoints. Experts representing different disci-
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plines have to be brought together and so the interdisciplinary workshop on 
modelling, Thinking in Practice,1 was conceived. By including experienced 
scholars with their own ideas around the term and concept of modelling, the 
workshop aimed to collect different opinions and knowledge in order to ana-
lyze the intent and varied usages of the term modelling in and beyond the con-
text of Digital Humanities. When bringing together experts with diverse areas 
of expertise, it is essential to decide on a suitable format to let them share 
knowledge and experiences of the subject matter gained from their particular 
perspectives (see Liyanage, Taha, Ballal, and Li 2009).  
2. The Workshop Organization - Setting the Space 
Knowledge sharing, communicating, collaborating and personal meetings 
belong to scholarly work and are part of most researchers’ everyday lives (see 
Hirsch 2012, 182). Even if several of the participants of this workshop are 
connected to the Digital Humanities, which are inherently interdisciplinary (see 
Thaller 2012), each discipline involved draws on their own specific traditions 
and methods. To enable the sharing of thoughts across the borders of disci-
plines during the workshop, it was important for the scholars involved to be-
come aware of the hidden views and assumptions which are often seen as self-
evident and are rarely discussed during the ordinary scholarly work within any 
single discipline. In order to truly benefit from the expertise of all participants, 
an appropriate method had to be found for bringing to light not only explicit 
but also implicit knowledge collected through experience, and to make these 
insights accessible to others (see Nissen 2005, 13). Thus the location, partici-
pants, and format are all addressed hereafter. 
2.1  The Location – Finding Suitable Surroundings 
Concerning the aim of breaking with models and conventions of academic 
meetings, it was undesirable to use an ordinary, run-of-the-mill meeting room. 
The location should rather constitute an inspiring surrounding to create a stimu-
lating atmosphere, facilitating continuous sharing as described above. For this 
reason, Wahn Manor House2 became the venue of choice (image 1). This his-
torical building has been rented by the University of Cologne for many years, 
and it houses its theater collection as well as large representative rooms. Be-
cause of the connection between the venue and theater – which can be said to 
be related to modelling in interesting ways – terms and characteristics from this 
area come to mind and can be helpful metaphors for thinking about the event. 
                                                             
1  <http://modellingdh.eu>. 
2  <http://www.schloss-wahn.com>.  
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For the workshop we utilized one state room, called Gartensaal (garden hall), to 
function as stage and auditorium (image 2), while another smaller room, called 
Chinesisches Zimmer (Chinese room), was used for breaks. Both of them fea-
ture luxuriant eighteenth century oil paintings covering their walls, which es-
tablish a welcoming and inspiring contrast to the educational surroundings 
created to minimize distractions for students that are often found in university 
contexts. 
Image 1: Entrance and Front Yard of Wahn Manor House 
Image 2: The Workshop Room (Gartensaal) 
2.2  The Participants – Bringing together Interdisciplinary Experts 
Besides choosing a venue, the search for potential participants is obviously a 
fundamental step in making the workshop a successful event. According to the 
intention of the workshop, experts from various disciplines were invited, form-
ing a network of competences around the subject of modelling in and adjacent 
to Digital Humanities. As this topic has not often been approached from such 
an interdisciplinary angle before it promised a unique opportunity to create new 
and unpredictable insights, and it was thus possible to secure primary research-
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ers for the workshop. Furthermore, the workshop also presented the chance to 
make use of modelling as a way to reflect on the participants’ own scholarly 
work and methods. 
The resulting list of participants for the workshop was not only interdiscipli-
nary but also diverse from the view of nationality, age, and experiences. The 
participants consisted of the invited speakers (both active and retired profes-
sors), guests (selected PhD students who were invited to listen to the talks), a 
representative of the organization funding the overall project, and the project 
team (four principal investigators, one research associate and four research 
assistants) – almost 25 people in total. The disciplines represented ranged from 
Archeology, Literary Studies, and Psychology to Computer Science. Continu-
ing the theater metaphor, all attendees became actors, audience, and producers 
at the same time to share their knowledge and experiences with the whole 
group in creative ways. Switching roles was made possible through a workshop 
format that created a scope of action which encouraged participants to do so. 
Image 3: The Group of Participants and Organizers 
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2.3 The Format – Crossing Disciplines, Switching Roles and 
Creating Impulses 
To kick off the workshop, two of the research project’s principal investigators 
acted out a dialogue while wearing masks to underline the theatrical character 
of their performance and link it to the venue (Ciula et al. 2018, this HSR Sup-
plement). With this presentation, they created an appropriate atmosphere for 
the workshop and set the stage for the upcoming main acts. In the structure set 
for the workshop, the speakers were paired up, each person presenting their 
paper before switching roles and questioning the other on stage (image 5). In 
this way a dialogue was initiated on the basis of the areas of expertise of both 
of the presenters, before the discussion was opened to the audience (image 6). 
The revised articles published in this HSR Supplement also capture these dia-
logues. Interestingly, the questions from the respondents were comprised not 
only of those prepared in advance by studying their partnered speaker’s posi-
tion paper (circulated prior to the workshop), but also spontaneous questions 
which only occurred while engaging with the topic interactively. To document 
the dialogues, a method was used that takes into account examples and meta-
phors, and differentiates between explicit and implicit statements (see Geißler 
and Tardella 2018, this HSR Supplement). 
Guided exercises were offered to facilitate the reflection and recording of 
results within the entire group between dialogue sessions (see Gengnagel 2018, 
this HSR Supplement). During these parts, all participants were encouraged to 
think and act creatively, so that they could adopt other, different roles, roles 
which had the power to heavily influence this part of the workshop’s outcome 
by prompting spontaneous thoughts. The historical Gartensaal offered an in-
spiring backdrop, and the seats were placed in a U-shape to make the discus-
sion among the group easy.  
On the one hand, clear structures were provided by a program designed by 
the organizers in advance. On the other hand, spontaneity and improvisation by 
the actors, as well as the switching of roles, were encouraged since it seemed 
imperative to do so to properly illuminate the very complex topic of modelling. 
To stimulate the flow of implicit knowledge (see Nissen 2005, 13-4) about it, 
the workshop offered time and space for informal conversations in the smaller, 
adjacent room used for coffee breaks and lunch. Other parts of Wahn Manor 
House like the entrance hall and front yard were also accessible and allowed 
participants to clear their heads or search for alternative stimuli without moving 
too far away from the ongoing conversations. While lunch was served in the 
castle, the dinner was held in a nearby restaurant to provide a spatial separation 
from the workshop venue and to allow the workshop topic to be left behind if 
desired. 
In order to not only intellectually move through many disciplines and 
thoughts, but also physically make use of the entirety of the workshop’s loca-
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tion, the venue itself became the main focus of interest for an hour during a 
guided tour of the extensive theater collection, which is spread out over the 
entire building. It contains a variety of items originating from different coun-
tries and times, ranging from shadow puppets, miniature stage models, costume 
designs, archived newspaper articles, and posters, to requisites. This provided 
some references to a discipline otherwise not represented at the workshop and a 
more hands-on opportunity to discover links and metaphorical similarities to 
modelling.  
Connected to the workshop’s topic, a discussion arose based on the sugges-
tion that this collection represents a very interesting case: typically, a collection 
of artifacts corresponds to a specific model with respect to the content and the 
items (where they are located, how they are stored). Similarly, academic meet-
ings are most commonly constituted for a special group of scholars from one 
discipline. This collection, however, is organized quite differently – as this 
workshop also aimed to be. The castle offers contorted, narrow corridors and 
staircases in which parts of the collection are kept; even the historical attic is 
used for archiving documents. What can be observed in Wahn is in a way the 
modelling (of the collection) needing to adapt to an existing architectural mod-
el, which is originally intended to be used for another purpose (as a Manor 
House).  
While preparing the workshop program, it became apparent that not only the 
theater collection but almost every museum can be linked to the topic of mod-
elling in some way. For example, the art museum with its artists who used 
models – people as well as objects and events – to create paintings and sculp-
tures; the ethnographic museum which models different cultures from all over 
the world in the space of different exhibition rooms, using objects and props to 
let the visitor experience a different culture for a short while.  
Image 4: Øyvind Eide during the Introduction 
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Image 5: Giorgio Fotia and Paul Fishwick during their Dialogue 
Image 6: Audience Discussion after one of the Dialogues 
3. Conclusion
The examples that came up during the workshop illustrate the broad use of the 
term “model” in everyday language. Likewise, the dialogues and discussions 
during the more scholarly parts made it very clear that the term “modelling” 
has different meanings and usages in each of the disciplines represented by the 
participants. Ultimately, this once again serves to emphasize why initiatives 
such as this workshop are important to define and redefine the term “model-
ling” more precisely for academic use.  
Furthermore, it became clear that it is worthwhile to invest some time, prior 
to and after the event, to reflect on the organization of the event and the signifi-
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cance for the outcomes of its participants, location, and format. The space has 
to be set in accordance with the subject matter and desired results, and it can be 
fruitful to search for connections between topic and surroundings. This article 
identified the main organizational tasks for the workshop Thinking in Practice 
for accommodating the group’s interdisciplinarity and bringing to light the 
participants’ implicit knowledge of the topic – exactly the motivation to hold 
such an event as part of the research project after all. Taking these challenges 
into account and creating the workshop’s surroundings accordingly, as de-
scribed in this article, contributed to make it a notably successful event. 
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Observational Drawing.  
From Words to Diagrams 
Nils Geißler & Michela Tardella ∗ 
Abstract: »Beobachtungen in Bildern: Von Wörtern zu Diagrammen«. In this 
paper we illustrate the observational activity we carried out during the work-
shop and its results. In our opinion this work is helpful to get a synopsis both of 
the event, as the development and communicative exchange of academic con-
tent, and the content itself. After introducing the criteria used for the design 
of an observation support tool, the observation grid, we present a list of words 
used to encircle the concept of model and the practice of modelling. This is fol-
lowed by a list of metaphors employed in the processes of conceptualizing 
model and modelling, and of communicating research; finally, a list of explicit 
definitions is included. In the last paragraph we focus on an interesting exper-
iment in visualizing the data extracted from each talk. 
Keywords: Model, modelling, interdisciplinarity, observation, visualization. 
1.  Introduction
In this paper we present and discuss some of the results of the observational 
activity carried out by the authors of this article as part of the Thinking in Prac-
tice workshop. The “objects” to be examined were identified on the basis of 
some key questions formulated in the light of the aims of the project: how do 
the speakers present, structure and discuss the content of their talks? What do 
they wish to communicate? What examples do they use? What is the relevant 
terminology employed in order to define what a model and/or a modelling 
process is? What metaphors do they consider really effective when conceptual-
izing the content of their talks? 
The observation work entailed, as a preliminary step, the design of an ob-
servation support tool, a grid, which was developed in order to keep track of 
individual contributions to the debate and the exchanges between the partici-
pants. In particular, it was designed to bring into focus some central aspects 
related both to the level of the expressed content and to the scholarly event 
∗ Nils Geißler, Cologne Center for eHumanities (CCeH), Universität zu Köln, Meister-Ekkehart-
Straße 11, 50931 Cologne, Germany; nils.geissler@uni-koeln.de.
Michela Tardella, Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee, Consiglio
Nazionale delle Ricerche, via Carlo Fea 2,  00161, Rome, Italy; michela.tardella@gmail.com.
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itself. This event was a meeting between scholars to discuss, in an organized 
setting, a specific topic, to exchange views, and to engage in an open debate 
(cf. Schubert and Reuhl 2018, in this HSR Supplement). 
To analyze the workshop from a linguistic and communicative point of 
view, we drew inspiration from Michael Halliday’s model of communication 
(M. Halliday 1978), namely the modelling of the “Context of Situation”, a 
notion adopted from Malinowski’s theory.1 Halliday’s model covers three 
important aspects, which are strictly related to the linguistic choices applied in 
creating a text: the field, which gives an indication of what is being talked 
about and the actions and content to which the text refers; the tenor, which 
refers to the social relations existing between the individuals involved in a 
communicative situation (it also influences the strategies chosen to activate the 
linguistic exchange); and the mode, which describes the way the language is 
used in a speech interaction, including the medium (spoken, written, written to 
be spoken, etc.) as well as the rhetorical mode (exposition, persuasion, etc.).  
The interplay between field, tenor and mode gives rise to the different pos-
sible options that are actualized in every concrete communicative context. This 
model seemed to us particularly suited to observe, register and analyze specific 
elements and aspects of the interactions between the workshop participants. 
Our interest was indeed in observing the modalities and the tools the partici-
pants chose for presenting their works, including their linguistic register, the 
coverbal gesture, and their use of space. 
The observation grid was inspired both by Halliday’s framework and by es-
tablished research practices adopted in many disciplines – from Anthropology 
and Ethnology to Sociology, Psychology and Education – as useful means to 
record all content and to grasp and reconstruct the event by taking into account 
how and in which situations communicative acts were manifested.  
                                                             
1  The factors involved in a communicative situation, and which are able to determine or 
influence the way in which the language, in its various aspects, is used, are multiple and 
complex. They have been formalized and modelled by scholars belonging to very different 
fields of research, from Linguistics (Ferdinand de Saussure’s Circuite de la Parole and Jakob-
son’s communication functions) to Anthropology (Bronislaw Malinowski’s context of situa-
tion), from Psychology (Karl Bühler’s Organonmodell) to Mathematics (Claude Elwood Shan-
non and Warren Weaver’s mathematical theory) followed by the more recent cognitive 
approaches, such as Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory. These are just some of the mod-
els that emerged in the literature in the last decades. For an overall historical and theoreti-
cal view see Gensini (2012). 
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2. An Analytical Grid 
The observation grid was designed to facilitate the observation and to record specif-
ic aspects of the event’s content. The categories identified to guide the observers 
were: 1. Examples/Comparisons; 2. Words used to encircle model and modelling; 3. 
Metaphors; 4. Approach (how they think about the topic in general); 5. Argumenta-
tion (“Confident in his/her choices”, Negotiation, Agreement, Disagreement); 6. 
Common definition of model (if there is any) or common points; and 7. Notes (free 
annotations). 
The data collected in relation to these specific areas of the debate and to the def-
inition of theoretical and practical frameworks on the part of the scholars involved 
has proven particularly useful for the development of the research trajectory that we 
are currently pursuing through the project Modelling between Digital and Humani-
ties: Thinking in Practice. Terms variously related to model and modelling, their 
fields of application, their rhetorical aspects – both communicative and argumenta-
tive (Argumentation) and those functional for conceptualization (Metaphors) – and 
definitions constitute valuable resources for understanding how the notion of model 
and the process of modelling are conceived and positioned along the theory-praxis 
axis. Moreover, these elements allow us to reflect on the possibility of identifying a 
shared conceptual core for the two notions of model/modelling that is adopted in 
several disciplines, and hence is transdisciplinary. 
With respect to the level of communicative exchange, we chose to monitor three 
specific aspects and to identify various options that would facilitate the observers’ 
work: 1. Delivery (Reading, Ad lib., Slides, Other); 2. Linguistic register (Informal, 
Formal, Technical, Literary, Dated, Historical, Humorous, Archaic, Rare); and 3. 
Coverbal gesture/Use of space (Rich, Medium, Poor, Other).2 All the aspects per-
taining to the strategies of communication have been recorded but, due to time and 
space restrictions, not all have been analyzed. In what follows we focus on present-
ing and reflecting on the terminology and metaphors employed, and on the explicit 
definitions of model and modelling. Considerable space will be devoted to our 
experiment in visualizing the recorded material. 
                                                             
2  The reason for these choices lies in the fact that, in our view, the communication strategies 
adopted – in a more or less conscious and planned way – constitute in themselves a first 
attempt to model the content of a talk. For example, the choice to use a visual aid, based on 
either images or writing, is highly revealing of the field of research, its methodology, the 
tools it employs and the theoretical systems within which the research in question is devel-
oped. This range of information is relevant to any research intended to study and under-
stand whether a given concept and the practical and theoretical processes within which it is 
applied have any transdisciplinary potential. On the other hand, the investigation of the use 
of space and gestures help us understand the attitude adopted by the participants in their 
exchanges with colleagues often working in very different areas of research. 
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3. Words: Terms, Notions, Definitions 
3.1 Words Used to Encircle the Concept of Model and Practice of 
Modelling 
In this section we provide a list and a visualization of the words used by the 
participants to encircle the concepts of model and modelling. The terms were 
gathered not just from the explicit definitions provided by speakers, but also 
from the discourse(s) around those concepts with which the participants en-
gaged, both in their own talks and in the discussion that followed. We attempt-
ed to represent and freeze the metalinguistic activity around these two terms, 
by means of which the participants delimited their meanings in their own field 
of research (see Figure 1). 
- Willard McCarty: Ontology; Given versus constructed naturality; Cogni-
tion; Simulation; Slippery; Wherever; Whoever; Continuously; Recur-
sively. 
- Nina Bonderup Dohn: Metaphor; Resemblance; Analogy; Concreteness; 
Epistemology; Ontology. 
- Barbara Tversky: Diagram; Mark; Schema; Action; Element; Spraction; 
Map; Relations; Proximity; Directionality; Abstractness. 
- Christina Ljungberg: Icon/Diagrammatic Icon; Analogy; Visuality; Map; 
Similarity; Mental model; Mental image. 
- Rens Bod: Pattern; Principles; Formalization. 
- Fotis Jannidis: Pattern; Theory; Schema; Function; Hypothesis; Indica-
tors; Context; Representation; Operationalization; Function; Handle in-
formation; Definitions (“The only true definition”); Indicators. 
- Oliver Nakoinz: Network; Purpose; Practice; Simulation; Deduction; In-
duction; Artifact; Conceptual Framework; 3D, Simulation; Typology; 
Comprehensiveness; Predictiveness; Efficiency; Accuracy; Mapping; 
Pragmatism; Representation; Analogy; Hidden assumptions. 
- Gunnar Olsson: Index; Icon; Symbol; Sign; (Communicable) Identi-
ties/Differences; Association, Geometric; Maps. 
- Claas Lattmann: Sign (Index; Icon; Symbol); Similarity (Icons: Diagram, 
Image; Metaphor); Representation; Potentiality; Structure; Relation; Ob-
ject; Transfer knowledge; Image (models); Reasoning; Creativity; Acces-
sibility; Explorability; Verification; Analogy; Syntactical attributes. 
- Giorgio Fotia: Reduction; Abstraction; Combination; Approximation. 
- Paul Fishwick: Design; Manipulation; Information; Artifact; Sequences; 
Mathematics; Computing. 
- Günther Görz: Knowledge; Representation of empirical states; Structure; 
Operationalization; Transformation; Simulation. 
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- Francesca Tomasi: Ontology; Sharing; Common features; Pattern;
Thoughts structure; Standards; Interpretation; Point of view.
Figure 1:  Network Diagram for the Terms Used to Encircle Model and 
Modelling. Dashed Lines indicate Similar or Related Terms 
2.2  Metaphors Employed to Conceptualize the Contents 
Far from being merely figures of speech or stylistic decorations, metaphors can 
be considered as fundamental cognitive schemes deeply embedded and strong-
ly effective in human cognition and communication.3 In this section we present 
the metaphors used by the participants both for vehiculating their understand-
ing of the concepts and communicating its content in a convincing way.  
1) Willard McCarty: Cosmological reconfiguration; Decolonization of
thought; Machine as actor and machine’s perspective; Telescope;
“Computer [is like] a myriad of servants”; “Simulation [is like] let
modelling go loose”; Error log, the illusion of perfect machine.
3  Since the late nineteen-seventies significant work has been done in the field of metaphor 
research, both empirical and theoretical, that we cannot address here. A comprehensive 
overview can be found in Gibbs (2008). 
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2) Nina Bonderup Dohn: Models are grounded on the “Seeing as” meta-
phor; Metaphor of “lens” and “light”; “Learning as acquisition”4 that 
means that knowledge is an object and mind is a box; “Learning as 
participation” that implies that knowledge is distributed, knowing is 
participating, the learning norms, values and ways of acting and 
communicating; Exploration. 
3) Christina Ljungberg: Iconicity as a bridge between language and feel-
ing. 
4) Rens Bod: Metaphorical interpretation of concepts such as procedure, 
grammar, tree, pattern, structure, principle; “You’re sitting next to 
them (the humanities) and try to find out what they’re doing”. 
5) Oliver Nakoinz: Models are conceptual frameworks for handling 
knowledge. 
6) Gunnar Olsson: Mappa Mundi Universalis/tetrahedron; “bouncing be-
tween the three walls”; Trajectories, points and lines and plains; 
“Cave wall”; Divided line; Magic trick. 
7) Giorgio Fotia: Productive metaphors to describe modelling one may 
want to reflect upon: approximation; scale (of models); (models) het-
erogeneity; (model) reduction. 
8) Paul Fishwick: Barometer; See an object through the information lens. 
9) Günther Görz: Tree of knowledge. 
10) Francesca Tomasi: multiple lens; sharing is marrying. 
As it emerges from this schematic list, the most frequent metaphor employed to 
explain how the concept of model and the practice of modelling are conceived 
is the cognitive one “to know is to see”. This specific metaphorical understand-
ing also emerges from the list of words used to encircle the concept of model, 
among which “knowledge” and “image” are two of the most frequent terms 
(see § 3.1). According to this metaphor, modelling is a practice that allows us 
to look at (to think upon, interpret, represent) an object of knowledge, while a 
model is, at the same time, both an heuristic tool (lens) by means of which an 
object is re-described and a result of the process of redescription, a starting 
point for a new interpretation of the object itself. 
3.3  Defining Model and Modelling 
In this section we provide a synthesis of the various, more or less explicit, 
definitions of model and modelling proposed by the participants in the work-
shop. Defining something implies a theoretical effort to clarify the meanings 
given to a term and, simultaneously, the scholarly and/or scientific content the 
speaker aims to vehiculate by means of the term itself. 
                                                             
4  This metaphor has been taken from Sfard (1998). See Bonderup Dohn’s paper (2018, in this 
HSR Supplement). 
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The goal of this exercise is not to create new definitions, but to find out if a 
common conceptual core can be identified and where the two concepts are 
positioned along the theory-practice axis. 
In order to achieve these objectives, we analyze the definitions according to 
the approach of the “intensional definition”. This kind of definition lays on the 
distinction between the definiendum, namely the concept or object to be de-
fined; the genus, that is the category or the set the definiendum belongs to; and 
the differentiae, or the attributes that distinguish a definiendum from other 
definienda belonging to the same genus.5 
It is worth noting that this activity is conducted on the basis of a semasiolog-
ical analysis which, by taking into account the various uses of the terms, aims 
to circumscribe the meaning(s) given to them by scholars, in our case those 
involved in the workshop. 
Another clarification is important: this kind of work is usually done in rela-
tion to a specific discipline, where each term is systematically described and 
defined in relation to other terms belonging to the same technical vocabulary 
and especially in relation to the terms used to define it. However, the workshop 
we applied our analysis to was conceived as an interdisciplinary discussion. 
This should imply a reflection (that we cannot undertake here) on the technical 
lexicons of each discipline in order to understand if, for example, the meanings 
given to the terms chosen as genera are shared among the interdisciplinary 
community and, consequently, to assess whether there is a theoretical frame-
work shared among different research areas. 
Building a cross-disciplinary lexicon would be a crucial step in laying the 
foundations of a common discourse around model and modelling. The termino-
logical analysis shown on the following pages can be considered as a first, 
albeit limited, “attempt” in this direction. 
1) Nina Bonderup Dohn 
a) A model is “an instrument of redescription […] the model is essentially a 
heuristic instrument that seeks, by means of fiction, to break down an in-
adequate interpretation and to lay the way for a new, more adequate in-
terpretation”6. 
b) Models are instruments for configuration and reconfiguration. 
DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
model(s) Instrument(s) 
redescription; seeks to break 
down an inadequate inter-
pretation; for configuration 
and reconfiguration 
 
                                                             
5  See, on this approach, A. Brahaj, M. Razum and J. Hoxha (2013). 
6  This definition is borrowed from Ricoeur (1975/2003). See Bonderup Dohn’s paper (2018, in 
this HSR Supplement). 
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2) Barbara Tversky
a) A model is a thinking tool.
DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
model tool thinking
3) Rens Bod
a) Formalizing or fleshing out the relation between patterns and principles is
what I call modelling.
b) Modelling is a form of reasoning.
DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
Modelling formalizing; fleshing out relations between patterns and principles 
Modelling form reasoning
4) Fotis Jannidis
a) A model is a representation of something by someone for some purpose at
a specific point in time.
b) It is a representation which concentrates on some aspects – features and
their relations – and disregards others.
DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
model representation
of something by someone for 
some purpose at a specific 
point in time; 
concentrates on some aspects 
and disregards others 
5) Oliver Nakoinz
a) A model is a simplified mapping for a special purpose7.
DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
model mapping for special purpose 
6) Claas Lattmann
a) Models are iconic signs (images, metaphors, diagrams).
b) Every model is a sign and, hence, represents something.
c) Modelling, therefore, is an act of representation. Modelling per se is
inherently practical, that is, as being the production of a specific model.
d) Modelling is the practical particular actualization of an abstract general
theory.
7  This definition is taken from Stachowiak (1973). See Nakoinz’s paper (2018, in this HSR 
Supplement). 
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DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
Models sign iconic 
Modelling act of representation 
Modelling production of a specific model 
Modelling actualization of an abstract theory 
 
7) Paul Fishwick 
a) Modelling represents the activity of designing, manipulating, and testing 
models. 
b) Models can be considered to be information representations of our world 
– they are ways of physically encoding information using a specific tech-
nology, with associated analogies and metaphors. 
c) Models are viewed as artifacts that we create to understand other artifacts. 
DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
Modelling activity of designing, manipulating, testing models 
Models representations of our world 
Models ways of physically encoding infor-mation 
Models artifacts created to understand other artifacts 
 
8)  Francesca Tomasi 
a) Model is, firstly, a question of extracting properties of an object as a 
result of an interpretation. 
b) Model is also a matter of language. And a formal language, from a com-
putational point of view, is a question of data structure and abstract data 
types: i.e. graph (the network), tree (a hierarchy), table (a relation), se-
quence (a list). 
c) Model is the conceptual framework (in the field of ontology design). 
d) Model as a conversion method. 
e) Model is also a question of interface. 
f) Models are a guideline; models are the representations of a domain. 
g) Models are a visual and iconic abstraction. 
h) Modelling activity is the choice of the features of the observed reality 
(e.g. an object in a domain) to be formally represented (the abstract mod-
el). 
i) Modelling means in fact also to identify common features of a collection 
or extracting those patterns that could be recognized in similar resources. 
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DEFINIENDUM GENUS DIFFERENTIA 
model question extracting properties; interface 
model matter formal language 
model conceptual framework  
model method conversion 
models guidelines  
models representations domain 
models abstraction iconic and visual 
modelling choice of the features of the ob-served reality 
modelling identify common features of a collec-tion 
modelling extracting patterns 
 
If we group the genera extracted from the definitions, we see that they can be 
correlated with some general concepts. Concerning model(s), these concepts 
are: cognitive instrument (instrument, thinking tool); icon (iconic sign, iconic 
and visual abstraction); representation (representation, mapping); artifact; 
method (ways, guidelines, question, matter, conceptual framework). With 
respect to modelling, we can group these dynamic concepts: form (formalizing, 
form); action (act, production, actualization, activity); selection (choice, identi-
fying, extracting). 
This partial result confirms that the workshop’s speakers link the two con-
cepts both to practical and theoretical dimensions, with a significant remark: 
modelling is defined by the majority of the participants as an activity, an actu-
alization, a production, an act; the concept is positioned on the practical side of 
the theory-praxis axis. In contrast “model”, although conceived of as an artifact 
or even a concrete (visual, perceptible) representation, is mainly positioned on 
the side of theory, as for example as an abstraction, a framework, or a sign 
(although grounded in reality).8 This distinction was kept as a common and 
shared conceptual framework in the discussion. 
It is obvious that this preliminary analysis should be expanded, applied to a 
more consistent and representative corpus and, moreover, should also include 
the attributes ascribable to the differentiae. A tentative reflection on the latter 
suggest that the differentiae are linked to the following concepts: purpose, 
                                                             
8  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in defining “model”, two quasi-synonyms, namely 
“tool” and “instruments”, are used in a metaphorical sense: a model in these cases is seen as 
a cognitive object useful to do things such as thinking, describing, interpreting. “Modelling” 
is also defined as a way of giving a form to patterns, so as a rather abstract and theoretical 
process. 
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aspect, information and feature, but a deeper and more extensive study is need-
ed.  
4.  Diagrammatical Visualizations
As part of the research for the project Modelling in Digital Humanities, Nils 
Geißler charted and visualized models of text in the course of a case study 
concerned with visually translating definitions of modelling. It would have 
been an obvious approach to use established standards such as UML, ERM or 
OWL as a basis for this experiment, since they are well supported by software 
that facilitates graphical design processing or conceptual processes that can 
lead to automatically translated visualizations.9 Yet we decided to manually 
draw diagrams to visualize the terms and their relations given by the work-
shop’s participants to avoid possible assumptions and limitations entailed by 
the abovementioned standards.10 
The aim of the study at hand is to visualize definitions (or models) of mod-
els that make them easy to compare and understand by readers without a deeper 
knowledge of specialized modelling languages. The goal is to provide illustra-
tions that show the unique features and perspectives of a certain model or way 
of modelling and the (more) general, common features shared by other models. 
It also aims to draw out structures that can be found in different modelling 
strategies in order to emphasize what is specific to each of them.  
These diagrammatical visualizations express an attempt to show the unique 
features of each approach towards modelling. However, this is done not in a 
purely textual form but by using a visual language that we hope is self-
explanatory to the viewer. 
These visual expressions are accompanied and mirrored by the quotes that 
were originally given by the workshop participants when defining models and 
modelling. Thus the diagrammatical visualizations are not arbitrary, but rather 
connected to and grounded in textual foundations. 
We picked a total of seven diagrammatical visualizations (see figure 2 to 8) 
to present in this article. Figure 3 and 4, and figure 5 and 6, are pairs showing 
alternative visualizations of the same definitions, where each alternative em-
phasizes a different aspect. Further explanations are given in the captions of the 
figures. With the exception of figure 2, all the visualizations replicate the dis-
tinction between modeller, model and modelled,11 in order to give the read-
er/viewer reference points for comparison. 
9  See OMG (2017), W3C (2012), and Silberschatz et al. (2011) for further reading. 
10  The dangers of using standards in modelling are pointed out by Eide (2015) on page 60. 
11  On this distinction see Ciula and Marras (2016) and Kralemann and Lattmann (2013). 
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5.  Conclusion
In this paper we illustrated the observational activity carried out during the 
workshop and some of its results. In the introduction we explained the criteria 
used for drawing up the observation grid, the tool employed in order to gather 
the data and the information needed to develop our reflections. Then we pre-
sented a list of words used to encircle the notions of model and modelling, 
followed by an analysis of the metaphors adopted in the processes of conceptu-
alizing and communicating the research presented during the workshop. Final-
ly, a list of explicit definitions was analyzed and presented together with the 
visualizations of the data extracted from each talk. 
The central point of this work is twofold: it enabled us to reflect on the in-
formation collected in relation to the theoretical and practical frameworks 
emerging from the talks at the workshop and is useful for the development of 
the research that we are pursuing through the project Modelling between Digi-
tal and Humanities: Thinking in Practice. In our opinion the terms variously 
related to model and modelling, the metaphors employed, and the definitions 
adopted or formulated by the participants constitute important resources for 
understanding how the notion of model and the process of modelling are con-
ceived and positioned along the theory-praxis axis. Moreover, these elements 
helped us to reflect upon the possibility of identifying a shared conceptual core 
for the two notions that is used in several disciplines. 
Working on the diagrammatical visualizations and discussing the different 
alternatives to drawing certain statements reconfirmed the propositions brought 
forward by the participants’ statements. We can understand those visualizations 
as “[m]odels [that] are viewed as artifacts that we create to understand other 
artifacts” (7c), because “[m]odel is, firstly, a question of extracting properties 
of an object as a result of an interpretation” (8a) and “[m]odels are a visual and 
iconic abstraction” (8g). 
Our analysis is preliminary and surely in need of enhancement, particularly 
with regard to the non-linguistic data. Nevertheless, the approach is valuable in 
itself in that it allowed us to examine the various ways in which participants 
from different fields of research engage in modelling, and to highlight some 
interesting convergences of perspectives around this concept and practice. 
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The Discourse about Modelling: Some  
Observations from the Outside 
Tessa Gengnagel ∗ 
Abstract: »Einige außenperspektivische Anmerkungen zum Modellierungsdis-
kurs«. This article presents some observations about the modelling discourse in 
the Digital Humanities from the perspective of an early stage researcher. It 
touches briefly on issues of interdisciplinarity and disciplinary discontinuity. 
Specifically, it questions the shared basis of the discourse in terms of the ter-
minology that is used and the research literature that is commonly drawn up-
on. By way of example, the article calls attention to the seemingly forgotten 
and in any case neglected literature concerned with the conceptualization of 
models and modelling in science and the humanities that was produced by cy-
berneticists and philosophers of science in the GDR and the USSR, especially in 
the 1960s and 1970s. It may be argued that in order to advance the discourse 
about modelling in the Digital Humanities, the discourse about modelling in 
the humanities would have to be unearthed and considered first or at least as 
well, particularly where it already crossed paths with disciplines adjacent to 
computing. 
Keywords: Interdisciplinarity, digital humanities, modelling. 
1.  Introduction 
This article will not be about modelling. It will be about the discourse about 
modelling, as embodied in the workshop that spawned this HSR Supplement. I 
use “discourse” in a general sense of “conversation” here and not to evoke 
Foucault. 
Since this contribution calls for an impression of my personal observation of 
the event, three qualifications need to be made: my interest in the topic paral-
lels the work on my yet-to-be-finished PhD thesis, my involvement in the field 
as such is fairly recent – from a historical point of view – and my participation 
in the event was passive in nature. This will therefore amount to a short evalua-
tion from the outside perspective of an early stage researcher. 
Having said that, I want to focus on three issues: 
1) Interdisciplinarity 
                                                             
∗  Tessa Gengnagel, Cologne Center for eHumanities (CCeH) / a.r.t.e.s Graduate School, Univer-
sitätsstraße 22, 50931 Cologne, Germany; tessa.gengnagel@uni-koeln.de. 
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2) History
3) Consequences
2. Interdisciplinarity
The Digital Humanities are, per definitionem, an interdisciplinary field of study. 
This means that the practitioners draw their scholarly inspiration from varying 
backgrounds. One of the questions that needs to be asked, then, is how the Digital 
Humanities arrive at solutions that genuinely fit an inquiry specific to the Digital 
Humanities. The process required for this seems to be one of synergy and therein 
lies the importance of a workshop such as the one under review here. 
Interdisciplinarity poses a chance and a problem. It offers a wide breadth of 
methodological and theoretical underpinnings while at the same time running the 
risk of drifting around aimlessly, with no one to take the helm. Or, as Gunnar Ols-
son put it in the closing discussion: “On the high seas there are no maps because 
there are no fix points.” 
This introduces an important aspect of navigational difficulty. The question is 
not just who guides. The question is also what to use as guidance. 
I reference the metaphor of the exploring seafarer in this context because it was 
used during the workshop, building on Willard McCarty’s introduction of the topic 
into the Digital Humanities discourse with his essay “Tree, Turf, Centre, Archipela-
go – or Wild Acre? Metaphors and Stories for Humanities Computing” (McCarty 
2006). The exercises employed during the workshop first asked the participants to 
position themselves on an imaginary ship, then what direction their compass would 
be pointing, and later whether to explore an island or sail to new destinations. Thus, 
the approach taken to the process of synergy was one of individual introspection 
but, more importantly, collective sourcing. 
Much is made of the collaborative nature of the Digital Humanities in contrast to 
the traditional humanities in which a single scholar may carry out his or her work in 
the proverbial quiet little chamber (from the German expression “im stillen 
Kämmerlein”). It might be a side effect of the practice-orientation of the Digital 
Humanities or one of its enabling foundations. Either way, what struck me during 
the workshop was that the benefits of this reality might have their limits when it 
comes to epistemological considerations. Ideas need to be shared in a communal 
space; especially in academia, where the torch continually passes from one hand to 
another. But there also needs to be a common ground with a common terminology. 
I feel like this is the stage that we are at right now: trying to ascertain a shared 
language and a shared understanding of a concept. 
As Nelson Goodman wrote in his Languages of Art:  
Few terms are used in popular and scientific discourse more promiscuously 
than ‘model’. A model is something to be admired or emulated, a pattern, a 
case in point, a type, a prototype, a specimen, a mock-up, a mathematical de-
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scription–almost anything from a naked blonde to a quadratic equation–and 
may bear to what it models almost any relation of symbolization. (Goodman 
1976, 171) 
He finds the use of the term so ubiquitous and its meaning so vague that he suggests 
that it should be “dispensed with [...] in favour of less ambiguous and more in-
formative terms.” (Goodman 1976, 172) 
Trying to tackle the issue from a semiotic point of view might not be particularly 
enlightening then. In the Digital Humanities, the need for discussion arises from the 
computational use of the terms “model” and “modelling”, as well as the narrow 
focus on “data modelling”. Part of the raison d’être for the workshop and the pro-
ject behind it is, I surmise, the recognition that this scope needs to be widened if 
there is to be progress towards a better understanding of what scientific models are 
and what they mean in the context of the humanities. This is still tied to the ques-
tion of computability: in a data model, there is always a conceptual model implied 
and a data model can be improved when the fundamental step of conceptually 
modelling objects of study from the humanities is explicitly examined. 
While there were experts from the fields of Computer Science and Mathematics 
present at the workshop, juxtaposed with representatives from fields such as Geog-
raphy, Semiotic Literary Studies, Psychology and Archaeology, I wish that this 
point had been made clearer. Why are the Digital Humanities interested in model-
ling beyond the question of data modelling and what are they specifically interested 
in? Conceptual modelling would be my answer. 
For this, it might have been helpful to take a closer look at conceptual models in 
the humanities, rather than discussing topics such as iconicity, where the debate 
seemed to oscillate between the visual representation of models (as in the form of 
graphs) – and why this is necessary for our comprehension of the world – and our 
visual comprehension of the world and why that is necessary to formulate models. 
In one of the sessions Rens Bod rightfully pointed out that examples of models 
from the humanities were strangely missing from many presentations, even though 
they exist (e.g. in the case of stemmatology).  
Perhaps the question is not so much how we model but what we model. The 
former follows from the latter. 
3. History 
I will keep this point short. Still, I wanted to draw attention to the historical 
perspective that is often missing from the discourse. Rens Bod provided a very 
valuable look at the history of the humanities (Bod 2018, in this issue). One 
aspect that I would like to emphasize, however, is that there appears to be a 
wealth of epistemological writings about “models” as a concept in the Philoso-
phy of Science that has yet to be fully unearthed. In my research, I found a 
number of books and articles that I deem highly relevant to the current debate 
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in the Digital Humanities. They were written in the 1960s and 1970s by cyber-
neticists and philosophers in the GDR and USSR (e.g. Stachowiak 1972, 1973; 
Štoff 1966). I understand, of course, why they were not read or reviewed on the 
other side of the Iron Curtain but at least German researchers will still come 
across them very easily nowadays. They include attempts to classify models 
across science and the humanities. These classification attempts seem almost 
more advanced than anything under discussion today. That they were devel-
oped in the field of cybernetics which is not en vogue any longer but shares 
some significant overlap with the Digital Humanities as a transdisciplinary 
study concerned with the workings of both man and machine is probably not a 
coincidence.  
Similarly, there are excellent contributions to the topic of models in the hu-
manities out there, such as from the hermeneuticist and historian Gordon Leff, 
who wrote about Models inherent in History around the same time (Leff 1972). 
While there is certainly more literature available on “models in science”, in-
cluding dedicated encyclopedia articles (e.g. Frigg and Hartmann 2017), that 
should not obscure the view. If there is something quite specifically relevant to 
the issue at hand out there, it should take precedence over oft-quoted but mar-
ginally related classics and finding it should be the first task of anyone investi-
gating the topic from a particular angle – in this case, that of the Digital Hu-
manities. 
4.  Consequences 
Which brings me back to what I stated earlier. How far does a collective effort 
to understand the topic at hand carry towards synergy? I think it is an important 
step in sampling the interdisciplinary status quo – however, only in respect to 
certain disciplines, given that the experience and the knowledge from a field 
like cybernetics will be absent (or present) based on the visibility of the disci-
pline itself, not its value for the debate. This is why I am always in favor of 
featuring more historians. Of course, one would have to find one who special-
izes in this area first. That might be one of the biggest obstacles facing the 
Digital Humanities nowadays: The discontinuity of disciplinary tradition. 
Secondly, the workshop was highly stimulating intellectually and proved, in 
my opinion, that the discourse needs not so much widening at this point but 
sharpening. Primarily in two directions: What types of models exist in the 
humanities; why and how are they used (even if implicitly)? And how is this 
relevant for the Digital Humanities, theoretically and practically?  
Answering these questions requires a single line of argumentation, one that I 
am eager to see established as a result of the workshop.  
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Arianna Ciula, Øyvind Eide, Cristina Marras & Patrick Sahle 
(Eds.): Models and Modelling between Digital and Humanities – 
A Multidisciplinary Perspective.
This Supplement of Historical Social Research stems from the 
contributions on the topic of modelling presented at the workshop 
“Thinking in Practice”, held at Wahn Manor House in Cologne on 
January 19-20, 2017. With Digital Humanities as starting point, 
practical examples of model building from different disciplines are 
considered, with the aim of contributing to the dialogue on modelling 
from several perspectives. Combined with theoretical considerations, 
this collection illustrates how the process of modelling is one of 
coming to know, in which the purpose of each modelling activity 
and the form in which models are expressed has to be taken into 
consideration in tandem. 
The modelling processes presented in this volume belong to 
specific traditions of scholarly and practical thinking as well as 
to specific contexts of production and use of models. The claim 
that supported the project workshop was indeed that establishing 
connections between different traditions of and approaches toward 
modelling is vital, whether these connections are complementary or 
intersectional. The workshop proceedings address an underpinning 
goal of the research project itself, namely that of examining the 
nature of the epistemological questions in the different traditions 
and how they relate to the nature of the modelled objects and the 
models being created. This collection is an attempt to move beyond 
simple representational views on modelling in order to understand 
modelling processes as scholarly and cultural phenomena as such.
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